SHAWN PATRICK DOWD, APPELLANT,
v.
SUN-CRETE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC., AND FIREMAN'S FUND INSURANCE COMPANIES, APPELLEES
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A workers' compensation appellate court quashed an order granting the employer/carrier clarification on whether it could credit temporary total disability (TTD) benefits against permanently total disability (PTD) benefits owed. The court held that once the original order became final, the judge of compensation claims lacked jurisdiction to amend or clarify it.
No. The court held that because the May 24 order had already become final, the judge lacked jurisdiction to amend, vacate, or republish it when the employer/carrier filed its motion for clarification more than 30 days after the original order's entry.
[1] A judge of compensation claims lacks jurisdiction to amend, vacate, or republish an order after it has become final.
[2] A motion for clarification filed more than 30 days after the entry of an order cannot be used to alter the substance of that final order.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Because the May 24 order had already become final, the JCC was without jurisdiction to amend, vacate, or republish it at the time the E/C filed its "Motion for Clarification."”
Establishes the core holding that a final order cannot be clarified or amended after it becomes final, regardless of claimed misunderstanding.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn May 24, 1990, the judge of compensation claims ordered the employer/carrier to pay the claimant permanent total disability benefits from October 7,…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
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SHIVERS, Chief Judge.
The claimant in this workers’ compensation case appeals an order entered by the judge of compensation claims (JCC) on the employer/carrier’s (E/C’s) motion for clarification. We quash the order, for the reason set out below.
On May 24, 1990, the JCC issued an order finding the appellant/claimant to have been permanently totally disabled (PTD) since the stipulated date of maximum medical improvement (October 7, 1987), finding there to have been a negligent handling of the claim, and ordering, among other things, that the E/C pay claimant PTD benefits from October 7, 1987 “with credit being taken for any benefits paid in this same category.” It is undisputed that the E/C had been voluntarily paying the claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits since October 7, 1987, but that it had not paid any permanent total disability benefits prior to the entry of the order. Following the order, the E/C paid claimant all past-due PTD benefits, taking a credit for TTD paid during that period.
On June 27, 1990, the E/C filed a “Motion for Clarification,” seeking to have the JCC declare whether the May 24, 1990 order did or did not allow credit for TTD benefits against the amount of PTD owed from October 7,1987, and claiming that the possibility of the order being subject to differing interpretations did not occur to them until it was brought to their attention by claimant’s attorney, more than 30 days after entry of the May 24 order. At the hearing on the motion for clarification, the JCC stated “It’s my ruling that the overpayment was intended to be compensation, payment of compensation, and therefore it’s not a gratuity and merely should be reclassified.” The JCC then entered a written order on July 9, 1990, finding the E/C to be entitled to credit for “temporary total disability benefits paid against the amount due and owing for permanent total disability benefits for the same period.”
Because the May 24 order had already become final, the JCC was without jurisdiction to amend, vacate, or republish it at the time the E/C filed its “Motion for Clarification.” Stone & Webster Engineering Co. v. McCray, 377 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979); Rule 4.141, Workers’ Compensation Rules; section 440.25, Fla.Stat. The July 9th order is therefore quashed.
ORDER QUASHED.
BOOTH and JOANOS, JJ., concur.
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Brooks v. Monroe Cnty. Sheriff Dep't & Gallagher Bassett Ins. Servs., Inc., 634 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…ervicing Agent.” In addition, the order directs the employer and servicing agent to pay “[t]he bills of South Seminole Community Hospital and of Dr. Greenberg.” We believe that this case is indistinguishable from Dowd v. Sun-Crete Construction Co., 582 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In Dowd, the judge of compensation claims had issued an order finding that the claimant was permanently and totally disabled since the stipulated date of maximum medical improvement; directing the employer and carrier to pay per…
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Millinger v. Broward Cnty. Mental Health Div. & Risk Mgmt., 655 So. 2d 104 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)…stent with Farrell, that absent statutory or rule authority, a JCC, or the equivalent, does not have jurisdiction to vacate an order that has become final.3 See Breen v. Smith, 644 So. 2d 183 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Dowd v. Sunr-Crete Construction Co., 582 So. 2d 83 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Stone & Webster Engineering Co. v. McCray, 377 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979). See also E.M. Scott Contractors v. Baker, 479 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (“[a] deputy commissioner has no authority to vacate an order which has b…
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RTG Furniture Corp. & St. Paul Travelers v. Alford, 907 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…2003 order. We agree. Once an unambiguous order becomes final, the JCC is without jurisdiction to amend, vacate, or republish it. Brooks v. Monroe County Sheriff Dep’t, 634 So. 2d 295, 296 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Dowd v. Sun-Crete Constr. Co., Inc., 582 So. 2d 83, 84 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). In the instant ease, the original order was final over a year before the JCC entered the July 2004 order. Additionally, the original order clearly stated that Claimant was at maximum medical improvement for all of her injuri…
Authorities Cited
- Stone & Webster Eng'g Co. & Kemper Ins. Co. v. McCRAY, 377 So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979)