VICTORIA LONG, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1991-04-24
No. 88-02328
SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur.
578 So. 2d 288 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

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Synopsis

Victoria Long appealed her convictions for racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, living from earnings of prostitution, and keeping a house of ill fame. The court affirmed her convictions for racketeering, conspiracy, and living off earnings, but reversed her conviction for keeping a house of ill fame because the statute was unconstitutionally vague under Warren v. State. The court remanded for entry of judgment on the lesser included offense of keeping a house of prostitution and resentencing.


Holding

The court affirmed Long's convictions for racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, and living from earnings of prostitution as supported by sufficient evidence. However, the court reversed her conviction for keeping a house of ill fame because the statute was unconstitutionally vague under Warren v. State, and instead directed entry of judgment for the lesser included offense of keeping a house of prostitution under section 796.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes.


Headnotes

[1] A conviction for keeping a house of ill fame must be reversed when the statute under which it was obtained has been declared unconstitutionally vague.

[2] A court may direct the entry of judgment for a lesser included offense when the evidence supports it and the original conviction is reversed.

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Key Quotes

“our supreme court overturned the ill fame statute as unconstitutionally vague”

Establishes the constitutional defect requiring reversal of the house of ill fame conviction

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Facts & Procedural History

Victoria Long was convicted of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, living from earnings of prostitution, and keeping a house of ill fame.…

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Opinion of the Court
HALL, Judge.

HALL, Judge.

Victoria Long contends the trial court erred in denying her motions for judgment of acquittal and a new trial on charges of racketeering, conspiracy to commit racketeering, living from earnings of prostitution, and keeping a house of ill fame. She contends the evidence was insufficient to support her convictions.1 We find no merit in her contentions and sustain her convictions on racketeering, conspiracy, and living off earnings. We reverse, however, Long’s conviction for keeping a house of ill fame.

As we stated in Wolfe v. State, 576 So. 2d 915 (Fla.2d DCA, 1991), our supreme court overturned the ill fame statute as unconstitutionally vague. See Warren v. State, 572 So. 2d 1376 (Fla.1991). Warren v. State reversed earlier supreme court and district court of appeal decisions interpreting the ill fame statute as constitutional. Since the Warren opinion had not yet been filed at the time of Long’s conviction, the trial court did not have the benefit of that decision.

Though Long’s conviction and sentence for keeping a house of ill fame must be reversed, we find the evidence adduced at trial was sufficient to establish Long’s guilt for the lesser included offense of keeping a house of prostitution under section 796.07(2)(a), Florida Statutes (1987). See Wolfe v. State. As we are authorized to do under section 924.34, Florida Statutes (1987), we direct the trial court to enter judgment for the lesser included offense and to resentence Long accordingly.

Because we are setting aside one conviction while allowing the others to stand, the presumptive sentence under the guidelines could change. Therefore, a new scoresheet must be prepared for all of Long’s convictions. If the scoresheet reflects a change in the presumptive sentence, Long must be resentenced on all convictions.

Accordingly, this case is reversed and remanded with directions consistent with this opinion.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. . Herman Lamar Golden, James Jerome Wolfe, and Victoria Long were codefendants in the proceeding below. Golden’s and Wolfe’s appeals were considered separately in case nos. 88-01961 and 88-01962, respectively.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Paige v. State, 641 So. 2d 179 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)
    …onally vague; however, evidence was sufficient to establish the defendant’s guilt for keeping a house of prostitution and so trial court was directed to enter judgment for this lesser included offense and to resentence the defendant); Long v. State, 578 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (same); Wolfe v. State, 576 So. 2d 915 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (same). The courts have also remanded for an adjudication of guilt on the lesser offense in such situations without reference to section 924.34. See Franklin v. State, 257…
  • Golden v. State, 578 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
    …, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J., concur. . Herman Lamar Golden, James Jerome Wolfe, and Victoria Long were codefendants in the proceeding below. Wolfe’s and Long’s appeals were considered separately in case nos. 88-01962, 576 So. 2d 915, and 88-02328, 578 So. 2d 288, respectively.…

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