STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLANT,
v.
EDDIE SHELTON, TOMMY JONES, AND MOSES JONES, APPELLEES
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The State appeals a trial court's order imposing monetary sanctions against the State Attorney's Office for gross negligence in failing to ensure key witnesses were present at jury selection, resulting in a dismissed jury panel. The appellate court reverses, holding that trial courts lack inherent authority to assess attorney's fees or costs against the state in criminal cases absent applicable statutes or rules.
A trial court has no inherent authority to assess attorney's fees or costs against the State Attorney's Office in criminal cases. Only through criminal contempt procedures under Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure 3.830 and 3.840 can such sanctions be imposed, and even then such sanctions cannot be for the benefit of defendants.
[1] A trial court lacks inherent authority to assess attorney's fees or costs against the State Attorney's Office in criminal cases.
[2] A trial court cannot impose sanctions against a party for the benefit of the opposing party in a criminal case.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the trial court has no inherent authority to assess attorney's fees or costs against the State Attorney's Office in criminal cases”
Establishes the core holding that trial courts lack the power to impose monetary sanctions directly on the state in criminal proceedings
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn Monday morning, jury selection commenced in a criminal attempted murder and burglary case. The prosecutor had failed to subpoena the two key state …
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W. SHARP, Judge.
The state appeals from an order by the circuit court which sanctioned it for grossly negligent preparation of a criminal case, and which required the State Attorney’s Office to pay $50 to the Public Defender’s Office, $50 to defense counsel, and $150 to the general revenue fund for reimbursement for costs associated with an aborted jury selection effort, and the wasted time and effort of court personnel and facilities. The trial judge expressly found there had been no intentional misbehavior on the part of the prosecutor. We reverse.
On a Monday morning the process of selecting a jury panel in a criminal trial was commenced. The two key state witnesses (the alleged victims of attempted murder and burglary of a dwelling) had not been subpoenaed for the trial. On the pri-or Friday, the prosecutor dispatched his investigator to serve Kevin (one of the victims). The investigator reached Kevin by phone on Saturday and told him it was extremely important for Kevin to appear in court on Monday.
Also on Friday, the witness coordinator for Volusia County tried to telephone Kevin’s mother (the other alleged victim). The coordinator was told that Kevin’s mother was vacationing out of state. She was also told on Monday that Kevin had been hospitalized in Gainesville, Florida.
While the prosecutor was engaged in picking the jury on Monday morning, the coordinator entered the courtroom to tell him her bad news concerning the state’s two key witnesses. Once again the prosecutor dispatched the investigator to locate Kevin. He found Kevin at home, in bed.
At about the same time, the prosecutor requested a continuance from the trial judge. The investigator had not told the prosecutor he had actually talked with Kevin. Thus, the prosecutor could not assure the court that the state could proceed with the case. So far as he knew, Kevin had neither been contacted nor been subpoenaed. Accordingly, the judge dismissed the jury panel. Later that afternoon, Kevin arrived in court, prepared for trial.
The defense attorneys moved for sanctions and specifically requested that Kevin and his mother be precluded from testifying at trial. The trial judge refused to impose sanctions against Kevin or his mother, and ruled that excluding their testimony would be inappropriate. Instead, the trial judge faulted the handling of this case by the prosecutor’s office. She stated:
If such was an isolated incident, then perhaps a mere reprimand would be in order, but reprimands have failed in the past to remedy the situation. At some point, the court has a duty to exercise its inherent powers and regain control of the court and the caseload. Defendants have a right to be timely tried. The State has the duty, if it charges someone with a crime, to be prepared to go forward and prove the charges.
In this case, the State was not adequately prepared and such lack of preparation was not just neglect, but gross neglect considering the circumstances.
We sympathize with the trial court’s attempt to resolve this case with a few well-assessed costs against the party it felt caused the trial delay. However, the trial court has no inherent authority to assess attorney’s fees or costs against the State Attorney’s Office in criminal cases. State v. Harwood, 488 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986); State v. J.L.P., 435 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983). Nor is there any applicable rule or statute which would permit the assessment of such fees or costs. See Harwood; J.L.P. It appears that only through the use of criminal contempt procedures (direct or indirect),1 can .a trial court assess fines or costs against an attorney in a criminal case. But in any event, such sanctions cannot be for the benefit of the defendants. Harwood.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand this case to the trial court for such further proceedings as it may consider are warranted, which are consistent with this opinion.
REVERSED; REMANDED.
COWART and HARRIS, JJ., concur. . Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.830 and 3.840.
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Williams v. State, 596 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…the expenses for the unused jurors were "fully allocable to your client." The clear implication of this statement is that Williams, through his indecisiveness about a plea, wasted the jurors’ time and the court system’s money. Cf. State v. Shelton, 584 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991) (costs improperly assessed against assistant state attorney for "grossly negligent preparation of a criminal case” resulting in "aborted jury selection effort”). The record before us is insufficient to determine who, if anyone, w…
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Fredericks v. Sturgis, 598 So. 2d 94 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)…dant was advised of his rights under rule 3.840 or that any party was aware of that rule’s application. Also, an award of attorney’s fees for another party or a court’s wasted time in a criminal contempt proceeding is improper. See State v. Shelton, 584 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. [*97] 5th DCA 1991); Dowis v. State, 578 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); Routh v. Routh, 565 So. 2d 709 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990). Finally, in Lowe, supra, the court stated that generally, the mere failure of an attorney to timely appear for trial…
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State v. Grady Nelson, 27 So. 3d 758 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010)…ng costs against the State Attorney’s Office as a sanction for a discovery violation in a criminal prosecution. The trial court does not have inherent authority to assess costs against the State Attorney’s Office in criminal cases. State v. Shelton, 584 So. 2d 1118 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991); State v. Harwood, 488 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986). Accordingly, we grant certiorari, and quash the trial court order assessing costs against the State Attorney’s Office in this cause. Petition granted; order quashed.…
Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. J.L.P. and K.L.M., 435 So. 2d 392 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983)
- Hunter P. Barker v. City OF Coconut Creek, 488 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986)
- State v. Harwood, 488 So. 2d 901 (Fla. 5th DCA 1986)