W. W. LANGFORD, DOING BUSINESS AS SIMMONS, LANGFORD AND COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
SOUTH FLORIDA LUMBER AND SUPPLY COMPANY, A CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. | 1912-01-01
Taylor, Shackleford, Cockrell and Hocker,, J. J. concur.
63 Fla. 484 Florida Supreme Court (1912) Positive Treatment
Cited by 12 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

A materialman who furnished supplies to a contractor sought to enforce a statutory lien against the property owner, who was not in privity with the supplier. The Florida Supreme Court held that the notice given to the property owner was insufficient under the lien statute because it failed to state the specific sum owed by the contractor.


Holding

The court held that a statutory materialman's lien requires substantial performance of all requisites, including delivery of written notice stating the specific sum for which the contractor is indebted. The notice in this case was insufficient because it did not state a definite sum owed by Reed to the Supply Company, only that materials valued at over $2,500 had been contracted for and were past due.


Key Quotes

“A person entitled to acquire a lien, not in privity with the owner, as aforesaid, shall acquire a lien upon such owner's real or personal property as against him, .................. by the delivery to him, or his agent, of a written notice that the contractor or other person for whom the labor has been performed, or the materials furnished, is indebted to the person performing the labor or furnishing the materials in the sum stated in the notice.”

The statutory requirement for materialmen's liens against non-privity owners, establishing that notice must state a specific sum owed.

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Facts & Procedural History

South Florida Lumber and Supply Company furnished materials to contractor P. E. Reed for work on a building owned by W. W. Langford. The Supply Compan…

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Opinion of the Court
Whitfield, C. J.

Whitfield, C. J. — This proceeding in equity is to enforce a lien for material furnished to Reed, the contractor, by the Supply Company who was not in privity with Lang-ford the owner of the property in which the material was used. A demurrer by Langford to the bill of complaint on grounds that no equity is stated against the owner of the property who was not in privity with the complainant, was overruled, and from a decree adjudging a lien the owner of the property appealed.

The order overruling the demurrer to the bill of complaint is assigned and argued as error. The statute provides for liens for materialmen and enacts that “A person entitled to acquire a lien, not in privity with the owner, as aforesaid, shall acquire a lien upon such owner’s real or personal property as against him, .................. by the delivery to him, or his agent, of a written notice that the contractor or other person for whom the labor has been performed, or the materials furnished, is indebted to the person performing the labor or furnishing the materials in the sum stated in the notice.”

Sec. 2211 Gen. Stats, of 1906.

The notice given by the material man to the owner of the property is as follows: “Mess.

Simon, Langford & Co., Arcadia, Fla. Gentlemen:— Mr. P. E.

Eeed, who has the contract for your building, contracted with us for something over twenty-five hundred dollars’ worth of material to be used on your building.

We called on him about two weeks ago for a settlement and have since written to him.

He states, however, that you are holding back money until job is completed.

Owing to the fact that this money is now long past due, we are compelled to put you on notice that we will look to you for this account, as owners of the building.

We should be very glad to1 have au answer to this letter by return mail.

Yours very truly, South Florida Lumber & Supply Co., A. D.

Hagadorn, Sec. & Gen. Mgr.”

Where a statutory lien may be obtained by compliance with stated requirements there must be a substantial performance of all the requisites before the lien is acquired.

The statute provides that the lien is acquired by delivery to the owner or his agent a written notice that the contractor or other person to whom the material was furnished for the owner’s property, is indebted to the person furnishing the materials in the sum stated in the notice.

DeSoto Nat.

Bank v. Arcadia Electric Light, Ice & Telephone Co., 59 Fla. 479, 52 South.

Rep. 612.

The notice given in this case to Langford, the owner of the property, does not state a snm for which the contractor Reed is indebted to the Supply Company for materials.

The statement in the letter that Reed has a contract with the Supply Company for $2500.00 worth of material to he used in Langford’s building; that Reed had been called on “for a settlement;” and “that this money is now long past due and we are compelled to put you on notice tha l we will look to you for this account,” is not a statement that Reed is indebted to the Supply Company for materials in the sum stated in the notice as required by the statute.

This notice is insufficient to create a lien under the statute and the complainant has no equity if it cannot be predicated upon a duly acquired statutory lien.

This decree is reversed.

Taylor, Shackleford, Cockrell and Hocker,, J. J. concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Harper Lumber & Mfg. Co. v. Teate, 98 Fla. 1055 (Fla. 1929)
    …ent in said notice to the substantial effect that said Carman Company, the contractor, “is indebted” to Harper Lbr. & Mfg. Co. in the sum so stated, which statement is an essential requirement of the statute.- See Langford v. South Florida Lbr. Co., 63 Fla. 484, 59 So. [*1065] R. 12. Although the notice is not required to follow the precise phraseology of the statute, there must be at least a substantial compliance therewith, by the use of language of equivalent import, in stating that the contractor or ot…
  • …report of sale of the same to this court. Done and ordered this 12th day. of January, 1912, at Bartow, Florida, at chambers.” From this decree Langford alone entered his appeal to this court and we rendered an opinion therein, which is reported in 63 Fla. 484, 59 South. Rep. 12, as Langford, v. South Florida Lumber & Supply Company. As a reference to such opinion will show we reversed such decree as to Langford, upon the grounds and for the reasons therein stated, but we said nothing as to that pari of t…
  • …be delivered to the owner or his agent. Peck v. Hinds, 68 Ill. Appeal 319; Belanzer v. Hersey, 90 Ill. 70; Ramsey v. Hawkins, 78 Fla. 189, 92 So. 823; DeSoto Natl. Bank v. Arcadia et al., 29 Fla. 479, 52 So. 612; Langford v. South Fla. Lumber Co., 63 Fla. 484, 59 Southern 12. The probative effect of the evidence in this case fails to show a delivery of the cautionary notice to the owner either before the second payment was made to the .contractor or at any other time. The legal evidence submitted at mos…

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