DOROTHY HARRIS, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR,
v.
COCOANUT GROVE DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, AND ANOTHER, DEFENDANTS IN ERROR
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Dorothy Harris sued for breach of an employment contract for one year at $35/week, claiming wrongful discharge in December 1911 after only two months. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the trial court's dismissal, holding that a cause of action arises immediately upon wrongful discharge of an employee under a fixed-term contract, without requiring the employee to wait until the contract term expires.
A cause of action arises immediately upon the wrongful discharge of an employee under a contract for a definite time, and it is not necessary to await the termination of that period before seeking judicial redress. The demurrer should have been confined to the special count rather than applied to the common counts.
“a cause of action is stated, and this alone is tested by a demurrer”
Establishes the standard for testing a demurrer—whether a cause of action is stated, not whether all damages will ultimately be recoverable.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDorothy Harris entered into a one-year employment contract with Cocoanut Grove Development Company beginning October 1, 1911, at thirty-five dollars p…
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Cockrell, J.
— This is an action for breach of a contract of employment, for one year beginning October 1, 1911, at thirty-five dollars a week, and reimbursement of traveling expenses from New York City to Miami, Florida. The declaration consists of the common counts and also a special count alleging the contract and the discharge of the plaintiff Dorothy Harris without cause in December, 1911, the action following the discharge within one week. A demurrer to the declaration was sustained upon the ground that the action was premature and final judgment entered upon failure to amend.
We find the authorities against this ruling. Whatever may be the proper measure of damages at the trial of the cause, there can be no doubt that a cause of action is stated, and this alone is tested by a demurrer. The cases with striking unanimity hold that a cause of action immediately arises upon the wrongful discharge of an employee under contract for a definite time, and it is not necessary to await the termination of that period before asking the courts for redress; without exhausting the list of cases directly on this point we cite Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co., 173 U. S. 1, 43 L. Ed. 591, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 335; Davis v. Ayers, 9 Ala. 292; Paige v. Barnett, 151 Mass. 67, 23 N.
E. Rep. 725; Roberts v. Rigdon, 7 S.
E. Rep. 742; Litchenstein v. Brooks, 75 Texas, 196, 12 S.
W. Rep. 975; Hamilton v. Love, 152 Ind. 641, 53 N.
E. Rep. 181; 54 N.
E. Rep. 437, 71 Am. St. Rep. 384; Howay v. Going-Northrup Co., 24 Wash. 88, 64 Pac. Rep. 135, 6 L.
R. A. (N. S.) 1. These cases are in line with the decisions of this court in Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 8 South. Rep. 450, wherein we decided that upon an unequivocal breach of an executory contract the injured party might sue immediately for an entire breach of the contract without awaiting the expiration of the time it would take to complete the contract, and though this was said of a contract to deliver logs, there can be no differentiation in the principle there announced because this is a contract to pay for services.
One other objection is made to the form of the declara; tion, that it does not state the venue in the margin. This is not a local action, but even were it so the declaration is entitled “In the Circuit Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit, in and for Dade County, Florida.” This should satisfy the most capricious stickler for the old time common law form of pleading.
With only a passing reference to the well established rule in this State that the demurrer should have been confined to the special count, and that the ground sustained did not apply to the common counts, the judgment cannot be sustained.
Judgment reversed.
Whitfield, C. J., and Taylor, Shackleford and Hocker, J. J., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151 (Fla. 1928)…he contract. As to the sufficiency vel non of the allegation as [*160] to damages, demurer was not the proper way to test that. Demurrer tests the cause of action. There was not a total absence of claim for damages. Haines v. Coconut Grove Dev. Co., 63 Fla. 175, 59 So. R. 11 Cyc. 297. Losses that necessarily result in the usual course of things, from the breach of a contract, are presumed to have been within the contemplation of the parties, and may be recovered under a general allegation of damages withou…1 / 2
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Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 151 Fla. 62 (Fla. 1942)…t them, there is nothing revolutionary about our former holdings in.this cause. We have long held that a similar rule is applicable to ordinary contracts for-personal services when made with agents or employees. See Harris v. Coconut Grove Dev. Co., 63 Fla. 175, 59 So. 11; Hazen v. Cobb, 96 Fla. 151, 117 So. 853; h.n. 20 and 21; and the principle involved is given even a wider scope in Pollardy-Watrous Ins. Agency v. M. Tucker, Inc., 120 Fla. 895, 163 So. 284. And in a recent case, we again extended the ru…
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Gilliland v. Mercantile Inv. & Holding Co., 147 Fla. 613 (Fla. 1941)…is we do not agree. The doctrine of anticipatory breach of contract has been approved by us. See Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543, 8 So. 450; Thomson v. Kyle, 39 Fla. 582, 23 So. 12, 63 Am. St. Rep. 193; Harris v. Coconut Grove Development Company, 63 Fla. 175, 59 So. 11. The plaintiff is held to the same degree of proof to recover damages in an action brought on an anticipatory breach as if he had waited until after the time elapsed for fulfillment of his contract. Numerous cases from other jurisdiction…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Sullivan v. McMillan, 26 Fla. 543 (Fla. 1890)
- Pierce v. Tennessee Coal, 173 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1899)