UNDERWRITERS GUARANTEE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
ELIZABETH GREGORY, APPELLEE
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An insured sought personal injury protection (PIP) benefits after slipping on wet soap at a gas station while refueling her van. The Florida appellate court reversed summary judgment for the insured, holding that PIP benefits require both that an injury arise from vehicle use and that it be caused by either occupying the vehicle or physical contact with it, with causation being the necessary link.
An insured is not entitled to PIP benefits merely because an injury arose out of vehicle use; the statute requires either that the insured was occupying the vehicle or that the injury was caused by physical contact with the vehicle. Here, Gregory was neither occupying the vehicle nor injured by contact with it, as her injury was caused by slipping on soap.
[1] An insured must demonstrate that an injury arose out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle to be entitled to personal injury protection (PIP) benefits.
[2] To recover PIP benefits, an insured must have sustained an injury while occupying a motor vehicle or, if not an occupant, the injury must have been caused by physical con…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an insured must meet two requirements before being entitled to PIP benefits. First, her injury must be "arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle." Second, her injury must be sustained "while occupying a motor vehicle," or "while not an occupant ... if the injury is caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle."”
Establishes the statutory two-prong test for PIP eligibility
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceElizabeth Gregory pulled her van into a self-service gas station and noticed wet concrete near the pumps. After walking back to refuel, she slipped on…
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PER CURIAM.
An insurer appeals an order granting summary judgment in favor of an insured claiming personal injury protection (PIP) benefits. We reverse.
Elizabeth Gregory pulled her van into a self-service Shell gas station. She noticed wet concrete on the ground near the pumps as she walked into the station office to pay. Gregory walked back to the service island and re-fueled. She then returned to the office, picked up some juice, and concluded her transaction. Upon leaving the office, she acknowledged an acquaintance and began her return to her van. At that point, Gregory slipped on what she termed “greasy soap.” When she tried to stop her fall, her feet went up, and her left hand and arm contacted the van. She fell over and her back hit the tank platform causing her injury. The trial court granted Gregory’s motion for summary judgment finding the insurer liable for the PIP benefits sought.
Under sections 627.736(1) and (4)(d)(l), Florida Statutes (1987), an insured must meet two requirements before being entitled to PIP benefits. First, her injury must be “arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of a motor vehicle.” Second, her injury must be sustained “while occupying a motor vehicle,” or “while not an occupant ... if the injury is caused by physical contact with a motor vehicle.”
In the instant case, Gregory was re-fueling. We have no problem with finding the injury arose out of the ownership, maintenance, and use of the vehicle. That determination is not controlling, however, since we conclude Gregory clearly did not meet the statute’s occupancy or contact requirement. As conceded by her counsel, Gregory was not occupying the vehicle when she was injured. She had not been in the vehicle for some minutes before the fall. Nor was her injury caused by physical contact with the vehicle. According to Gregory’s own testimony, it was the “greasy soap” which caused her to slip. On her descent, her arm did hit the van; however, her injury was not caused by physical contact with the van.
Traditional tort concepts of causation are to be considered part of the personal injury protection statute. The mere involvement of a motor vehicle is not enough. Causation is the necessary link that connects a plaintiff’s injuries to the physical contact and brings them within the statute. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Castagna, 368 So. 2d 348, 349 (Fla.1979).
Accordingly, summary judgment in Gregory’s favor is reversed. The case is remanded for the trial court to enter judgment as a matter of law in favor of the insurer.
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Niglio v. Omaha Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 679 So. 2d 323 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)…ere was no PIP coverage under section 627.736(4)(d)1. Id. at 644. Welty demon [*325] strates that Castagna requires something more than the application of a simple “but for” test to determine coverage. See Underwriters Guarantee Ins. Co. v. Gregory, 582 So. 2d 11 (Fla. 3rd DCA)(no coverage under section 627.736(4)(d)1 when plaintiff slipped on greasy soap at Shell station where she had gone to fuel up her van), rev. denied, 592 So. 2d 680 (Fla.1991). In a statute regulating motor vehicle insurance, the phra…
Authorities Cited
- Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v. Ercole Castagna, 368 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1979)