STEVEN VALDEZ, ETC., PETITIONER, TOM TRAMEL, SHERIFF, ETC., RESPONDENT; LAWRENCE A. DEMERS, PETITIONER,
v.
TOM TRAMEL, SHERIFF, ETC., RESPONDENTS; KEVIN J. ORY, PETITIONER, V. TOM TRAMEL, SHERIFF, ETC., RESPONDENTS

Fla. | 1991-06-20
Nos. 76260, 76310 and 76311
SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur., BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.
581 So. 2d 161 Florida Supreme Court (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 4 cases

Opinion of the Court
OVERTON, Justice.

OVERTON, Justice.

These consolidated petitions seek review of McCaskill v. McMillan, 563 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), in which the First District Court of Appeal certified the question presented regarding the interpretation of rule 3.133(b)(6),1 Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, concerning the timely charging of defendants by indictment or information as a matter of great public importance. We have jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(4), Florida Constitution. We answered this question m Bowens v. Tyson, 578 So. 2d 696 (Fla.1991), holding that rule 3.138(b)(6) does not mandate a defendant’s automatic release if the state files an information or indictment after the thirty-day filing period has expired but before the court hears the defendant’s motion for release. In accordance with Bowens, we approve the decision of the district court.

It is so ordered.

SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, GRIMES and HARDING, JJ., concur. BARKETT, J., concurs specially with an opinion, in which KOGAN, J., concurs.

. This rule has been renumbered as rule 3.134, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. See In re Amendment to Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.133(b)(6) (PreTrial Release), 573 So. 2d 826 (Fla.1991).

Concurrence
BARKETT, Justice,

BARKETT, Justice,

concurring specially.

I agree with the result for the reasons stated in my opinion in Bowens v. Tyson, 578 So. 2d 696 (Fla.1991) (Barkett, J., specially concurring).

KOGAN, J., concurs.


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    …e.1 This appeal followed. It is correct that when a defendant’s probation is revoked while she is serving a true split sentence, the trial court may not impose a sentence that exceeds the remaining balance of the suspended sentence. Poore v. State, 581 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988); Boone v. State, 967 So. 2d 999, 1000-01 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007). However, a review of the plea colloquy and sentencing hearing supports the trial court’s ruling that Hayes was not given a true split sentence. The trial court accepted th…
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