ATLANTA CASUALTY COMPANY, A GEORGIA CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
MARYBETH YADEVIA, APPELLEE
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Atlanta Casualty Company appealed a summary judgment awarding PIP (Personal Injury Protection) benefits to an injured employee whose medical expenses were paid by her employer's worker's compensation carrier. The court reversed, holding that the employee could only recover PIP benefits to the extent that worker's compensation payments depleted her settlement with the tortfeasor, preventing double recovery.
The employee is entitled to PIP benefits only to the extent that satisfaction of the worker's compensation lien depleted her settlement with the tortfeasor, plus reasonable attorney's fees and costs under Florida Statute section 440.39(3)(a), thereby preventing double recovery from both worker's compensation and PIP.
[1] A personal injury protection (PIP) insurer is entitled to a credit for worker's compensation benefits paid to an insured to the extent that the insured would otherwise re…
[2] An insured is entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits only to the extent that the satisfaction of a worker's compensation lien depleted the amount of the in…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits only to the extent that her "satisfaction of the [worker's] compensation lien [on the proceeds of plaintiff's settlement with the tortfeasor] depleted the amount of ... [her] ... settlement" with the tort-feasor, i.e., to the extent plaintiff paid the worker's compensation carrier for the satisfaction of the worker's compensation lien, "plus the amount of attorney's fees and costs permitted by section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes [1985]."”
Establishes the limiting principle for PIP recovery when worker's compensation has already paid medical expenses
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMarybeth Yadevia was injured in an automobile accident caused by a third party. Her employer's worker's compensation carrier paid her medical expenses…
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LEHAN, Judge.
Defendant Atlanta Casualty Company, the PIP insurer for plaintiff Marybeth Yadevia who was injured in an automobile accident by a third party tortfeasor, appeals from the summary judgment determining that Yadevia is entitled to PIP benefits for medical expenses notwithstanding the payment of those expenses by Yade-via’s employer’s worker’s compensation carrier. On the authority of Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 571 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), we reverse. Under the circumstances of this case which are similar to those in McGhee, plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits only to the extent that her “satisfaction of the [worker’s] compensation lien [on the proceeds of plaintiff's settlement with the tortfeasor] depleted the amount of ... [her] ... settlement” with the tortfeasor, i.e., to the extent plaintiff paid the worker’s compensation carrier for the satisfaction of the worker’s compensation lien, “plus the amount of attorney’s fees and costs permitted by section 440.39(3)(a), Florida Statutes .” Id. at 548. In other words, plaintiff is entitled to those benefits only to the extent that she would not thereby receive double payment from both worker’s compensation and PIP. See also South Carolina Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 467 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).
Since in this case the PIP insurer had already paid plaintiff the amount for which plaintiff settled the worker’s compensation lien and no claim for the foregoing attorney’s fees and costs was made below, plaintiff was entitled to no further recovery from that insurer in this suit.
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and DANAHY, J., concur.
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Pate v. Renfroe, 715 So. 2d 1094 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998)…ict, from which he would have satisfied the lien of the workers’ compensation carrier, thus making him eligible for PIP benefits for the past medical bills and lost wages encompassed by the jury’s verdict. See, e.g., Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Yadevia, 579 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (plaintiff [*1099] whose medical expenses had been paid by workers’ compensation was entitled to PIP benefits for medical expenses only to the extent she would not receive a double payment); Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 571 So. 2d…
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Allstate Ins. Co. v. Pelayo Mazorra, 599 So. 2d 739 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…seeks certiorari review of that reversal. Since it is undisputed that Arnold involved the identical legal question and that the second district is the only Florida court of appeal to have determined the issue, accord Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Yadevia, 579 So. 2d 213 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), review denied, 591 So. 2d 185 (Fla.1991); Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 571 So. 2d 546 (Fla, 2d DCA 1990), the circuit court had no choice but to follow Arnold. Pardo v. State, 596 [*740] So. 2d 665 (Fla.1992). It therefore could n…
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Delehanty v. Coronet Ins. Co., 619 So. 2d 990 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…mpensation insurance, his own PIP insurance, and the tortfeasor’s liability insurance. Plaintiff appeals from the judgment in his suit for a declaration of what he should recover from his PIP carrier. As we said in Atlanta Casualty Co. v. Yadevia, 579 So. 2d 213, 214 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), On the authority of Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGhee, 571 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990), we reverse. Under the circumstances of this case which are similar to those in McGhee, plaintiff is entitled to PIP benefits only to the ex…
Authorities Cited
- Fortune Ins. Co. v. McGHEE, 571 So. 2d 546 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- S.C. Ins. Co. v. Arnold, 467 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)