JANICE BICKETT, APPELLANT,
v.
THOMAS BICKETT, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-04-02
No. 90-332
Before COPE, LEVY and GODERICH, JJ.
579 So. 2d 149 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 2 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

The Florida appellate court affirmed a final judgment in a family law case while addressing a collateral issue regarding a writ of garnishment obtained by the former wife's former counsel to collect attorney's fees. The court held that such garnishment cannot interfere with child support and alimony obligations, and criticized the former counsel's inappropriate threat to garnish child support payments.


Holding

The court affirmed the final judgment and held that trial courts have full authority to stay, modify, or condition a garnishment writ to ensure that alimony and child support payments retain priority and that the obligor retains sufficient funds to live on. The court also held that an attorney is not at liberty to threaten to garnish a former client's child support payments.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court has authority to stay, modify, or condition a writ of garnishment to ensure that alimony and child support payments have priority and that the obligor has s…

[2] A lawyer is prohibited from threatening to garnish a former client's child support payments to collect attorney's fees.

Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“the trial court has full authority to stay, modify, or condition the writ to assure (a) that alimony and child support payments have priority, and (b) that the husband has funds remaining on which to live.”

Establishes the trial court's equitable authority to protect child support and alimony obligations from interference by other creditors' garnishment writs.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

In this family law dispute, the former wife's former counsel obtained a continuing writ of garnishment directed at the husband's income to collect a j…

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

[*150] PER CURIAM.

The final judgment is affirmed under authority of Canakaris v. Canakaris, 382 So. 2d 1197 (Fla.1980). This ruling is without prejudice for either party to apply to the trial court for relief from a continuing writ of garnishment obtained by the former wife’s former counsel,1 directed at the income of the husband, in an effort to collect former counsel’s judgment for attorney’s fees. The parties have asserted that counsel has garnished funds which were the source for the husband’s payment of child support and alimony, resulting in those obligations not being paid. If that is the case (and there has been no fact finding below on that point), the trial court has full authority to stay, modify, or condition the writ to assure (a) that alimony and child support payments have priority, and (b) that the husband has funds remaining on which to live. See Young, Stern & Tannenbaum, P.A. v. Ernst, 453 So. 2d 99, 102-03 (Fla. 3d DCA 1984). See generally Garcia v. Garcia, 560 So. 2d 403 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); § 61.1301, Fla.Stat. (1989); Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.550(b).

We comment briefly on a matter which came to our attention during this appeal. At an earlier stage a fee dispute apparently arose between the former wife and her former counsel. From the materials before us it appears that former counsel wrote to his former client:

Today you told my secretary that you couldn’t pay this amount. I must therefore inform you that unless you stick to our agreement, I will consider the entire fee due and owing and will, take legal action against you. This could mean that I will end up receiving your child support payments rather than you.

Assuming that passage reflects what the lawyer intended to say,2 it was entirely inappropriate. Counsel is not at liberty to suggest that he would proceed against his former client’s child support. If (as it appears) that was the intention, such an approach was unacceptable.

The final judgment is affirmed.

. The former counsel referred to in this opinion is not the counsel for the wife on this appeal.

. It is possible that it does not, since the letter indicated it was signed in counsel's absence by his secretary.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Merian v. Merhige, 690 So. 2d 678 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997)
    …y allowance for the attorney’s fee debt, noting that “Attorney Fees do take a back seat to the child support....” We agree that the trial court can order a payment schedule to assure that support payments are given priority. See Bickett. v. Bickett, 579 So. 2d 149, 150 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Young, Stern & Tannenbaum, P.A. v. Ernst, 453 So. 2d 99, 102-03 (Fla. 3d DCA [*683] 1984). However, we see no basis for saying that the attorney’s fee allowance should be zero. At least a modest monthly allowance should have…

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw