W. R. FLETCHER, APPELLANT,
v.
J. E. MORIARTY, APPELLEE
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The Florida Supreme Court denied a rehearing, affirming its prior decision regarding a turpentine lease. The court held that a lessor who warrants title cannot later repudiate the lease based on a patent not being issued at the time of the lease, especially when the lessee seeks to enforce the lease after the lessor has acquired full title.
No, the lessor cannot repudiate the lease under these circumstances. A court of equity will not permit a lessor who has made a lease with full warranty to repudiate it on the ground that a patent had not been issued to a portion of the lands when the lease was made, if the lessee is acting within their rights to enforce the lease after the lessor has acquired complete title.
“Even of the patent to a portion of the lands included in the turpentine lease was issued upon a right acquired by occupancy and completed 'after the execution of the lease, the complainant will not be permitted in a court of equity to repudiate a lease with full warranty made by him, on the ground that a patent had not been issued to a portion of the lands when the lease was made, where the leassee seeks within his rights to enforce the lease only after the lessor had acquired complete title to the lands from the government.”
Establishes the court's reasoning for denying the lessor's attempt to repudiate the lease.
The case involves a turpentine lease. A petition for rehearing questioned whether the lease conveyed only timber then on the land and whether the pate…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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On Re-Hearing.
Whitfield, C. J.
— A petition for rehearing suggests that the court overlooked the contention that the lease conveyed only timber then on the lands and that the conclusion of the court that the patent referred to in the opinion may have been issued by reason of payments or otherwise and not by actual occupancy, is not warranted by the record.
The lease in this case contemplated the working for a period of three years each of different portions of the lands during succeeding years, and the ultimate termination of the lease was not provided for or shown.
The face of the patent warrants a conclusion that it may have been issued under section 8 of the Act of Congress approved May 20, 1862. Even of the patent to a portion of the lands included in the turpentine lease was issued upon a right acquired by occupancy and completed 'after the execution of the lease, the complainant will not be permitted in a court of equity to repudiate a lease with full warranty made by him, on the ground that a patent had not been issued to a portion of the lands when the lease was made, where the leassee seeks within his rights to enforce the lease only after the lessor had acquired complete title to the lands from the government. Rehearing denied.
Shackleford, and Cockrell, J. J.', concur. Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
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Camichos v. Diana Stores Corp., 157 Fla. 349 (Fla. 1946)…s by any oral agreement made by him. Without such allegation there could be no relief. See Holmberg v. Queck 90 Fla. 437, 105 So. 817; Rhode v. Gallat 70 Fla. 536, 70 So. 417; Smith v. Shackleford 92 Fla. 731, 110 So. 358. In Fletcher v. Moriarity, 62 Fla. 486, 56 So. 437, we held that, “Verbal agreements as to the terms of a lease of lands cannot vary or control the terms and meaning or effect of the lease as subsequently reduced to writing.” See also Swisher v. Conrad, 76 Fla. 644, 80 So. 564. Paragr…
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Bell Corp. v. Bahama BAR & Rest., Inc., 74 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1954)…ot sufficient, but it should be clear and convincing. The language used by this Court in the case of Camichos v. Diana Stores Corporation, 157 Fla. 349, 25 So. 2d 864, 869, may well be applied. In that case the Court said: “In Fletcher v. Moriarty, 62 Fla. 486, 56 So. 437, 438, we held that: “ ‘Verbal agreements as to the terms of a lease of lands cannot vary or control the terms and meaning or effect of the lease as subsequently reduced to writing.’ “See also Swisher v. Conrad, 76 Fla. 644, 80 So. 564.…
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Dowling Park Naval Stores Co. v. Houck, 64 Fla. 242 (Fla. 1912)…hts is a turpentine lease “for the full period of three years from the date of the cuting (for turpentine purposes) of each and every parcel of said timber.” This distinction between the two cases is patent and substantial. See Fletcher v. Moriarty, 62 Fla. 486, 56 South. Rep. 437; Fla. Ass’n. v. Stephens, 61 Fla. 598. In this case the Circuit Court properly held that the lease gave to the lessees and their assigns the right to box, work and use said timber for turpentine purposes for a period of three ye…