GILTEX CORPORATION, A DELAWARE CORPORATION, APPELLANT,
v.
RAYMOND DIEHL, JR., APPELLEE
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Giltex Corporation appealed an attorney's fee award in a contract dispute over real estate, arguing the trial court failed to comply with the Rowe standard requiring specific findings on hourly rate, hours expended, and enhancement/reduction factors. The court reversed and remanded because the trial court's order was facially deficient in making the express findings required by Rowe.
The court held that Rowe applies to attorney's fee awards in contract disputes and requires the trial court to set forth specific findings on hourly rate, hours reasonably expended, and the grounds for any enhancement or reduction. The trial court's order was fundamentally erroneous on its face for failing to make these express findings, and Giltex's acceptance of the benefits of the judgment did not estop it from appealing for a greater sum.
[1] A trial court must set forth specific findings regarding the hourly rate, hours reasonably expended, and appropriateness of reduction or enhancement factors when awarding…
[2] The requirement for specific findings in attorney's fee awards applies to fees awarded based on a contract.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Rowe requires the trial court in determining the proper amount of attorney's fees to set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors.”
Establishes the mandatory Rowe standard for attorney's fee determinations
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceGiltex Corporation was the prevailing party in a contract dispute involving the sale and purchase of real estate and was entitled to an attorney's fee…
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SMITH, Judge.
Appellant, Giltex Corporation, was previously successful in demonstrating its entitlement to an attorney’s fee as the prevailing party in a contract dispute involving the sale and purchase of real estate.1 Upon remand, the trial court awarded a fee of $6500 — $4,500 for services rendered in the trial court and $2,000 for services rendered in the appeal. However, the trial court’s order fails to set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors, contrary to Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985). We reverse.
On appeal, appellee, Raymond Diehl, Jr., contends this court should not reach the question of the applicability of Rowe, because there is no transcript of the attorney’s fee hearing below and the lack of a transcript constitutes an insufficient record which precludes appellate review. Clayton v. Clayton, 442 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983) (decision of trial court has the presumption of correctness and appellant has burden to demonstrate error — lack of a trial transcript or a proper substitute is a fatal flaw in appellant’s case). Next, Diehl contends that Rowe does not apply to a contract dispute like the one involved in this case. Stabinski, Funt & De Oliveira, P.A. v. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986).
Finally, Diehl contends that Giltex’s acceptance of a cashier’s check for $6500, subsequent to filing its notice of appeal, constitutes an acceptance of the benefits of the trial court’s final order and Giltex is estopped to seek reversal of that order on appeal. McMullen v. Fort Pierce Financing & Construction Co., 108 Fla. 492, 146 So. 567 (Fla.1933).
We reject each of appellee’s arguments.
Rowe requires the trial court in determining the proper amount of attorney’s fees to set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, the number of hours reasonably expended, and the appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors. If the court decides to adjust the lodestar, it must state the grounds on which it justifies the enhancement or reduction. Rowe, 472 So. 2d at 1151. Rowe applies to this award of fees based upon a contract. Boyette v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 528 So. 2d 539 n. 1 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
In Boyette, this court rejected the reasoning of Stabinski, upon which appel-lee relies. While the lack of a transcript or stipulated statement might otherwise require affirmance, this rule is not applicable in this case because the trial court’s order is fundamentally erroneous on its face for failure to make the express findings required by Rowe. Southeast Bank, N.A. v. David A. Steves, P.A., 552 So. 2d 292, 293 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Appellee’s further contention, that the acceptance by appellant of the benefits of the judgment requires affirmance, was rejected by this court when it denied appellee’s motion to dismiss, filed before consideration of this appeal on the merits. The general rule that a party is estopped to seek reversal of a judgment, where the party recovering judgment or decree accepts the benefits thereof, does not apply when the amount found in favor of the litigant by the judgment or decree is due him in any event — when there is no controversy over his right to receive and retain it — so that the only question to be determined by the appellate court is whether he is or is not entitled to a greater or additional sum. McMullen, 146 So. at 569 (Fla.1933).
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
JOANOS, C.J., and BARFIELD, J., concur. . Giltex Corp. v. Diehl, 544 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989).
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Citator
Cited By (13 total)
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Esaw v. Esaw, 965 So. 2d 1261 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)…riate substitute. In particular, an award of attorney’s fees without adequate findings justifying the amount of the award is reversible even where the appellant has provided an inadequate record of the trial court proceedings. Giltex Coup. v. Diehl, 583 So. 2d 734, 735-36 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), held that even though a transcript and stipulated statement of the evidence were lacking, an order awarding attorney’s fees should be reversed “because the trial court’s order [was] fundamentally erroneous on its face fo…
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Baratta v. Valley OAK Homeowners' Ass'n AT THE Vineyards, Inc., 891 So. 2d 1063 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…mandatory). We therefore find the trial court’s “Final Judgment for Attorneys Fees and Costs” fundamentally erroneous on its face.4 See Bayer v. Global Renaissance [*1066] Arts, Inc., 869 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004) (citing Giltex Corp. v. Diehl, 583 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)). We affirm the trial court’s finding that Valley Oak was entitled to attorney’s fees. We reverse the amount of attorney’s fees awarded and remand for the court to make findings explaining how $6821.25 in fees was reasonable for…
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Trishia Wolfe v. Nazaire, 758 So. 2d 730 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)…roper amount of attorney’s fees based on a contract, the trial court must set forth specific findings as to the hourly rate, number of hours reasonably expended, and appropriateness of the reduction or enhancement factors. See Giltex Corp. v. Diehl, 583 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)(citing Florida Patient’s Compensation Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145, 1151 (Fla.1985)). In calculating reasonable fees, the trial court must determine the number of hours reasonably expended and a reasonable hourly rate, then mult…
Previewing 3 of 13 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Fla. Patient's Comp. Fund v. Rowe, 472 So. 2d 1145 (Fla. 1985)
- McMullen v. Fort Pierce Fin. & Constr. Co., 108 Fla. 492 (Fla. 1933)
- State ex rel. First Tr. & Sav. Bank v. Southerland, 108 Fla. 433 (Fla. 1933)
- Clayton v. Ruthe Lee Clayton, 442 So. 2d 310 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Stabinski, Funt & DE Oliveira, P.A. v. LAW Offs. OF Frank H. Alvarez, 490 So. 2d 159 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986)
- Se. Bank, N.A. v. David A. Steves, P.A., 552 So. 2d 292 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Giltex Corp. v. Diehl, 544 So. 2d 302 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)
- Brigges v. State, 528 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 5th DCA 1988)
- Boyette v. Martha White Foods, Inc., 528 So. 2d 539 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)