CITY OF MIAMI, APPELLANT,
v.
GENE WATKINS, APPELLEE
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The court affirmed the order requiring the City to pay permanent total disability benefits and penalties, but remanded for a minor correction to the end date of back benefits.
[1] A judge of compensation claims has jurisdiction to order payment of permanent total disability benefits previously awarded, even if the employer has deducted those benefi…
[2] Penalties for non-payment of compensation are mandatory under section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, when compensation payable under an award is not paid within 30 days of…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe City of Miami deducted permanent total disability benefits from a city employee's pension. The judge of compensation claims ordered the City to pa…
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JOANOS, Judge.
The City of Miami, self-insured, has appealed an order of the judge of compensation claims requiring the payment of permanent total disability benefits awarded in March 1986, which benefits the City had deducted from Watkins’ city disability pension pursuant to local ordinance. The City challenges the judge’s jurisdiction to enter the order, and alleges in the alternative that the award is not supported by competent substantial evidence, and should not have been accompanied by an award of penalties. We affirm on all issues, save for the minor corrections indicated below.
The jurisdictional issue raised by the City has been settled against it. See City of Miami v. Smith, Case No. 90-1599 (Fla. 1st DCA April 4, 1991); Barragan v. City of Miami, 545 So. 2d 252, 253 (Fla.1989); Marion Correctional Institution v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA), rev. den. 531 So. 2d 1354 (Fla.1988). The City argues that the award of penalties was erroneous in that, at the time it reduced Watkins’ pension, the reduction was approved by Florida case law. However, penalties were awarded herein under section 440.20(8), Florida Statutes, which provides, without exception, that “[i]f any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there shall be added to such unpaid compensation an amount equal to 20 percent thereof ...” (emphasis supplied). We therefore affirm the award of penalties herein, with the minor adjustment indicated below.
The City finally alleges that the award of back benefits was not supported by competent substantial evidence because, among other reasons, it extended through September 1989 rather than August 1989. Appel-lee Watkins concedes this error. We therefore remand for the sole purpose of correcting the order to reflect that back benefits are due through August 1989, and the concomitant adjustment of the penalties award. The order is in all other respects affirmed.
ZEHMER, J., and CAWTHON, Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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City OF Miami v. Bell, 606 So. 2d 1183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)…), “there shall be added to such unpaid installment a punitive penalty” of 10%. The use of the word "shall” in this context is mandatory in meaning. See Sigg v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 594 So. 2d 329 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); City of Miami v. Watkins, 579 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Payment of the statutory penalty required by subsection (7) can be excused only if a timely and appropriate notice to controvert has been filed in accordance with subsection (6) or if the employer’s nonpayment has resulted from…
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Steinbrecher v. Better Constr. Co., 587 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)…fter the thirty-day period set forth in the statute, the twenty percent penalty must be imposed. Recent opinions addressing the section 440.20(8) penalty provision have construed the provision as mandatory. For example, in City of Miami v. Watkins, 579 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in approving an award of penalties, the court stated that section 440.20(8) “provides, without exception, that ‘[i]f any compensation, payable under the terms of an award, is not paid within 30 days after it becomes due, there s…
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Bell v. Univ. OF Fla. & Div. of Risk Mgmt., 652 So. 2d 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995)…mandatory, in contrast to the authority cited by the JCC in his order. Compare Sigg v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 594 So. 2d 329 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992); Steinbrecher v. Better Construction Co., 587 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); City of Miami v. Watkins, 579 So. 2d 759 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) with Paver Development Corp. v. McDevitt, 419 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982); Crowell v. South Broward Hospital District, 378 So. 2d 801 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979), cert, denied mem., 392 So. 2d 1373 (Fla.1980). However, that does not…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Barragan v. City OF Miami, 545 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1989)
- Marion Corr. Inst. v. Kriegel, 522 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)