MINEOLA EDWARDS BRYANT, APPELLANT,
v.
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLEE
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Bryant appeals the trial court's order striking Allstate as a defendant in her suit against an uninsured tortfeasor, arguing the court wrongly applied the rule against splitting a cause of action. The Fifth District reversed, holding that Bryant's separate uninsured motorist coverage claim against Allstate constitutes a distinct cause of action from her tort claim against the tortfeasor.
The trial court erred in applying the rule against splitting a cause of action. Bryant's claim against Allstate for breach of the uninsured motorist provision is a separate cause of action from her tort claim against the tortfeasor, because each coverage provision in an insurance policy gives rise to a separate cause of action. Therefore, Bryant may separately assert her uninsured motorist claim against Allstate.
[1] A plaintiff may not split a cause of action by dividing property and personal injury claims arising from a single tort into separate lawsuits.
[2] A breach of each separate and divisible coverage provision in an insurance contract gives rise to a separate cause of action that may be asserted independently.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The rule against splitting a cause of action requires that all damages sustained by a party as a result of a single wrongful act are lost if not claimed or recovered in one action.”
Establishes the traditional rule against splitting causes of action that the court must interpret in this context.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceBryant was injured in an automobile accident caused by an uninsured tortfeasor. She had an insurance policy with Allstate that included personal injur…
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GOSHORN, Chief Judge.
Mineóla Bryant appeals the order striking her insurer, Allstate Insurance Company, as a defendant in Bryant’s suit against an uninsured tortfeasor, against whom Bryant had earlier obtained a Clerk’s default. She argues that the trial court erred in determining she was attempting to split her cause of action. We agree and reverse.
Bryant’s insurance contract with Allstate includes personal injury protection, property damage and uninsured motorist coverages. Following an automobile accident, Bryant successfully sued Allstate for damages to recover the cost of repairing her car. Allstate settled a second suit with Bryant for personal injury protection benefits. The instant appeal stems from Bryant’s attempt to sue Allstate as a party defendant in her suit against the uninsured tortfeasor. Allstate prevailed on its motion to have her claim against it stricken on the basis that Bryant was precluded from subjecting Allstate to a successive action by the application of the judicially created rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action.
The rule against splitting a cause of action requires that all damages sustained by a party as a result of a single wrongful act are lost if not claimed or recovered in one action. Ganon v. Staturn, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So. 2d 432 (1942). Allstate’s argument is that the “single wrongful act” was the automobile accident and thus all damages arising therefrom should have been joined in a single suit. Had Bryant attempted to sue the tort-fea-sor for personal injury claims in one suit and property damages in a separate action, then Bryant would properly have been precluded from bringing her instant suit under the rule prohibiting splitting causes of action. See McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) (the law does not permit a plaintiff to split his cause of action by dividing his property and personal injury claims arising from a single tort into two lawsuits). However, the wrongful act for which Bryant brought the instant suit is Allstate’s alleged breach of the uninsured motorist provision of her insurance contract, not the tortfeasor’s tort. This coverage is separate and divisible from the other risks underwritten by Allstate in the policy. See 44 C.J.S., Insurance, § 336, p. 1284.1 A breach of each coverage provision gives rise to a separate cause of action and may be separately asserted. Couch on Insurance 2d (Rev ed) § 74:825. Accordingly, Bryant has not split her cause of action by bringing the uninsured motorist action separately.
REVERSED and REMANDED for further proceedings.
PETERSON and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur. . This section provides:
Where a policy grouping several risks incident to the ownership and operation of motor vehicles, such as those of accidental bodily injury or death occasioned to the operator, loss or damage from accident or injury suffered by some person caused by the vehicle and for which the owner is liable, loss or damages to property caused by the motor vehicle, and loss or damages to vehicle by fire, accident, burglary, or theft, its legal effect is not different from the legal effect of separate policies each against one of the grouped risks....
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Tyson v. Viacom, Inc., 890 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005)…2d 844, 846 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)(landlords did not split cause of action by bringing two separate actions under single lease, one for accelerated payment of rent and one for failure to remove petroleum storage equipment); Bryant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (insured does not split cause of action by suing separately for breach of individual coverage issues contained in single insurance policy); Popwell v. Abel, 226 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 4th DCA 1969) (separate suits on check and breach o…1 / 2
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William H. Scovell & Sandra Z. Scovell v. Delco OIL Co., Inc., 798 So. 2d 844 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)…of Gainesville, 778 So. 2d at 522. The rule against splitting a cause of action requires that all damages sustained by a party as a result of a single wrongful act are lost if not claimed or recovered in one action. See Bryant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 194, 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)(citing Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793, 10 So. 2d 432 (1942)). Affirmative defenses like res judicata (usually used to raise the rule) ordinarily must be pleaded in an answer, and not on a motion to dismiss. See Barbado v. Gr…
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Almeroth v. Gov't Emps. Ins. Co., 587 So. 2d 550 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)…cy into which appellants and appellee had entered. Appellants assert that the insurance policy sued upon is a! severable contract, with separate premiums paid for property damage coverage and uninsured motorist coverage. Bryant v. Allstate Ins. Co., 584 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). They argue that they should therefore be allowed to initiate one cause of action for property damage and a separate cause of action for personal injuries. We agree with the reasoning in Bryant, which supports the conclusion that…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Gaynon v. Statum, 151 Fla. 793 (Fla. 1942)
- Eleyna McKIBBEN and Robert McKibben v. Zamora, 358 So. 2d 866 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978)