N. GOLDRING, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
EALEY WHITE, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for personal injuries, holding that a driver is liable for damages proximately caused by negligently striking a pedestrian with a vehicle in a street.
Yes, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The court held that a driver is liable for injuries proximately caused by negligently striking a pedestrian who is properly walking in a street and lacks a reasonable opportunity to escape.
“Where a person who is not careless, but who is properly walking along or across a street, is injured by a vehicle rapidly and negligently driven upon him before he has reasonable opportunity to escape, the party so driving the vehicle is liable in damages for injuries proximately caused by the negligence.”
This quote establishes the legal principle for driver liability in cases of pedestrian-vehicle collisions due to negligence.
Previewing 1 of 2 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceEaley White sued N. Goldring for personal injuries, alleging Goldring negligently struck him with his automobile while operating it in a Pensacola str…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Personal Injury cases and more on FLexlaw
Shackleford, J.
— Ealey White brought an action against N. Goldring in which he sought to recover damages for personal injuries alleged to have been occasioned by the negligence of the defendant in running against him, the plaintiff, and striking him with his automibile, which was being operated by the defendant in a street in the City of Pensacola, Florida. Ro point is made on the pleadings. The plaintiff laid his damages at $10,000.00 and recovered a judgment for $250.00, which the defendant has brought here for review by writ of error. The principle assignments urged before us is the overruling of the motion for a new trial, which questions the sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict. We do not think that this assignment has been sustained. See the discussion in Geo.
E. Wood Lumber Co. v. Gipson, decided this day. We are further of the opinion that this case is ruled by Mugge v. Brachin, decided here at the present term, wherein we held that “Where a person who is not careless, but who is properly walking along or across a street, is injured by a vehicle rapidly and negligently driven upon him before he has reasonable opportunity to escape, the party so driving the vehicle is liable in damages for injuries proximately caused by the negligence.” We would also refer to Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co., 62 Fla. 166, 57 South. Rep.
233. We have considered all the assignments argued before us and, no reversible error having been made to appear, are of tifre opinion that the judgment must be affirmed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Taylor, Cockrell and Hocker, J. J., concur.