ANTONIO ROPIZA, APPELLANT,
v.
ROBERTO P. REYES AND RITA ACUNA REYES, HIS WIFE, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
In this real estate dispute, the court held that a liquidated damages clause giving the seller three alternative remedies upon buyer default is unenforceable under Florida law, but reversed the trial court's judgment on the pleadings because the seller may still pursue a separate claim for actual damages for breach of contract.
The court held that the liquidated damages clause is unenforceable as a matter of law under Cortes v. Adair, but the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings because it improperly foreclosed the seller's separate claim for actual damages based on breach of contract. A presuit demand for the deposit does not constitute an irrevocable election of remedies.
[1] A liquidated damages clause in a real estate contract is unenforceable as a matter of law when it confers a unilateral option on the vendor to choose from multiple remedi…
[2] A motion for judgment on the pleadings should not be granted if a ruling on a particular issue does not dispose of the entire case.
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court correctly held invalid the liquidated damages clause in the real estate contract which gave Ropiza three options including retention of the deposit. In entering a judgment for the Reyeses on the pleadings, however, the court incorrectly foreclosed Ropiza's claim under separate allegations for damages based on breach of contract.”
Establishes that while the liquidated damages clause is invalid, this does not bar the seller from pursuing actual damages for breach of contract
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRopiza agreed to sell real property to the Reyeses under a purchase contract requiring them to obtain conventional financing within 90 days and provid…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Election Of Remedies cases and more on FLexlaw
FERGUSON, Judge.
The parties to this action executed a Deposit Receipt and Sales Purchase Agreement whereby Ropiza agreed to sell to the Reyeses certain real property located in Monroe County. Pursuant to the contract, the Reyeses paid an $8,000 deposit to Freelancer Limited, the real estate broker. By terms of the agreement the Reyeses were required to apply for and obtain a conventional mortgage within ninety days of the contract date.
For reasons not pertinent here, Ropiza decided not to consummate the transaction. Thereafter, both parties made demands on Freelancer for the deposit. Freelancer filed an interpleader action naming Ropiza and the Reyeses as defendants. Ropiza filed a crossclaim against the Reyeses seeking the deposit monies as liquidated damages or, alternatively, money damages for breach of contract.
In response to Ropiza’s crossclaim, the Reyeses filed an answer denying Ropiza’s allegations and further pleaded, as an affirmative defense, that the default provision in the contract was unenforceable as a matter of law.1 The Reyeses’ motion for judgment on the pleadings was granted. This appeal ensued.
On the authority of Cortes v. Adair, 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (cited with approval in Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla.1991)),2 the trial court correctly held invalid the liquidated damages clause in the real estate contract which gave Ropiza three options including retention of the deposit. In entering a judgment for the Reyeses on the pleadings, however, the court incorrectly foreclosed Ropiza’s claim under separate allegations for damages based on breach of contract. See Bolen Int'l, Inc. v. Medow, 191 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966) (it was error for the lower court to grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings where a ruling on a particular question does not dispose of entire case), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 808 (Fla.1967).
Where the seller, in a contract for the sale of realty, is given the option, in the event of a breach by the buyer, of retaining the deposit as liquidated damages or proceeding with an action at law or equity, a presuit demand for the deposit does not constitute an irrevocable choice of remedies. See Erwin v. Scholfield, 416 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982) (vendors’ filing of action seeking damages and specific performance against condominium purchasers, who entered into contract which provided that upon default vendors at their option could retain purchasers’ deposit as liquidated damages or proceed at law or equity, did not constitute an election between alternative remedies so as to preclude vendors’ claim for deposit as liquidated damages).
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further consistent proceedings.
. The default clause in the contract provided: Default: If Buyer fails to perform this contract within the time specified, the deposit paid by Buyer may be retained by or for the account of Seller as consideration for the execution of this agreement and in full settlement of any claims for damages, and all parties shall be relieved of all obligations under this contract, or Seller, at his option, may proceed at law or in equity to enforce his legal rights under this contract.
. In Cortes, we held that a default clause in a contract for the sale of real property which conferred a unilateral option on the vendor to choose from three alternate remedies — an action at law for actual damages, an action in equity for specific performance, or retention of the deposit as liquidated damages if that amount exceeded actual damages — was unenforceable as a matter of law.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Vicente Martinez v. Fraxedas, 678 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996)…act to seek legal assistance, in the event that he qualified. . We also note that "[a] partial judgment on the pleadings is not authorized.” Henry P. Trawick, Jr., Trawick's Florida Practice and Procedure § 10-9, at 186 (1995 ed.); Ropiza v. Reyes, 583 So. 2d 400, 401 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); Bolen International, Inc., v. Medow, 191 So. 2d 51, 53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966), cert. denied, 200 So. 2d 808 (Fla.1967); Morris v. Truax, 152 So. 2d 515, 519 (Fla. 2d DCA 1963).…
Authorities Cited
- Lefemine v. Baron, 573 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1991)
- Bolen Int'l, Inc. v. Medow, 191 So. 2d 51 (Fla. 3d DCA 1966)
- Erwin v. Morgan Scholfield and Doris D. Scholfield, 416 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 5th DCA 1982)
- Augusto Cortes and Mary Cortes v. Adair, 494 So. 2d 523 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Ayres v. Ayres, 200 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1967)
- Bolen Indus., Inc. v. Medow (two cases), 200 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 1967)