JAMES THOMPSON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Thompson appealed the trial court's summary denial of his third Rule 3.850 post-conviction relief motion. The appellate court held that while his first ground (mental incompetence at time of crime) was time-barred and improperly raised, his second ground (illegal sentence from improper stacking of mandatory minimums) was not time-barred and had not been previously decided on the merits, requiring reversal and remand.
The first ground was time-barred under Rule 3.850 and improperly raised. The second ground alleging an illegal sentence was not time-barred and had not been previously decided on the merits since prior motions were denied on procedural grounds without reaching the substantive issues, therefore the denial was reversed and the case remanded.
[1] A motion for post-conviction relief raising the issue of mental incompetence at the time of the crime is time-barred if the judgment and sentence became final prior to Ja…
[2] The issue of mental incompetence at the time of the crime, if it could have been raised on direct appeal, is improperly raised in a motion for post-conviction relief.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“We find the first ground to be time-barred pursuant to Rule 3.850, which requires a person whose judgment and sentence became final prior to January 1, 1985 to file motions for post-conviction relief by January 1, 1987.”
Establishes the time-bar requirement that defeated Thompson's first ground based on the finality date of his 1982 conviction
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThompson filed his first Rule 3.850 motion for post-conviction relief in 1984, which was denied for lack of proper verification. A second motion was f…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Merits Determination cases and more on FLexlaw
SHIVERS, Chief Judge.
Appellant/defendant appeals' the trial court’s summary denial of his motion for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Rule 3.850, Fla.R.Crim.P., arguing that the trial court erred in finding that the motion was a successive motion raising issues which had been previously decided. The trial court’s order, dated February 23, 1990, appears to have been directed toward the third in a series of motions for post-conviction relief filed by the appellant. Although the motion itself does not appear in the record on appeal, appellant claims that the motion was filed in January 1988 and that it raised the following two grounds: (1) that his original 1982 conviction was “illegally obtained due to the defendant being mentally incompetent at the time of the crime,” and (2) that the court imposed an illegal sentence by improperly “stacking” three-year minimum mandatory terms.
We find the first ground to be time-barred pursuant to Rule 3.850, which requires a person whose judgment and sentence became final prior to January 1, 1985 to file motions for post-conviction relief by January 1, 1987. In addition, because this is a ground which could or should have been raised on direct appeal, it was improperly raised via Rule 3.850.
The second ground alleges an illegal sentence and is, therefore, not time-barred under Rule 3.850. Further, although this ground appears to have been raised previously in a 1984 motion for post-conviction relief, the record indicates that the trial court did not rule at that time on the merits of the issue, but instead denied the 1984 motion on the basis that it failed to contain the proper verification required by Rule 3.850. A second motion for post-conviction relief, filed sometime in 1985, likewise appears not to have contained a ruling on the issues raised in the instant motion. Because Rule 3.850 provides that a second or successive motion may be dismissed if it fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits, we reverse the trial court’s denial of the second ground, and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
JOANOS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Ranaldson v. State, 672 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996)…pplied “only when the grounds raised were previously adjudicated on their merits, and not where the previous motion was summarily denied or dismissed for legal insufficiency.” McCrae v. State, 437 So. 2d 1388, 1390 (Fla.1983).1 In Thompson v. State, 582 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), this court emphasizes that a second or successive 3.850 motion may only be dismissed if “[the motion] fails to allege new or different grounds for relief and the prior determination was on the merits.” Id. at 750 (emphasis in or…
-
Gomez v. State, 600 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Johnson v. State, 536 So. 2d 1009 (Fla.1988); Delap v. State, 513 So. 2d 1050 (Fla.1987); Thompson v. State, [*37] 582 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA1991); Rule 3.850 Fla.R.Crim.P.…
-
Louis Charles Sheptin aka Louis Carl Rubin aka Louis Charles Shiptin v. State, 613 So. 2d 611 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Thompson v. State, 582 So. 2d 749 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); State v. Morris, 538 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850.…