THOMAS EDWARD DIXON, A/K/A ALVIN LESTER COTTRELL, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Thomas Dixon challenges his organized fraud conviction on double jeopardy grounds after being previously convicted of dealing in stolen property. The court reverses his conviction, finding that the prosecutor conceded the fraud charge involved the same conduct as the prior theft offense, thereby violating the Double Jeopardy Clause under Grady v. Corbin.
Dixon's organized fraud conviction is reversed because the prosecution violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. Under Grady v. Corbin, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government must prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.
[1] The Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent prosecution if the government must prove conduct constituting an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted…
[2] A subsequent prosecution for organized fraud is barred by double jeopardy when the conduct constituting the offense is the same as conduct for which the defendant was pre…
Previewing 2 of 4 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the [djouble [jjeopardy clause bars any subsequent prosecution in cases in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in the prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.”
The core rule from Grady v. Corbin establishing when double jeopardy bars subsequent prosecutions
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceDixon was previously convicted of dealing in stolen property under Florida law. He was subsequently charged with organized fraud related to the same t…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Double Jeopardy Clause cases and more on FLexlaw
DIAMANTIS, Judge.
In this case appellant, Thomas Edward Dixon a/k/a Alvin Lester Cottrell, raises a double jeopardy1 challenge to his prosecution for organized fraud.2 Appellant had previously been convicted of dealing in stolen property.3 Because we conclude that the subsequent organized fraud prosecution is barred by the double jeopardy clause, we reverse appellant’s organized fraud conviction, vacate his sentence, and remand with directions that he be discharged as to that offense.
Appellant entered a plea of nolo contendere to the organized fraud charge and reserved the right to appeal the trial court’s rejection of his contention that his prosecution on this offense violated double jeopardy. There is no dispute that this contention is dispositive. Not only is this contention dispositive, but the right not to be twice placed in jeopardy is “fundamental”. State v. Johnson, 483 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1986).
At the nolo contendere plea hearing the prosecutor candidly conceded:
[tjhat dealing in stolen property, that act of that, which I have charged him with organized fraud, is the same exact dealing in stolen property.
The prosecutor also conceded that “it relates to the same transaction”.
Based upon the prosecutor’s concessions 4 we must reverse the appellant’s conviction for organized fraud on the binding and controlling authority of Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). In Grady, the Supreme Court held that the [djouble [jjeopardy clause bars any subsequent prosecution in cases in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in the prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted.
Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2093. The court further stated that “[t]he critical inquiry is what conduct the State will prove.” Id.
By way of a caveat we point out that the state could have prosecuted appellant for both dealing in stolen property and organized fraud in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding the double jeopardy snare. Grady, 110 S.Ct. at 2095.
Conviction REVERSED; sentence VACATED; cause REMANDED with direction that appellant be discharged as to the offense of organized fraud.
COBB and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. . U.S. Const, amend. V.
. § 817.034(4)(a)2, Fla.Stat. (1989).
. § 812.019(1), Fla.Stat. (1989).
. See Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301, 303 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984).
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Williams v. State, 601 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…conduct that constitutes the crimes of armed robbery, murder, and accessory after the fact, appellant’s conduct in acting as an [*1256] accessory after the fact in no way constitutes an element of either armed robbery or murder. See Dixon v. State, 584 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). Because the state need not prove conduct that constitutes the offense of accessory after the fact in order to establish an essential element of armed robbery or murder, double jeopardy does not bar appellant’s prosecution for ar…
Authorities Cited
- Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (U.S. 1990)
- State v. Johnson, 483 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1986)
- Freeman v. State, 450 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 5th DCA 1984)