MARGARET TRIESBACK AND OTHERS, APPELLANTS,
v.
RICHMOND TYLER AS TRUSTEE, AND OTHERS, APPELLEES
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Margaret Triesback appealed a decree that reformed a deed from her mother Margaret C. Tyler to Richmond Tyler, seeking to change the property description from the southern two-thirds to the northern two-thirds of a lot. The Florida Supreme Court reversed, holding that a grantee seeking reformation of a voluntary deed supported only by love and affection cannot establish the equity necessary for reformation when doing so would disinherit other heirs.
A grantee has no equity to reform a deed to the disinheritance of other heirs when the deed is supported solely by love and affection, which constitutes insufficient consideration for reformation purposes. The court held that while love and affection can support a deed as written, it will not alone support an equity in the grantee to reform the deed.
“This consideration is sufficient to uphold a deed as written, but it seems that it will not alone support an equity in the grantee to reform the deed.”
Establishes the distinction between consideration sufficient to validate a deed and consideration sufficient to support reformation.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMargaret C. Tyler executed a deed in 1881 to her son Richmond Tyler in trust for his children. The mother had previously conveyed the southern third t…
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Cockrell, J.
— This is an appeal from a decree reforming a deed of conveyance from Margaret C. Tyler, to Richmond ' Tyler in trust for his children, so as to read the northern two-thirds of Lot i, Sec. 1, Tp. 2 S. E.' 26 E., in Duval County instead of the southern two-thirds.
The deed was executed in 1881, about two years prior to the death of the grantor, who was the mother of the said Eichmond. It appears that the mother had theretofore deeded the southern third to other sons, the middle third to Eichmond, her oldest son, and one acre in the northern third to Mary W. Shepard, her oldest child, and that the reformed deed excepted “one acre heretofore conveyed to Mary W. Shepard.”
The difficulty with the case arises upon the consideration supporting the deed, which appears to have been only love and affection. This consideration is sufficient to uphold a deed as written, but it seems that it will not alone support an equity in the grantee to reform the deed. In this aspect the deed is said to be voluntary, an act of bounty, entitling the donee to no more consideration than the other children of the donor, who are sought to be disinherited pro tanto. • .
While the modern trend of the cases may be to seize upon some fact or circumstance, that may be construed into a valuable as opposed to a mere good consideration, we find no such fact or circumstance here, and the appellee plants himself boldly upon the proposition that love and affection from mother to son is all sufficient.
The deed names as an additional consideration the sum of five dollars, but this money consideration may be ignored upon the sworn answer and lack of proof. The bill further alleges title by adverse possession of the northern third, but this too admittedly failed upon the proof.
In the absence of any fact or circumstance going to show a valuable consideration moving from the grantee to the grantor, we find the authorities abundantly support us in holding that the grantee has no equity to reform the deed to the disinherison of the other heirs of the grantor equally entitled to her bounty. Shears v. West over, 110 Mich. 505, 68 N. W. Rep. 266; Enos v. Stewart, 138 Cal. 112, 70 Pac. Rep. 1005; Mulock v. Mulock, 31 N. J. Eq. 591; Mudd v. Dillon, 166 Mo. 110, 65 S. W. Rep. 973; Powell v. Powell, 27 Ga. 36, S. C. 73 Am. Dec. 724; Dawson v. Dawson, 1 Dev. Ev. 93, S. C. 18 Am. Dec. 573; Smith v. Smith, 80 Ark, 458, 97 S. W. Rep. 439, S. C. 10 Ann. Cas. 522; Willey v. Hodge, 104 Wis. 81, 80 N. W. Rep. 75, S. C. 76 Am. St. Rep. 852. See also Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956, 43 South. Rep. 243, a case of specific performance.
Decree reversed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Shackleford, J., concur;
Taylor, Hocker and Parkhill, J. J., concur in the opinion.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Providence Square Ass'n, Inc. v. Biancardi, 507 So. 2d 1366 (Fla. 1987)…t on the part of the grantor, or where the only consideration is “love and affection” rather than material value, equity will not decree reformation on the ground of mistake. Smith v. Pattishall, 129 Fla. 498, 176 So. 568 (1937); Triesback v. Tyler, 62 Fla. 580, 56 So. 947 (1911); Harrod v. Simmons, 143 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962). On the other hand, a deed given pursuant to valuable consideration is normally the result of some degree of bargaining and is, therefore, bilateral in character. Whether there…
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Schreiber v. Chase Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 422 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)…ital affinity, which is the relationship of husband and wife. A deed for love and affection is a voluntary act, and is not clear whether the grantee has any superior rights to the grantor or others holding under him. Triesbach [Triesback] v. Tyler [62 Fla. 580], 56 So. 947 (Fla.1911); Harrod v. Simmons, 143 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 19.62); Tischler v. Robinson, 84 So. 914 (Fla.1920); and Money v. Powell, 139 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962). Therefore, it is The Fund’s position that a title based on a deed re…
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In re Est. OF Marvin Robinson v. Robinson, 720 So. 2d 540 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…Finally, Shirley makes an analogy to cases which hold that a court may not reform transfers by deed after the death of the grantor based on a unilateral mistake. She cites Harrod v. Simmons, 143 So. 2d 717 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962), and Triesback v. Tyler, 62 Fla. 580, 56 So. 947 (Fla.1911). In Harrod, the court refused to reform a deed after the death of the grantor where the deed omitted a piece of property that the grantor allegedly intended to convey. 143 So. 2d at 718. The Harrod court relied on Triesback, w…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Maloy v. Boyett, 53 Fla. 956 (Fla. 1907)