DAVID BUIEY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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David Buiey was convicted of sale of a substance in lieu of cocaine and sentenced as a habitual felony offender to eight years' imprisonment followed by seven years' probation. The appellate court reversed the sentence because it exceeded the statutory maximum and remanded for resentencing, while affirming the conviction and addressing collateral sentencing issues.
The sentence exceeds the ten-year statutory maximum under Florida's Habitual Felony Offender Statute and must be reversed. Probationary split sentences are authorized and do not violate double jeopardy, and fixed statutory costs may be imposed without prior notice. However, a lien for attorney fees must be imposed with notice and opportunity to contest the amount.
[1] A sentence of imprisonment followed by probation may not exceed the statutory maximum sentence for the underlying felony offense.
[2] The imposition of a probationary split sentence is an authorized disposition under Florida law.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The sentence of eight years' imprisonment followed by seven years' probation exceeds the ten-year maximum sentence for a third-degree felony under Section 775.084(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). The sentence must, therefore, be reversed.”
Establishes the primary basis for reversal—the combined sentence exceeds the statutory cap for third-degree felonies.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant was convicted of sale of a substance in lieu of cocaine, a third-degree felony. At sentencing, the trial court designated him a habitual fel…
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PER CURIAM.
This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment and sentence for sale of a substance in lieu of cocaine, a third-degree felony. At sentencing, the trial court found appellant a habitual felony offender and sentenced him to eight years’ imprisonment followed by seven years’ probation. The trial court also imposed a fine in the amount of $1,000, statutory court costs, and a lien for attorney fees in the amount of $1,000.
Appellant’s counsel filed an Anders1 brief, and we entered an order requiring a supplemental brief addressing the following issues: (1) whether the sentence of eight years’ imprisonment followed by seven years’ probation exceeds the maximum sentence for a third-degree felony under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, the Habitual Felony Offender Statute; (2) whether the imposition of a probationary split sentence results in a double jeopardy violation; (3) whether the imposition of fixed statutory costs without notice prior to the sentencing hearing is a violation of due process; and (4) whether the imposition of a lien for attorney fees and costs in a specific amount without providing an opportunity to contest the amount of the lien is a violation of due process.
The State concedes the first issue. The sentence of eight years’ imprisonment followed by seven years’ probation exceeds the ten-year maximum sentence for a third-degree felony under Section 775.084(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988). The sentence must, therefore, be reversed. Calhoun v. State, 522 So. 2d 509, 510 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
We affirm as to the second issue. In Glass v. State, 574 So. 2d 1099, 1102 (Fla.1991), the court held that imposition of a probationary split sentence is an authorized disposition under Section 921.-187(1)(g), Florida Statutes. We also affirm as to the third issue, regarding imposition of fixed statutory costs without notice pri-or to the sentencing hearing. State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla.1991).
As to issue four, the State concedes that appellant was not informed at the time of sentencing of his right to contest the amount of the lien and that this was error. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.720(d)(1); Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103, 1104-1105 (Fla.1989).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this cause for imposition of a sentence not exceeding ten years in length and to allow appellant notice and opportunity to contest the amount of the lien imposed under Section 27.56, Florida Statutes. In all other respects, the judgment of conviction and sentence are affirmed.
ERVIN, BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed.2d 493 (1967).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Authorities Cited
- Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (U.S. 1967)
- State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 139 (Fla. 1991)
- Bull v. State, 548 So. 2d 1103 (Fla. 1989)
- Glass v. State, 574 So. 2d 1099 (Fla. 1991)
- Calhoun v. State, 522 So. 2d 509 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)