CALVIN EZELL HALL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1991-05-09
No. 89-1040
WIGGINTON, BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur.
579 So. 2d 329 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 3 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Calvin Hall was convicted of second degree murder and grand theft in the stabbing death of Willie Taylor. The First District Court of Appeal reversed his convictions, finding that the trial court reversibly erred by allowing the victim's son to sit at counsel table and assist the prosecutor, and by failing to adequately inquire into the State's peremptory challenges of black jurors.


Holding

The court held that the trial court reversibly erred in allowing the victim's son to sit at counsel table and assist the prosecutor, and in accepting the State's peremptory challenge explanation without requiring a race-neutral basis independent of the victim's family's preferences. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial, mooting the remaining issues.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court errs by allowing a victim's family member to sit at the prosecutor's table and assist in the trial.

[2] A prosecutor may not avoid the race-neutral criterion for peremptory challenges by asserting that a victim's family member made the decision to strike a juror.

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Key Quotes

“While prosecutors are free to consult victims or their relatives during selection of a jury, they may not avoid the race neutral criterion for peremptory challenges with the explanation that the relatives made the decisions.”

Establishes the key legal principle that prosecutors cannot use victim family preferences as a substitute for race-neutral peremptory challenge justifications.

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Facts & Procedural History

Appellant Calvin Hall was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery after stabbing 77-year-old Willie Taylor and taking his wallet and truck.…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Appellant challenges his convictions and sentences for second degree murder and grand theft, contending that the trial court reversibly erred in allowing the victim’s son to assist the prosecutor at trial, in allowing the State’s peremptory challenges of black jurors, in excluding the testimony of an alibi witness, and in imposing a departure sentence. We agree with the first two contentions, reverse the convictions, and remand for a new trial. This disposition moots the remaining issues.

Appellant was charged with first degree murder and armed robbery after he stabbed 77 year old Willie Taylor and took his wallet and truck. Prior to jury selection, defense counsel objected to the fact that the victim’s son was sitting with the prosecutor, noting that there was no objection to him being present in the courtroom, which was his legal right. The court overruled the objection, remarking that the “victims’ rights” constitutional amendment1 contemplated “that this type person’s presence at all critical stages is different than just a spectator” and that one member of the victim’s family may sit at counsel table and assist the prosecutor at trial. The prosecutor then introduced Taylor’s son to the jury.

During jury selection, defense counsel pointed out to the court that of the six peremptory challenges used by the State, three were used to challenge black jurors. The court stated:

The Court will find as a matter of fact that the basis for the objection was that the victim’s relatives (sic), who is here pursuant to the constitutional amendment, has requested he be excused. And his race is black also. The victim is black and the juror who is being excused is black. The basis for the objection is not anything to do with racial discrimination. It is really because of the victim’s family requesting it.

The prosecutor commented, “I would have preferred to keep him.” The court did not conduct an inquiry into the State’s reasons for peremptorily challenging the other two black jurors.

The jury found appellant guilty of second degree murder and grand theft, lesser included offenses of the charged crimes. The judge sentenced him to life on the murder conviction and placed him on five years probation for the grand theft, to commence if he should be released from his life sentence.

The trial judge reversibly erred in accepting the State’s explanation of its peremptory challenge of the third black juror. While prosecutors are free to consult victims or their relatives during selection of a jury, they may not avoid the race neutral criterion for peremptory challenges with the explanation that the relatives made the decisions. The prosecutor must satisfy the court on the record that the family objection was race neutral. There is no explanation in this record why the relative objected. The court also erred in failing to in quire into the other two peremptory challenges of black jurors once the court was satisfied that the issue was properly raised. Thompson v. State, 548 So. 2d 198 (Fla.1989).

We do not construe Article I, section 16(b), of the Florida Constitution to permit victims or their families to actively participate in the conduct of the trial by sitting at counsel table or being introduced to the jury.

REVERSED and REMANDED for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

WIGGINTON, BARFIELD and WOLF, JJ., concur. . Article I, section 16(b), Florida Constitution, grants the relatives of victims the right to be "present” at all crucial trial proceedings. The parties differ on the construction of this term.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Booker v. State, 773 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 2000)
    …t in courtroom during trial); cf. Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395 (Fla.1996) (defendant claiming he was prejudiced by the fact that surviving victims and their families were seated in the first two rows in front of the jury box); Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 330 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (defendant challenging trial court’s decision to allow victim’s son to sit at counsel table and assist prosecutor at trial). Indeed, the issue here appears to be one of first impression in Florida, and it arises because Mrs.…
  • L. T. v. State of Fla. & T.J.T. (Fla. 1st DCA 2020)
    …), of the Florida Constitution and found that the victim’s rights provided for did not “permit victims or their families to actively participate in the conduct of the trial by sitting at counsel table or being introduced to the jury.” Hall v. State, 579 So. 2d 329, 331 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Similarly, the Fourth District in Barnett v. Antonacci, 122 So. 3d 400, 404-06 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013), “harmonized” a victim’s right to notice and participation under section 16 with the separation of powers provision of the F…

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