COREY JONES, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Corey Jones was convicted of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school and sentenced as a youthful offender, but the trial court also imposed a three-year mandatory minimum sentence required by statute. The appellate court reversed the sentence, holding that youthful offender sentencing provisions are exclusive and cannot be combined with mandatory minimum sentences.
The court held that the sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act are exclusive sanctions that may be imposed in a youthful offender sentence, except where otherwise provided by law. The three-year mandatory minimum cannot be imposed in conjunction with a youthful offender sentence, and the trial court must be free to consider alternative departure sentences on resentencing.
[1] The sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act are generally exclusive sanctions for youthful offender sentences.
[2] A mandatory minimum sentence may not be imposed in conjunction with a youthful offender sentence unless otherwise provided by law.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“Except as otherwise provided by law, the sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act are considered the exclusive sanctions that may be imposed in a youthful offender sentence.”
Establishes the fundamental principle that youthful offender sentencing provisions are exclusive and cannot be combined with other mandatory sentences.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceJones was convicted of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school, a crime requiring a three-year mandatory minimum sentence under Florida Statute …
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STONE, Judge.
The appellant was convicted of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school. Conviction for that crime requires the imposition of a three-year mandatory minimum sentence. § 893.13(l)(e), Fla.Stat. (1989). Appellant was sentenced as a youthful offender pursuant to section 958.04, Florida Statutes. Notwithstanding the youthful offender sentence, however, the trial court imposed the three-year mandatory minimum sentence. We reverse the sentence and remand for resentencing.
Except as otherwise provided by law, the sentencing provisions of the Youthful Offender Act are considered the exclusive sanctions that may be imposed in a youthful offender sentence. E.g., Salazar v. State, 544 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989); Dean v. State, 476 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Ellis v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985); Patterson v. State, 408 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982); Whitlock v. State, 404 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981). See also State v. Diers, 532 So. 2d 1271 (Fla.1988).
The 1987 amendment to section 958.04(3) has recently been construed to permit the state to appeal youthful offender sentence terms below the sentencing guidelines. See Kepner v. State, 577 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1991). The state asserts that this amendment also served to modify the previous interpretations of the youthful offender act cited above.
In Kepner, the supreme court recognized that in order to permit the state to appeal youthful offender sentence terms below the sentencing guidelines, the amended statute must be construed as impliedly requiring written reasons for a downward departure from the guidelines under certain circumstances. We can discern, however, no reason to apply the Kepner reasoning to sentencing provisions of general law, other than guideline departures, that may be inconsistent with the purpose of the Youthful Offender Act. Section 958.04(3), Florida Statutes, refers exclusively to appeals of sentencing guideline issues. The court, in Kepner, recognized that the stated purposes of the Act remain valid considerations in interpreting the Act other than where necessary to give effect to the Act’s other provisions.
Because the record is clear that the trial court deemed it obligatory to impose the three-year mandatory sentence, the trial court is free, on resentencing, to consider a departure sentence if deemed appropriate.
DELL and GARRETT, JJ., concur.
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Blacker v. State, 49 So. 3d 785 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010)…er. On remand, the trial court shall resentence Blacker as a youthful offender. Because he maintains his youthful offender status, the minimum mandatory penalties do not apply. See Mendez v. State, 885 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003); Jones v. State, 588 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (holding that the mandatory minimum penalties for drug trafficking do not apply to a defendant sentenced pursuant to the Youthful Offender Act).. Reversed and Remanded for further proceedings. TAYLOR, HAZOURI and GERBER, JJ., c…
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Aundray Kelly v. State, 739 So. 2d 1164 (Fla. 5th DCA 1999)…r Act, section 958.04, Florida Statutes (1997), is “in lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law,” a defendant sentenced under that act may not also be subjected to a minimum mandatory sentence for use of a firearm. See also Jones v. State, 588 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991) (mandatory three year sentence for conviction of selling drugs within 1,000 feet of school does not apply to defendant sentenced as youthful offender); Salazar v. State, 544 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (three year minimum manda…
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Porter v. State, 702 So. 2d 257 (Fla. 4th DCA 1997)…tes (1995), provides that a sentence imposed thereunder is “[i]n lieu of other criminal penalties authorized by law.” Defendants sentenced under the Youthful Offender Act may not also be subjected to a minimum mandatory sentence. See Jones v. State, 588 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Salazar v. State, 544 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989). The improper imposition of a minimum mandatory sentence, “because of its inherent potential of causing or requiring ‘a defendant to be incarcerated ... for a greater length of…
Previewing 3 of 7 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Whitlock v. State, 404 So. 2d 795 (Fla. 3d DCA 1981)
- Pope v. State, 475 So. 2d 1021 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Patterson v. State, 408 So. 2d 785 (Fla. 2d DCA 1982)
- Kepner v. State, 577 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 1991)
- State v. Diers, 532 So. 2d 1271 (Fla. 1988)
- Dean v. State, 476 So. 2d 318 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)
- Salazar v. State, 544 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)
- State v. McCRAY, 544 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)