MANIE D. FUTCH ET AL., APPELLANTS,
v.
JOSEPHINE A. PARSLOW, APPELLEE
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This appeal concerns adverse possession of real property in Tampa. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed a decree quieting title in Josephine A. Parslow against heirs of Columbus Stafford, holding that Parslow and her predecessor established adverse possession against the heirs within the statutory seven-year period.
Parslow established adverse possession and quieted title is affirmed. The court held that Alfred Parslow took actual possession and claimed the property adversely before John Carney's death in 1886, so the seven-year statute continued to run against Carney's heirs, barring the younger John Carney. As to Manie D. Futch, the suit was brought nearly ten years after she attained age 21, and Parslow held adversely to her, so she too is barred by the statute of limitations. No equitable circumstances warranted denial of Parslow's relief.
“The existence of the relation of co-tenancy does not preclude one co-tenant from establishing an adverse possession in fact as against the other co-tenant.”
Establishes the legal principle that co-tenants can claim adverse possession against each other, supporting Parslow's claim.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceColumbus Stafford owned Lot 4 of Block 8 in Tampa and died leaving heirs including his daughter Mary (who married John Carney and died intestate in 18…
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Whitfield, C. J.
This appeal is from a decree quieting title to real estate. It appears that Columbus Stafford was the owner of Lot 4 of Block 8 according to the General Map of Tampa when he died leaving as his heirs, two sons, LaFayette and Columbus, Jr., and a daughter Mary, who married John Carney and died intestate in 1883, leaving her husband John Carney and a daughter Manie D. who was born in July, 1879, and married Futch.
John Carney married again and had a posthumus son John Carney born in 1887, the father having died in December, 1886. On January 9th, 1884, LaFayette Stafford, joined by his wife, and Columbus Stafford executed to Alfred H. Parslow a conveyance of the entire estate. On January 9th, 1884, John Carney, who had been the husband of Mary Stafford before her death, and who with the daughter were her heirs, executed a conveyance of the property to LaFayette Stafford. In 1887 Alfred H. Parslow conveyed the land to his wife Josephine A. Parslow, through the medium of a third person.
On May 19th, 1910, Mrs. Josephine A. Parslow brought suit against Manie D. Futch and her husband to quiet the title to the land in Mrs. Parslow. By an amendment John Carney was made a defendant. The answer asserts a title to an undivided 1-3 interest in the property to be in Manie D. Futch and John Carney, the first as the heir of Mary Stafford Carney and the latter as the heir of the elder John Carney. The answer avers that the complainant and her predecessor in title took their conveyance with knowledge of defendant’s rights, and held possession as a co-tenant with the defendants.
The existence of the relation of co-tenancy does not preclude one co-tenant from establishing an adverse possession in fact as against the other co-tenant. See Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853, 7 South. Rep. 391.
There is ample evidence from which the chancellor could find that Alfred Parslow took actual possession of the lot whether lawfully or unlawfully and claimed it adversely before the death of the elder John Carney, therefore the statutory limitation of seven years continued to run against Carney’s heirs at his death in 1886, and his son and heir is barred. Armstrong v. Wilcox, 57 Fla. 30, 49 South. Rep. 41. As the suit was not brought until nearly ten years after Mrs. Manie D. Futch attained the age of 21 years, she is barred unless the possession of Parslow and his wife was not adverse to Mrs. Futch. The circumstances relied on to show that Parslow did not claim or hold adversely to Mrs. Futch before and after she became of age, were submitted to the chancellor and in view of the conveyance of the entire property and of Parslow’s acts and conduct while in possession the chancellor was justified in finding from the evidence that Parslow did hold adversely to Mrs. Futch.
There is no evidence that Mrs. Futch was mislead or deceived into failing to assert her rights before they were barred by the lapse of the statutory period, and no. countervailing equity appears in her behalf to warrant a denial of the relief prayed for by Mrs. Parslow. Mere ignorance of her rights would not prevent the bar of the statute of limitations as to Mrs. Futeh.
The conclusion reached makes it unnecessary to consider whether a cross bill filed herein was improperly stricken.
The decree appealed from is affirmed.
Shackleford, Cockrell and Hocker, J. J., concur. Taylor, J., absent on account of illness.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
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Commercial Bldg. Co. v. Parslow, 93 Fla. 143 (Fla. 1927)…her shows the two youngest appellees to be feme coverts It is true that infants not being sui juris, neither laches nor the statute of limitationss will run against them unless it has already commenced to run against the ancestors. Futch v. Parslow, 64 Fla. 279, 60 South. Rep. 343. In this case neither laches nor limitation can be imputed to the ancestor, but as to all feme coverts the right to the property involved was their separate property, and this fact may determine the time the statute of limitatio…
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Cook v. Rochford, 60 So.2d 531 (Fla. 1952)…e title by adverse possession as against the interest of such cotenant? As to the first question, if the quitclaim deed had purported to convey the entire property, it might have constituted color of title as to the whole. Compare Futch v. Parslow, 64 Fla. 279, 60 So. 343, 344. But in this case the quitclaim deed did not purport to convey anything more than the right, title or interest of Mrs. Wilkes. Under such facts the case of Futch v. Parslow, supra, is pertinent. In that case the Court said: "The ci…
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Morrison v. Byrd, 72 So. 2d 657 (Fla. 1954)…ettled that a deed purporting to convey the entire interest frojn one who holds only an undivided interest therein may constitute color of title, and the grantee may acquire title by adverse possession against the other co-tenants. Futch v. Parslow, 64 Fla. 279, 60 So. 343; Robinson v. Herrman, 101 Fla. 865, 132 So. 827. Under some circumstances this is true, even as between co-tenants. See Futch v. Parslow, supra. In this case, while Mrs. Morrison lived in the neighborhood and knew there were other heirs,…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Coogler v. Rogers, 25 Fla. 853 (Fla. 1889)
- Meylert M. Armstrong v. Wilcox, 57 Fla. 30 (Fla. 1909)