JUDITH M. KRABILL, APPELLANT,
v.
PROGRESSIVE SOUTHEASTERN INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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The court reversed summary judgment for the insurer because genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the motor home was used for recreational purposes and whether it served as the insured's permanent primary residence.
Summary judgment for the insurer was improper because material fact questions existed regarding the motor home's use and whether it constituted the insured's permanent primary residence.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when the record raises even the slightest doubt that a material issue of fact might exist.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“'[I]f the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,' summary judgment is improper.”
Court citing the standard for when summary judgment is improper due to disputed material facts.
Plaintiff owned a motor home that was her only vehicle, and she claimed coverage for losses from an accident involving it. The insurer denied coverage…
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PER CURIAM.
We reverse the summary judgment determining that plaintiff was afforded no coverage under the insurance policy issued by appellee for losses resulting from an accident involving plaintiff’s motor home.
There are fact questions as to whether the vehicle was used for “recreational purposes” and not for “everyday use,” as provided in the policy definition of the covered vehicle, and as to whether the vehicle was used as “a permanent and primary residence,” as provided in the policy’s exclusions from coverage. More specifically, while it appears that the vehicle was the only vehicle owned by the insured, that alone did not establish beyond any doubt that it was used for “everyday use,” and there was evidence indicating that the insured’s primary residence was her aunt’s home.
“ ‘[I]f the record raises even the slightest doubt that an issue [of material fact] might exist,’ summary judgment is improper.” Anderson v. Rosetree Village Ass’n, Inc., 540 So. 2d 173, 174 (Fla.2d DCA 1989) (quoting Snyder v. Cheezem Development Corp., 373 So. 2d 719, 720 (Fla.2d DCA 1979). See also Andrews v. Dept. of Natural Resources, 557 So. 2d 85, 89 (Fla.2d DCA 1990).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent herewith.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and LEHAN and FRANK, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Watkins DRY Wall, Inc. v. Drummond Court Corp., 373 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979)
- Snyder v. Cheezem Dev. Corp., 373 So. 2d 719 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979)
- Anderson v. Rosetree Vill. Ass'n, Inc., 540 So. 2d 173 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Andrews v. Dep't of Natural Res., 557 So. 2d 85 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)