JUAN LUIS GARCIA, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Garcia and Londono were jointly charged and tried for armed trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy. Londono's appeal succeeded on due process grounds (objective entrapment), and this court now holds that Garcia must receive the same relief and be discharged.
Garcia must also be discharged on due process grounds. The decision in Londono v. State is the law of the case, and because both defendants were ensnared in the same undercover operation where the police activity was impermissible under Cruz v. State, all ensnared parties must be discharged.
[1] A prior appellate decision in a case involving co-defendants tried jointly can establish the law of the case for the subsequent appeal of another co-defendant.
[2] Police conduct that violates due process principles may require the discharge of all individuals ensnared by such conduct, even if the entrapment statute has abolished ob…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“This court held therein that Londono was "objectively" entrapped as a matter of law within the discipline of Cruz v. State, 465 So.2d 516 (Fla.1985) in which, by a due process analysis, the Supreme Court held the police activity therein to have been impermissible, requiring discharge of "all" ensnared.”
Establishes the due process violation standard and that all defendants ensnared in the same impermissible police operation must be discharged.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGarcia and Londono were both ensnared in the same undercover operation and jointly charged with armed trafficking in cocaine and conspiracy to traffic…
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McNULTY, Senior Judge.
Appellant Garcia and Juan Londono were both ensnared in the same undercover operation. They were subsequently jointly charged in the same information with armed trafficking in cocaine (Count I) and with conspiracy to traffic (Count II). They were jointly tried before the same jury and each was convicted of the lesser included offense of attempted armed trafficking on Count I and of the conspiracy on Count II.
Londono prosecuted his appeal first, culminating in this court’s decision in Londono v. State, 565 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). This court held therein that Londo-no was “objectively” entrapped as a matter of law within the discipline of Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla.1985) in which, by a due process analysis, the Supreme Court held the police activity therein to have been impermissible, requiring discharge of “all” ensnared. Londono was thus acquitted.1
The question here then, of course, is whether Garcia should also be acquitted on the same grounds. We hold the decision in Londono v. State, to be the law of the case and that Garcia must also be discharged on due process grounds.2 Most recently, this court in essence reached the same conclusion in Herndon v. State (Fla. 4th DCA Case No. 89-3265, opinion filed May 8, 1991).
WE REVERSE AND REMAND WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISCHARGE APPELLANT.
GUNTHER and GARRETT, JJ„ concur. . The underlying operative facts are set forth in Londono and it will serve no useful purpose to repeat them here.
. The determination of due process ultimately is a judicial function and quite beyond the scope of legislative prerogatives. Thus, while we have said that the entrapment statute, section 777.-201, Fla.Stat., 1990, has abolished “objective" entrapment as such, Krajewski v. State (Fla. 4th DCA Case No. 90-0703) opinion filed March 13, 1991. (16 F.L.W. D.B. 692), we nevertheless in that case clearly reaffirmed the inherent power of the courts to determine due process questions involved in assailed police activities in a given case. Cf. Bowser v. State, 555 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Gonzalez v. State, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).
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Garcia v. Cristobal Reyes & The City of Fort Lauderdale, 697 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…1995). In his third amended complaint, Garcia does not allege violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, nor does he assert any causes of action for traditional common law torts such as false arrest. Instead, Garcia claims that our holding in Garcia v. State, 582 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991), where this court reversed his conviction for attempted armed trafficking and conspiracy on due process grounds, carries with it presumptive liability for civil damages. Our holding in Garcia was based on our finding in Londono v…1 / 2
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Lucious Brown and Henrietta Brown v. Miami-Dade Cnty. & Golden Glades Mgmt. Corp., 837 So. 2d 414 (Fla. 3d DCA 2003)…(emphasis added). The Fourth District has addressed sting operations in Garcia v. Reyes, 697 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997). Mr. Garcia had been the subject of a reverse sting operation in which it was found he had been entrapped. Garcia v. State, 582 So. 2d 88 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). He sued for damages because he had been in prison for thirty months before being freed. 697 So. 2d at 549-50. Relying on Trianon, the Fourth District ruled that there was no cause of action and that the claim was barred by sove…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cruz v. State, 465 So. 2d 516 (Fla. 1985)
- Gonzalez v. State, 571 So. 2d 1346 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990)
- Bowser v. State, 555 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Londono v. State, 565 So. 2d 1365 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)