ROBERT SMITH AND MICHAEL PATTERSON, APPELLANTS,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Robert Smith and Michael Patterson appealed their convictions for trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic in cocaine. The Florida Third District Court of Appeal reversed and remanded for a new trial, finding that the trial court erred in denying a continuance when a critical codefendant witness became available only after jury selection, and in failing to reduce the trafficking charge to attempted trafficking based on the evidence presented in a reverse-sting operation.
The trial court erred in both respects. First, the defendants were severely prejudiced by the lack of adequate time to depose and investigate Monroe and could not obtain a written deposition for cross-examination. Second, the trafficking charge should have been reduced to attempted trafficking because the defendants had not yet assumed legal possession of the cocaine at the time of arrest; temporary inspection does not constitute legal possession.
[1] A trial court errs in denying a motion for continuance when a codefendant who will testify against the defendant enters a plea bargain after the jury has been selected an…
[2] Insufficient time to depose a witness and obtain a transcribed deposition for impeachment purposes can severely prejudice a defendant.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the defendants were severely prejudiced because (1) they had insufficient time to depose or investigate Monroe and did not have the benefit of a written deposition with which to cross-examine him, an absolute essential in order to impeach the witness by his prior testimony”
Establishes the prejudice from denying the continuance motion and the critical importance of a written deposition for cross-examination.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceSmith and Patterson were arrested during a reverse-sting operation in which undercover police officers were selling cocaine to them. At the time of ar…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Reverse Sting Operation cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal by the defendants Robert Smith and Michael Patterson from judgments of conviction for (1) trafficking in cocaine, and (2) conspiracy to traffic in cocaine, based on an adverse jury verdict. We reverse and remand for a new trial.
First, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for a continuance when the state announced, after the jury had been selected and sworn, that a codefendant, Bobby Monroe, had entered into a plea bargain with the state and would be testifying as a state witness. Although the defendants were allowed to depose Monroe the next day after opening statements had been made and several state witnesses had testified, the deposition could not be completed and the incomplete deposition could not be transcribed before the state called Monroe as a witness. In our view, the defendants were severely prejudiced because (1) they had insufficient time to depose or investigate Monroe and did not have the benefit of a written deposition with which to cross-examine him, an absolute essential in order to impeach the witness by his prior testimony; and (2) Monroe gave devastating, non-cumulative testimony in this case concerning an agreement made among the defendants in North Carolina to come to Miami and purchase a quantity of cocaine, testimony which could not have failed to have had a decisive impact on the jury. At the very least, the trial court should have allowed the defendants a brief recess of a few days to allow them to conduct a complete deposition of Monroe and have the transcript of same prepared for their study before pressing forward with opening statements and testimony in the case; indeed, the state below commendably requested the trial court to do substantially just that “to protect the record,” (T. 32), but the trial court declined. Given these circumstances, the convictions herein must be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. See, e.g., Smith v. State, 525 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983), disapproved on other grounds, Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla.1985); Anderson v. State, 314 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 21 (Fla.1976).
Second, we conclude that the trial court erred in denying the defendants’ motion for judgment of acquittal on the drug trafficking charge in that said charge should have been reduced to attempted drug trafficking. This is so because the evidence adduced below established that, in this “reverse-sting” operation, the defendants had not yet assumed legal possession of the illicit drugs which the undercover police officers were in the process of selling to them before the arrests were effected. At the time of such arrests, the defendant Patterson was inspecting the cocaine for testing purposes and no money had actually changed hands; temporary, preliminary inspection does not, as urged, constitute legal possession of such drugs for purposes of convicting the defendants of drug trafficking. Accordingly, the trial court should have reduced the subject charge to attempted drug trafficking. Garces v. State, 485 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986); see Roberts v. State, 505 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987); see also Campbell v. State, 577 So. 2d 932 (Fla.1991).
The final judgments of conviction under review are reversed and the cause is remanded to the trial court for a new trial on charges of (1) attempted drug trafficking, and (2) conspiracy to traffic in drugs.
Reversed and remanded.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Cook v. State, 595 So. 2d 994 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…own v. State, 426 So. 2d 76, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). A trial court’s restriction on defense counsel’s ability to prepare for an applicable defense constitutes an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of a defendant’s conviction. See Smith v. State, 578 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Smith v. State, 525 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988); Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d at 76; Anderson v. State, 314 So. 2d 803 (3d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 330 So. 2d 21 (Fla.1976). In Smith v. State, 578 So. 2d at 36, this court revers…
-
Bell v. State, 930 So. 2d 779 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006)…(Fla. 3d DCA 1992). When the State is allowed to produce witnesses at trial who constitute a considerable surprise to defendant, the defense should be afforded a reasonable continuance to take discovery depositions of such witnesses. Smith v. State, 578 So. 2d 366, 367 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). The State argues that any error in this regard is harmless. The harmless [*788] error standard used to assess the State’s discovery violation does not focus on whether the discovery violation would have made a difference in…
-
Digna Rose Medina v. State, 748 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…used its discretion in failing to grant the continuance until the deposition could be transcribed, and that it was highly prejudicial because the lack of the deposition precluded effective cross-examination of a key witness. See also Smith v. State, 578 So. 2d 366 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). We conclude that the trial court in the present case abused its discretion in not granting a continuance so that the deposition of Mrs. Gomez, a key witness, could be transcribed. As in Anderson, the lack of a transcript preclud…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Bundy v. State, 471 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1985)
- Brown v. State, 426 So. 2d 76 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Smith v. State, 525 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)
- Campbell v. State, 577 So. 2d 932 (Fla. 1991)
- Roberts v. State, 505 So. 2d 547 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987)
- Dade Drugs, Inc. v. H.S.I. Support Sys., Inc., 485 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- Garces v. State, 485 So. 2d 847 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Anderson v. State, 314 So. 2d 803 (Fla. 3d DCA 1975)