STS LAND ASSOCIATES, L.P.; STS BUILDING ASSOCIATES, L.P.; SOUTH FLORIDA INDUSTRIAL PARK LOCAL GOVERNMENT NEIGHBORHOOD IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT BOARD OF DIRECTORS; DAVID RUSH; AND LOREN INDUSTRIES, INC., PETITIONERS,
v.
THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD, BY THE CITY COMMISSION OF THE CITY; THE BOARD OF APPEALS AND ADJUSTMENTS OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD; THE PLANNING AND ZONING ADVISORY BOARD OF THE CITY OF HOLLYWOOD; CONGO RIVER GOLF DEVELOPMENT, CO.; CHARLES A. BREINER AND HENRY BREINER, TRUSTEE, RESPONDENTS
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The Florida appellate court reviewed a circuit court decision affirming a city's approval of a miniature golf course as a special exception use in a business zoning district. The court held that the special exception was invalid because the zoning ordinance did not expressly permit such use at the time of approval, and even though the ordinance was later amended, the required specific findings were not made.
The court held that a special exception is not a permitted use unless the zoning ordinance expressly permits and lists such use as a special exception. Although the City later amended the ordinance to authorize outdoor commercial amusement facilities as a special exception, the Board's resolution failed to make the specific findings required by the amended ordinance, rendering the approval invalid.
[1] A special exception use is not a permitted use unless the zoning ordinance expressly permits and lists such use as a special exception.
[2] A zoning ordinance amendment permitting a use as a special exception, enacted after the initial approval of that use, does not render a challenge to the initial approval…
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a special exception is not a permitted use unless the zoning ordinance under which an applicant is proceeding expressly permits and lists such use as a special exception”
Establishes the fundamental legal principle governing special exceptions in zoning law that the circuit court failed to apply.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceCongo River Golf Development Company sought approval to place a miniature golf course on property in a BE-31 business zoning district in Hollywood, Fl…
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PER CURIAM.
Petitioners seek review of the circuit court’s decision, acting in its appellate capacity, affirming the City of Hollywood’s approval of a “special exception” use, which permitted Congo River Golf Development Company to place a miniature golf course on property located in a BE-31 (business) zoning district. Our review is limited to determining whether the circuit court afforded procedural due process and applied correct law. City of Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla.1982); Tomeu v. Palm Beach County, 430 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983).
We agree with petitioners that the circuit court applied incorrect law, as it overlooked the principle that a special exception is not a permitted use unless the zoning ordinance under which an applicant is proceeding expressly permits and lists such use as a special exception. See Metropolitan Dade County v. Betancourt, 559 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Rural New Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach County, 315 So. 2d 478, 480 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Mayflower Property Inc. v. City of Ft. Lauderdale, 137 So. 2d 849, 852 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962).
The City Commission did approve an amendment to the applicable zoning ordinance in this case to permit outdoor commercial amusement facilities as a special exception, but this approval did not occur until after the City had purported to approve the special exception requested by Congo River. Respondents contend that, even if we find the circuit court failed to apply the correct law, we should nevertheless deny the writ as moot because the City Commission has approved the amendment to the applicable ordinance authorizing the use in question as a special exception; thus, they argue a new application will undoubtedly be granted. In all probability permission will likely be granted. However, the amended ordinance requires the Board of Appeals and Adjustment to make certain specific findings in connection with any approval of an outdoor commercial amusement facility as a special exception in a BE-31 district, and the Board’s October 29, 1990, resolution failed to make such specific findings. Accordingly, we reject respondents’ contention that this matter is moot.
Based on the foregoing, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the circuit court’s April 22, 1991, decision.
DOWNEY, HERSEY and WARNER, JJ., concur.
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- City OF Deerfield Beach v. Vaillant, 419 So. 2d 624 (Fla. 1982)
- Rural NEW Town, Inc. v. Palm Beach Cnty., 315 So. 2d 478 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975)
- Tomeu v. Palm Beach Cnty., 430 So. 2d 601 (Fla. 4th DCA 1983)
- The Crown Life Ins. Co. v. Miguel Antonio Cervera Falla de Falla, 137 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d DCA 1962)
- Mayflower Prop., Inc. v. City OF Fort Lauderdale, 137 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 2d DCA 1962)
- Town OF Davie v. Harrison, 559 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990)