STACEY DEON MOORE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Stacey Moore appeals the denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a police stop and frisk. The court held that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion (founded suspicion) to detain Moore based solely on observing him riding a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. several blocks from a burglary location, and reversed the denial of the suppression motion.
The court held that the officer lacked founded suspicion to justify the stop and frisk. Merely observing the defendant on a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. several blocks from the burglary, without a description of the perpetrator or additional articulable facts, constitutes bare suspicion insufficient to support detention under Florida law.
[1] A law enforcement officer may temporarily detain a person only when circumstances reasonably indicate that the person has committed, is committing, or is about to commit…
[2] A founded suspicion, which is required to justify a temporary detention, must have some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, interpreted in li…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A "founded suspicion" is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer's knowledge. "Mere" or "bare" suspicion, on the other hand, cannot support the detention.”
Establishes the legal standard for justified police detention under Florida law, distinguishing founded suspicion from bare suspicion.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceMoore, a black male, was riding a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. on a street two to three blocks from an apartment where a burglary was reported in progress. A …
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PER CURIAM.
The appellant, Stacey Moore, appeals the denial of his motion to suppress. The testimony established that Moore, a black male, was riding a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. on a street two to three blocks from an apartment where a burglary was reported to be “in progress”. An officer, who was responding to the transmission regarding the ongoing burglary, saw the defendant on a bicycle near the burglary site and stopped him. The officer patted him down “for safety” and found a long object in Moore’s pocket. Moore said it was his glasses. The officer looked at the glasses and then continued the pat down. In the waistband of Moore’s pants the officer found a Louis Vuitton wallet and checkbook. The burglary victim subsequently identified the wallet and checkbook.
Moore argues that the stop and frisk was illegal because the police officer had no reasonable suspicion of illegal activity and under these circumstances the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress. We agree and reverse. Section 901.151(2), Florida Statutes (1987), Florida’s Stop and Frisk Law, provides:
Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any persons under circumstances which reasonably indicate that such person had committed, is committing, or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws of this state or the criminal ordinances of any municipality or county, he may temporarily detain such person for the purpose of ascertaining the identity of the person temporarily detained and the circumstances surrounding his presence abroad which led the officer to believe that he had committed, was committing or was about to commit a criminal offense.
It is well settled that to justify a temporary detention only a “founded suspicion” is required. A “founded suspicion” is a suspicion which has some factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the officer, when those circumstances are interpreted in light of the officer’s knowledge. “Mere” or “bare” suspicion, on the other hand, cannot support the detention. State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
Here the police officer testified that he did not have a description of the perpetrator of the burglary. His suspicion was aroused only by the fact that Moore was riding a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. and was coming from the area of the burglary. In similar cases the courts have refused to find that the officer possessed a founded suspicion. In Schaub v. State, 576 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) the defendant and another man were observed running through a darkened wooded area by a police officer on patrol in a high crime area at 3:00 a.m. This aroused the officer’s suspicion so he confronted the men. The court held that these circumstances did not give rise to a founded suspicion and the drugs seized from the defendant were suppressed. Similarly in Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) the officer answered a complaint about drug activity in an apartment. The defendant was in the general vicinity but not seen at or leaving the apartment. The officer did not have a description and stopped the defendant because he was in a known drug area. This was insufficient to support a finding of founded suspicion. Likewise in this case we do not believe that the officer developed a founded suspicion by merely observing the defendant on a bicycle at 2:00 a.m. several blocks from the ongoing burglary.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand.
DOWNEY and FARMER, JJ„ and WALDEN, JAMES H„ Senior Judge, concur.
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Wilson v. State, 734 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)…ohnson v. State, 438 So. 2d 774 (Fla.1983)(citing McNamara v. State, 357 So. 2d 410 (Fla.1978)). [*1110] To justify a temporary detention of an individual, a law enforcement officer must have a founded suspicion of criminal activity. Moore v. State, 584 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); § 901.151, Fla. Stat. (1997). A founded suspicion is one which has a factual foundation in the circumstances observed by the law enforcement officer, interpreted in li…
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Batson v. State, 847 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003)…y. See H.H. v. State, 775 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 4th DCA 2000)(holding that facts were insufficient to support reasonable suspicion where the defendant was found riding a bike at about 1:00 a.m. a few blocks from scene of a bicycle theft); Moore v. State, 584 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(holding that the fact that defendant was riding his bike at 2:00 a.m. only two to three blocks from an apartment where a burglary was reported to be “in progress” was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion that defendant…
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Phillips v. State, 781 So. 2d 477 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001)…e are not sufficient to justify an investigatory stop. Although the police officer’s hunch was correct, “[a] ‘hunch’ that criminal activity may be occurring is not sufficient.” La-Fontaine v. State, 749 So. 2d 558 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000); Moore v. State, 584 So. 2d 1122, 1123 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)(“ ‘Mere’ or ‘bare’ suspicion ... cannot support a [temporary] detention.”); Popple, 626 So. 2d at 186 (“Mere suspicion is not enough to support a[n] [investigatory] stop.”). In contrast, the defendant contends, and we agre…
Previewing 3 of 10 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- State v. Stevens, 354 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
- Jordan v. State, 544 So. 2d 1073 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- Fenuta v. State, 576 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)
- Schaub v. State, 576 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991)