WILLIE COX, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1991-10-04
No. 90-02558
SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J„ concur.
586 So. 2d 1321 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1991) Negative Treatment
Cited by 10 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Willie Cox pleaded no contest to drug possession charges while reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The Florida appellate court reversed, holding that the initial traffic stop lacked reasonable suspicion because the officer's description of a stolen vehicle was too vague and general.


Holding

The court reversed and held that the initial stop was unlawful because the description was too general and vague to constitute reasonable suspicion. All evidence seized as a result of the illegal stop—the marijuana and cocaine—should have been suppressed as the fruit of the unlawful police conduct.


Headnotes

[1] A police officer's suspicion that a vehicle is stolen is not reasonable when the description of the vehicle is too general and lacks distinguishing details.

[2] Evidence discovered as a direct result of an illegal stop must be suppressed.

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Key Quotes

“The description upon which the officer relied in this case was too general to constitute a founded or reasonable suspicion for a stop.”

Establishes the core holding that the vague description of a white Oldsmobile was insufficient to justify the stop.

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Facts & Procedural History

On March 8, 1990, at 3:00 a.m. near Tampa Airport, a police officer stopped Cox's white four-door Oldsmobile Cutlass with a rental tag. The officer re…

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Opinion of the Court
THREADGILL, Judge.

THREADGILL, Judge.

Willie Cox pleaded no contest to possession of cocaine and possession of marijuana reserving the right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. We reverse.

At the suppression hearing, it was established that on March 8, 1990, at 3:00 a.m. in the vicinity of the Tampa Airport, a Tampa police officer stopped a 1989 or 1990 white four-door Oldsmobile Cutlass displaying a rental tag and being driven by the appellant. Such a car had been included in a monthly list of stolen vehicles the officer had received at roll-call. The officer did not have the list with him, but remembered a “white Oldsmobile” was among the fifteen vehicles reported stolen. The officer did not know the year of the stolen car, the date it was stolen, the agency it was stolen from or its tag number. The officer did not check the appellant’s tag number through the police computer prior to the stop to determine if the car was stolen, because the computers were slow. A later computer check revealed that the car had not been stolen.

When the appellant stepped out to talk to the officer, he dropped a baggie of marijuana to the ground. The officer then arrested him for possession of marijuana, searched him, and found a rock of cocaine in his waistband. The appellant argues that the evidence should have been suppressed because the initial stop was illegal. We agree.

The description upon which the officer relied in this case was too general to constitute a founded or reasonable suspicion for a stop. Lewis v. State, 337 So. 2d 1031 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In Lewis we held that a description of two white males in a red Volkswagon selling drugs on the north side of Lakeland and heading south was too vague to justify a stop. The description in this case likewise lacks distinguishing details upon which reasonable suspicion for a stop could be based.

It is clear that the appellant's act of abandoning or accidently dropping the marijuana was prompted by or the result of the officer’s illegal stop. There was a direct connection between the unlawful police conduct and the discovery of the marijuana and later, after a search of the appellant, the cocaine. Since the initial stop was unlawful, the evidence seized as a result of that stop should have been suppressed. Curry v. State, 576 So. 2d 890 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); contra State v. Oliver, 368 So. 2d 1331 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979), cert. dismissed, Oliver v. State, 383 So. 2d 1200 (Fla.1980). Accordingly, the trial court erred by denying the motion to suppress.

Reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to vacate the judgments and sentences.

SCHEB, A.C.J., and ALTENBERND, J„ concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Hollinger v. State, 620 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1993)
    …GRIMES, Justice. We review State v. Hollinger, 596 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), because of certified conflict with Cox v. State, 586 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), Wallace v. State, 540 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989), and Spann v. State, 529 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). We have jurisdiction under article V, section 3(b)(4) of the Florida Constitution. The facts of this case are set out…
    1 / 2
  • MAY v. State, 958 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 2d DCA 2007)
    …ial court agreed with the State and denied Mr. May’s motion. If a defendant abandons property as a result of an illegal detention, the trial court should suppress the evidence. Welch v. State, 689 So. 2d 1240, 1241 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997); Cox v. State, 586 So. 2d 1321, 1322 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). Here, however, the deputies lawfully detained Mr. May. See State v. Holland, 680 So. 2d 1041, 1044 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996), aff'd, 696 So. 2d 757 (Fla.1997) (holding that detention is legal where valid objective reason supports…
  • State v. Hollinger, 596 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992)
    …In the instant case, Hanton applied no physical force on appellee nor did appellee submit to any show of authority. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order granting appellee’s motion to suppress the cocaine. To the extent that Cox v. State, 586 So. 2d 1321 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991); Wallace v. State, 540 So. 2d 254 (Fla. 4th DCA 1989); and Spann v. State, 529 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) are contrary, we acknowledge conflict. REVERSED. [*523] COWART, J., concurs. GOSHORN, C.J., concurs in result only.…

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