CLAY HYDER TRUCKING AND COMCAR INDUSTRIES, INC., APPELLANTS,
v.
GEORGE R. LASTINGER, APPELLEE
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
The First District Court of Appeal denied appellee's motion to dismiss an appeal challenging a $4,500 attorney's fee award. The court held that an order awarding attorney's fees is not final and appealable until the amount of the fee is determined, not when the obligation to pay is first imposed.
The appeal is timely. An order relating to attorney's fees is not final and appealable until the amount of the fee is actually set. An order that retains jurisdiction to determine reasonable attorney's fees is nonfinal and nonappealable.
[1] An order reserving jurisdiction to determine the amount of a reasonable attorney's fee is nonfinal and nonappealable.
[2] An appeal from an order awarding attorney's fees is timely if filed within the prescribed period after the amount of the fee is set.
Previewing 2 of 3 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“an order relating to attorney's fees is not final until the amount of the fee is set”
Establishes the primary legal rule that attorney's fee orders are only final when the specific amount is determined, not when the obligation is initially imposed.
Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceOn September 28, 1990, a Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order finding that the claimant was entitled to an attorney's fee and reserved jurisd…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Reservation Of Jurisdiction For Attorney'S Fees cases and more on FLexlaw
PER CURIAM.
Appellants seek review of an order which awarded $4500 in attorney’s fees. Appel-lee moves to dismiss, arguing that the appeal is untimely. We deny the motion to dismiss.
On September 28, 1990, the Judge of Compensation Claims entered an order finding that appellee was entitled to an attorney’s fee award. In its order, the court stated as follows:
WHEREFORE, having considered the evidence and arguments of counsel, the Employer, Clay Hyder Trucking Lines, Inc., by and through its Servicing Agent, Comear Industries, is hereby ordered as follows:
A. Pay to the claimant’s attorney, Karen O. Emmanuel, a reasonable fee under Florida Statute 440.34(3)(b) for services to her client in this cause.
D. Jurisdiction is hereby reserved to consider the amount of the reasonable, fee awarded. If the parties cannot agree on a reasonable fee, a hearing will be held at the office of the Judge of Compensation Claims....
The parties were unable to agree on the fee, a hearing was conducted and an order mailed on March 5, 1991, which awarded the $4500 attorney’s fee. Appellants filed the notice of appeal on March 29, 1991.
Appellee now moves to dismiss the appeal as to the September 28, 1990, order, arguing that appellant did not file a notice of appeal within 30 days of the date of that order. Appellee argues that the order is clear and unambiguous, requiring the Employer/Servicing Agent to pay an attorney’s fee, thus the September 28 order was final and reviewable.
Appellants respond in opposition, arguing that the issue was not finally resolved until the March 5 order was entered, actually awarding the attorney’s fee. We agree and deny the motion to dismiss. This court has previously determined that an order relating to attorney’s fees is not final until the amount of the fee is set. City of Tampa v. Fein, 438 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983). Similarly, this court has found that a JGC’s order which retains jurisdiction for the purpose of determining a reasonable attorney’s fee is nonfinal and, as such, is nonappealable. Sunny Pines Convalescent Center v. Walters, 422 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). Had appellants filed a notice of appeal from the September 28, 1990, order, the appeal would have been subject to dismissal. Here, appellants properly waited until the amount of the fee was set before seeking review.
MOTION DENIED.
SHIVERS, C.J., BARFIELD, J., and CAWTHON, Senior Judge, concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Dep't OF Child. & Families v. Monroe, 744 So. 2d 1163 (Fla. 1st DCA 1999)…y of Pensacola, 667 So. 2d 215, 216 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Wometco Enters. v. Cordoves, 650 So. 2d 1117, 1118 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995); Employer’s Overload of Dade County v. Robinson, 642 So. 2d 72, 73 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994); Clay Hyder Trucking v. Lastinger, 586 So. 2d 1082 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Kolmel Plumbing, Inc. v. Kolmel, 448 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984); City of Tampa v. Fein, 438 So. 2d 442, 443 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983); Sunny Pines Convalescent Ctr. v. Walters, 422 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982). The order reserv…
Authorities Cited
- City OF Tampa v. Fein, 438 So. 2d 442 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983)
- Sunny Pines Convalescent Ctr. & Hewitt Coleman & Assocs., Inc. v. Walters, 422 So. 2d 1079 (Fla. 1st DCA 1982)