ST. LUCIE COUNTY, FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION CO., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE
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St. Lucie County appealed the trial court's directed verdict for Federal Construction Co. on breach of contract claims and an award of expert witness costs on a summary judgment. The Fourth District reversed both rulings, finding sufficient evidence of breach regarding the contractor's failure to properly manage a tile work dispute on a jail construction project, and holding that costs for an expert witness who did not testify were improperly awarded.
The court held that there was sufficient evidence of breach of contract to prevent a directed verdict and require jury determination, and that costs for an expert witness who never testified were improperly awarded under prevailing case law.
[1] A directed verdict is improper when there is some evidence, however small, that a party breached its contractual duties.
[2] A court may not weigh the evidence on a motion for directed verdict; even a small amount of evidence is sufficient to require resolution by the trier of fact.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Even a small amount of evidence is sufficient to require the resolution of the dispute by the trier of fact.”
Establishes the legal standard for directed verdicts—any evidence sufficient to allow reasonable persons to differ requires jury determination
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFederal Construction Co. entered into a construction management agreement with St. Lucie County to manage the construction of a jail facility. A dispu…
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PER CURIAM.
We sua sponte consolidate these appeals arising from the same action in the trial court. We reverse the judgment on the merits based upon the trial court’s direction of a verdict for appellee in appellant’s action based upon an alleged breach of contract. We also reverse the imposition of costs for an expert witnesses’ services awarded after the entry of a summary judgment for appellee on appellant’s negligence claim.
The breach of contract action was predicated upon appellee’s alleged failure to carry out its responsibilities under a construction management agreement with the appellant involving the construction of a jail facility. Specifically, the appellant claimed that the appellee failed to act pursuant to its management duties to assist in resolving a dispute involving the tile work to be done on the project. The county presented evidence that the tile work eventually cost many times the amount originally contracted for, and that appellee was partially responsible for the excessive cost by failing to act properly and promptly to determine the cause of the problem. While it is undisputed that appellee was not responsible for the underlying cause of the title problem, we agree with appellant that there is some evidence that appellee did not perform the services for which it had contracted to resolve the tile problem.
There is evidence in the record, for example, that the appellee had agreed, but failed to secure the services of an independent expert to determine the cause of the tile problem. There is also abundant evidence suggesting that the appellee properly carried out its responsibilities, and that the difficulty in resolution of the tile problem was caused by others, including the appellant. However, on a motion for directed verdict, it is not the role of the court to act upon the weight of the evidence, even when it is great. Even a small amount of evidence is sufficient to require the resolution of the dispute by the trier of fact. Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). We conclude that upon the evidence presented, reasonable persons could conclude that appellee had breached its contractual duties in the manner it attempted to resolve the tile problem.
We also agree with appellant that the trial court acted contrary to prevailing case law in assessing costs for an expert witness who never appeared at trial. See Thellman v. Tropical Acres Steakhouse, Inc., 557 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990).
Accordingly, we reverse and remand with directions for further proceedings in accord herewith.
GLICKSTEIN, C.J., and WALDEN, JAMES H., Senior Judge, concur. ANSTEAD, J., concurs in part and dissents in part with opinion.
ANSTEAD, Judge,
concurring in part, dissenting in part.
I dissent only from that part of the decision reversing the cost judgment. Like the trial court, I do not believe it makes good sense to deny the appellee-defendant its costs for an expert specifically employed to determine the merits of appellant’s negligence claim, which was not decided in appellee’s favor until the first day of trial.
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Phillips v. Van's Elec. OF Lake Worth, Inc., 620 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993)…(Fla. 4th DCA 1985), review dismissed, 491 So. 2d 280 (Fla.1986). A judge is prohibited from acting as a substitute fact-finder on the weight of the evidence presented at trial by granting a directed verdict. St. Lucie County v. Federal Constr. Co., 584 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). On this record, we find that there was sufficient evidence of appellee’s negligence to send the case to the jury. In particular, the very morning of the incident the appel-lee had attempted to repair the unit from which lat…
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Psychiatric Inst. OF Del-Ray, Inc. v. Keel, 717 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998)…e that the trial court abused its discretion in taxing Appellants $7,500 for Dr. Nelson’s expert witness fee where Dr. Nelson was not qualified as an expert by the trial court nor did he testify at trial. See St. Lucie County v. Federal Constr. Co., 584 So. 2d 122, 123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Thellman v. Tropical Acres Steakhouse, Inc., 557 So. 2d 683, 684 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)(finding that it was not appropriate to tax expert witness fees of witnesses who are neither qualified as experts by the court nor testify…
Authorities Cited
- Riccio v. Allstate Ins. Co., 357 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)
- Tedder v. State, 557 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990)
- Thellman v. Tropical Acres Steakhouse, Inc., 557 So. 2d 683 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)