FRANK AND BRENDA BARNES, APPELLANTS,
v.
CAMDEN REALTY, INC., APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1991-04-09
No. 90-2296
NIMMONS, BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur.
578 So. 2d 20 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

The appellate court reversed a declaratory judgment, finding that a lower court improperly granted summary judgment. The case involved whether proceeds from a voluntary sale of homestead property were protected by homestead exemptions, a determination that required resolving disputed factual issues.


Holding

The court held that the determination of whether homestead exemption provisions apply to proceeds from a voluntary sale of homestead property, based on the seller's good faith intent to reinvest, is a factual issue. Therefore, summary judgment was inappropriate.


Headnotes

[1] Summary judgment is precluded when the resolution of a disputed issue of material fact is required.

[2] Homestead exemption provisions of the Florida Constitution may apply to proceeds from a voluntary sale of homestead property if the seller demonstrates a good faith inten…

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Key Quotes

“In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the funds in escrow are not protected by the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Florida relating to homestead exemptions.”

Describes the lower court's initial ruling that is being appealed.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellants sold their home, which had a lien from a prior judgment against them. To complete the sale, they placed a portion of the proceeds in escrow…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

The appellants appeal from a declaratory judgment which was entered upon the parties’ motions for summary judgment, and which established that the appellee is entitled to funds placed in escrow by the appellants. In reaching this conclusion, the court determined that the funds in escrow are not protected by the provisions of the Constitution of the State of Florida relating to homestead exemptions.. We find that this determination involved the resolution of a disputed issue of material fact, so as to preclude a summary judgment. We therefore reverse the declaratory judgment and remand for further proceedings.

When the appellants sold their home, a lien in connection with a previously recorded judgment for the appellee appeared as a cloud on the appellants’ title to the property. In order to consummate the sale, the appellants placed a portion of the proceeds in escrow, subject to a judicial determination regarding entitlement to these funds. The appellants then sought a declaratory judgment, asserting that the funds are protected under the provisions of Article X, Section 4 of the state constitution, relating to homestead exemptions. In Orange Brevard Plumbing & Heating Co. v. La Croix, 137 So. 2d 201 (Fla.1962), it was established that the provisions of the state constitution relating to homestead exemptions may apply to proceeds from a voluntary sale of homestead property if it is shown that the sale was made with a good faith intent to reinvest the proceeds in another homestead within a reasonable amount of time. The existence of such good faith intent is essentially a factual issue, which the parties contested in the present case. It was inappropriate for the court to resolve this disputed issue of material fact by the process of summary judgment. See Boman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 505 So. 2d 445 (Fla. 1st DCA), rev. den. 509 So. 2d 1119 (Fla.1987); Strickland v. Progressive American Ins. Co., 468 So. 2d 525 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985).

The declaratory judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.

NIMMONS, BARFIELD and ALLEN, JJ., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Lees v. Pierce, 648 So. 2d 839 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)
    …ierce’s good faith.3 Good faith is generally an issue of fact which precludes summary judgment. Lassiter v. Resolution Trust Corp., 610 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Snow v. Byron, 580 So. 2d 238 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Barnes v. Camden Realty, Inc., 578 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Bruce v. O’Neill, 445 So. 2d 379 (Fla. 4th DCA 1984); Brickell v. Hollywood, Inc., 436 So. 2d 276 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983); Pledger v. Burnup & Sims, Inc., 432 So. 2d 1323 (Fla. 4th 1983). The burden of proof to show that there are n…
  • Jebailey v. Watsky & Co., 676 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996)
    …r debtors for mortgage payments on a new homestead, but were not able to carry out that intent due to judgment creditor’s garnishment, judgment debtors had a “reasonable time” to reinvest proceeds into new homestead). Barnes v. Camden Realty, Inc., 578 So. 2d 20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), is directly on point. In Barnes, the home sellers filed a declaratory action seeking a determination that proceeds from the sale of their home were exempt from a judgment creditor’s lien. The trial court entered summary judgemen…

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