TWO M DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
JOHN W. MIKOS, PROPERTY APPRAISER OF SARASOTA COUNTY, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Two M Development Corporation challenged a property tax assessment by Sarasota County's Property Appraiser. The trial court initially ruled in Two M's favor, but after the Property Appraiser appealed and won on the issue of whether the property was substantially complete, the trial court then dismissed Two M's alternative claim for failure to comply with statutory assessment criteria as barred by the law of the case doctrine. The appellate court reversed, holding that the law of the case did not bar consideration of the statutory compliance claim because it was never previously decided.
The trial court erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction to consider Count II of Two M's complaint. The law of the case doctrine did not bar consideration of the statutory compliance claim because the appellate court's prior decision did not actually consider or decide that issue; it became moot once the court determined the units were correctly valued as substantially complete.
[1] The doctrine of the law of the case applies only to issues that were actually considered and decided on a former appeal.
[2] A prior appellate decision does not preclude a trial court from considering an issue not previously addressed in the same action.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The doctrine of the law of the case applies to issues that were actually considered and decided on a former appeal involving the same action.”
Establishes the foundational principle that the law of the case doctrine has strict limitations and applies only to issues previously decided.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceTwo M Development Corporation owned property consisting of twenty-four shell units in Sarasota County. In December 1986, Two M challenged the Property…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Tax Assessment cases and more on FLexlaw
SCHOONOVER, Chief Judge.
The appellant, Two M Development Corporation, challenges the trial court’s judgment determining that the court did not have jurisdiction to consider its claim that the appellee, John W. Mikos, Property Appraiser of Sarasota County, had improperly assessed its property. We reverse.
In December 1986, the appellant filed an action challenging the appellee’s tax assessment of its property consisting of twenty-four shell units. The appellant challenged the tax assessment on two grounds. Count I of the complaint alleged that the property was not substantially complete at the time of the assessment, and therefore, the assessment was improper and excessive. As to count II of the complaint, the appellant argued that if it were judicially determined that the property should be valued as substantially completed units, the assessment was still excessive and arbitrary because it failed to properly consider the statutory factors required by section 193.011, Florida Statutes (1985).
At the conclusion of a nonjury trial, the trial court entered a final judgment holding that the units were not substantially completed and ordered the appellee to reassess the property and treat it as unimproved property.
The appellee appealed the final judgment, and on June 30, 1989, in Mikos v. Two M Dev. Corp., 546 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), this court held that the appel-lee, appellant in that case, correctly assessed the property as substantially complete. The final judgment was reversed and the cause remanded with instructions to reinstate the tax assessment. The appellant’s motion for a rehearing was denied.
Subsequent to the issuance of our mandate in Mikos, the trial court entered two judgments in this matter. First, the court entered a judgment which vacated the original judgment in favor of the appellant and entered judgment in favor of the appellee. This judgment reinstated the original tax assessment. The court then entered an amended final judgment finding that it was without jurisdiction to consider the merits of count II of the appellant’s original complaint. The appellant filed timely notices of appeal from both judgments, and this court subsequently consolidated the appeals.
The doctrine of the law of the case applies to issues that were actually considered and decided on a former appeal involving the same action. Barry Hinnant, Inc. v. Spottswood, 481 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986). In this case, however, we were not asked to nor did we consider the question of the appellee’s compliance with the statutory criteria for assessment of property.
Furthermore, because we did not consider the question during the main appeal, we did not consider it on rehearing.
The trial court also did not consider this issue in the original proceeding. The issue became moot when the court determined that the units were incorrectly valued as substantially complete. Our prior opinion, therefore, did not prevent the trial court from considering the merits of count II of the appellant’s complaint. See Tri Par Land Dev. Corp. v. Henthorn, 241 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970); Harbour Club Condo No. Three, Inc. v. Sauder, 380 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980).
The trial court, therefore, erred by holding it lacked jurisdiction.
We, accordingly, reverse and remand with instructions to allow the appellant to proceed on count II of its complaint.
FRANK and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Fla. Dep't OF Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 101 (Fla. 2001)…e ease doctrine, this Court in U.S. Concrete, 437 So. 2d at 1063, explained that the doctrine is “limited to rulings on questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal.” (Emphasis supplied.) See also Two M. Dev. Corp. v. Mikos, 578 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). By reaffirming the principle articulated in earlier decisions that the law of the case doctrine is limited to questions of law actually presented and considered on a former appeal, U.S. Concrete was consistent with prior cas…
-
Bloco, Inc. v. Porterfield OIL Co., Inc., 990 So. 2d 578 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008)…case. The law of the case doctrine applies only to issues actually considered and decided in a prior appeal involving the same case. Analyte Diagnostics, Inc. v. D’Angelo, 792 So. 2d 1271, 1272 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001) (citing Two M Dev. Corp. v. Mikos, 578 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)). The doctrine requires that questions of law actually decided on appeal must govern the case in the same court and in the trial court through all subsequent stages of the litigation. Fla. Dep’t of Transp. v. Juliano, 801 So. 2d 1…
-
Fl-Carrollwood Care, LLC v. Gordon, 72 So. 3d 162 (Fla. 2d DCA 2011)…er had not ruled on the Estate’s unconscionability argument. Therefore, absent some unequivocal direction to the contrary in the mandate, on remand the trial court still had authority to consider and decide that issue. See Two M Dev. Corp. v. Mikos, 578 So. 2d 829, 830-31 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (explaining that trial court did not consider a particular issue in the original proceeding when its ruling on a different issue rendered the second issue moot; thus, the appellate court did not consider the issue in the f…
Previewing 3 of 8 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barry Hinnant, Inc. v. Spottswood, 481 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1986)
- TRI PAR Land Dev. Corp. v. Henthorn, 241 So. 2d 429 (Fla. 2d DCA 1970)
- Harbour Club Condo. NO. Three, Inc. v. Sauder, 380 So. 2d 449 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Mikos v. TWO M. Dev. Corp., 546 So. 2d 1110 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)