SIDNEY KRONHEIM AND RENEE JOYCE KRONHEIM, APPELLANTS,
v.
PH-7 TIFFANY CORP., APPELLEE
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The Kronheims exercised a right of first refusal in a lease to purchase property from PH-7 Tiffany Corp. The trial court granted specific performance but denied attorney's fees. The appellate court affirmed the specific performance relief but reversed the denial of attorney's fees, holding that the Kronheims as prevailing parties in the specific performance action were entitled to attorney's fees under the purchase agreement.
The Kronheims were entitled to specific performance relief ordering the defendant to convey the realty based on their valid exercise of the right of first refusal. The Kronheims, as prevailing parties in the specific performance action, were also entitled to attorney's fees under the purchase agreement, contrary to the trial court's denial of such fees.
[1] A party exercising a right of first refusal under a lease agreement assumes the rights of the third-party purchaser under the terms of the corresponding purchase agreemen…
[2] A prevailing party in a specific performance action to enforce a purchase agreement is entitled to an award of attorney's fees if the agreement provides for such fees.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“by exercising their right of first refusal contained in the lease, the plaintiffs assumed the third-party purchaser's rights under the terms of the purchase agreement herein with the defendant”
Establishes that exercise of the right of first refusal substituted the Kronheims into the third-party purchaser's position and contractual rights
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe Kronheims and PH-7 Tiffany Corp. were parties to a lease agreement that contained a right of first refusal. A third party offered to purchase real…
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PER CURIAM.
This is an appeal and cross appeal by the plaintiffs Sidney and Renee Kronheim and the defendant PH-7 Tiffany Corporation, respectively, from a final judgment entered after a non-jury trial in a specific performance action. The final judgment (1) grants the plaintiffs specific performance relief and orders the defendant to convey certain realty to the plaintiffs based on the latter’s exercise of a right of first refusal contained in a lease agreement between the parties, (2) declines, in effect, to award the plaintiffs any other relief, including attorney’s fees on the specific performance claim, and (3) denies the defendant any relief on its counterclaim. We affirm the final judgment under review, save for its denial of attorney’s fees for the plaintiffs.
First, we conclude that by exercising their right of first refusal contained in the lease, the plaintiffs assumed the third-party purchaser’s rights under the terms of the purchase agreement herein with the defendant — and that, accordingly, the plaintiffs were entitled to an award of attorney’s fees, as provided in the purchase agreement, because they were the prevailing parties in the specific performance action to enforce this agreement. Keys Lobster, Inc. v. Ocean Divers, Inc., 468 So. 2d 360, 363-64 (Fla. 3d DCA), rev. denied, 480 So. 2d 1295 (Fla.1985).
Second, we have carefully examined the balance of the points raised by both parties in this appeal and cross appeal and find that none of these points present reversible error. The final judgment under review is affirmed, save for the denial of attorney’s fees for the plaintiffs which is hereby reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with directions to award a reasonable attorney’s fee to the plaintiffs for successfully prosecuting the specific performance claim below.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part.
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