RUTH W. MCLAUCHLIN, APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
DAVID D. MCLAUCHLIN, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
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In this Florida family law case, both spouses appealed a final judgment dissolving their marriage. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's decisions regarding income imputation and alimony awards, but reversed the attorney's fees award for lack of adequate findings and remanded for proper determination of the fee amount.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing $35,000 income to the husband or in denying permanent alimony in favor of rehabilitative alimony. However, the trial court's attorney's fees award was reversed because it lacked requisite findings of fact, though the wife's entitlement to fees was affirmed.
[1] A trial court does not abuse its discretion by imputing income to a party in a dissolution proceeding at a reasonable level, even if a higher amount might also have been…
[2] A trial court may award rehabilitative alimony rather than permanent alimony when a spouse is young and employable, despite the length of the marriage.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision to impute $35,000 in income to the husband. While a higher amount might have been within the trial court's discretion, this amount is clearly reasonable under all the circumstances of this case.”
Establishes the standard for reviewing income imputation in alimony and child support cases and affirms the reasonableness of the trial court's determination.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe McLauchlins were married in 1974 and have three minor children. The husband is a licensed attorney who earned approximately $35,000 in his job wit…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
Both Ruth W. McLauchlin and David D. McLauchlin appeal the final judgment dissolving their marriage. The wife challenges the trial court’s decisions to deny her request for permanent alimony and to impute only limited additional income to the husband. Both parties challenge the award of attorney’s fees. We reverse the award of attorney’s fees and affirm in all other respects.
The McLauchlins were married in 1974. They have three minor children. Their marriage did not generate significant marital assets. Both parties are employable.
During the marriage, the husband attended law school. He has been licensed to practice law in Florida since 1981. From 1981 to 1989, he practiced primarily in Manatee County. In 1988, he took a job as a part-time hearing officer. The wife maintains that this second job resulted in decreased overall earnings. A few months after the couple filed for divorce, Mr. McLauchlin moved to West Palm Beach, Florida, and accepted a job in the attorney general’s office earning approximately $35,000. Shortly before the final hearing, the husband left that job and opened his own law office. As a result, his future income at the time of the final hearing was difficult to predict. The trial court chose to impute income to the husband at the level of his job with the attorney general, rather than at the somewhat higher levels he had experienced in the preceding years.
The wife is in her mid-thirties and has primary residential care of the couple’s three children. She worked outside the home during part of the marriage as a secretary/office manager for her father’s business and at her husband’s law office. She earned approximately $20,000 annually. Neither of those jobs are options for the future. It appears that the wife is struggling to find suitable employment that will be compatible with her obligations to her children. The trial court awarded no permanent alimony and three years’ rehabilitative alimony at $400 per month. Child support totals $1,110 and is based on the guidelines.
We find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s decision to impute $35,000 in income to the husband. While a higher amount might have been within the trial court’s discretion, this amount is clearly reasonable under all the circumstances of this case. Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979). In the future, if the husband’s private practice generates income above the level imputed at the final hearing, the amount of child support may be modified.
We also find no abuse concerning the decision to deny permanent alimony and to award rehabilitative alimony. Although this marriage was not a brief marriage, the wife is still young and able to find suitable employment. See Evans v. Evans, 443 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). The relatively equal distribution of the couple’s limited assets does not create a circumstance requiring permanent alimony. Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 479 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985) (unequal distribution of significant marital assets in a thirty-year marriage is a factor supporting greater permanent alimony). In the event that the wife is unable to find suitable employment within the allotted time, she may seek extended alimony. Laux v. Laux, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Sima v. Sima, 337 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982).
Finally, the trial court awarded an amount of attorney’s fees without providing the requisite findings. Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla.1990); Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla.1985). From the record, we cannot determine whether the trial court’s award was intended to require the husband to pay all or a portion of the wife’s attorney’s fees. We affirm her entitlement to fees, but remand for a proper determination of the amount.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part.
CAMPBELL, A.C.J., and LEHAN, J., concur.
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Citator
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Lucinda Jean Hinton v. Smith, 725 So. 2d 1154 (Fla. 2d DCA 1998)…wife to find employment earning that amount. See id. at 1148-49. As a general rule, where we have upheld the trial courts’ imputation of income, the spouse had a track record of having earned the imputed amount. See, e.g., McLauchlin v. McLauchlin, 580 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (imputing to husband previously earned income of $35,000 after he left job to open his own business); Desilets, 377 So. 2d 761, 764 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979) (imputing previously earned income to husband whose testimony showed his abilit…
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Oxley v. Oxley, 695 So. 2d 364 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…d has the ability to pay, as his available income exceeds $45,000 per month. We have considered McCauley v. McCauley, 599 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992), Martinez-Cid v. Martinez-Cid, 559 So. 2d 1177 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990), and McLauchlin v. McLauchlin, 580 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2d DCA), rev. denied, 591 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1991), and deem each inapposite. Therefore, we reverse the alimony award with direction that the court either re-examine the rehabilitation plan, award permanent periodic alimony, or provide a basis f…
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Hann v. Hann, 629 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)…A 1990). We recognize that this was not a short-term marriage; however, the wife is relatively young and, as the trial court found, the wife is “reasonably expected to secure employment in her chosen field of teaching.” See McLauchlin v. McLauchlin, 580 So. 2d 812 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 591 So. 2d 182 (Fla.1991). We, therefore, conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding-permanent alimony.1 That is not to say that the facts do not justify awarding the wife alimony. Clearly she need…
Previewing 3 of 5 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- Standard Guar. Ins. Co. v. Quanstrom, 555 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 1990)
- Desilets v. Desilets, 377 So. 2d 761 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Evans v. Evans, 443 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Laux v. Forrest E. Laux, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Andrews v. Andrews, 479 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Sima v. Celestine Raymond Sima, 337 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Barksdale v. Paul W. Davis, Inc., 337 So. 2d 863 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976)