RANDY LEON GHOLSTON, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1990-12-17
No. 89-02826
BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur., ERVIN, J., concurs & dissents with opinion.
589 So. 2d 307 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1990) Negative Treatment
Cited by 26 cases

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Synopsis

Appellant Gholston was convicted of six felonies and sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The court reversed and remanded for resentencing, holding that the trial court misapplied the habitual felony offender statute by attempting to enhance sentences for life felonies and by improperly reclassifying the degree of offenses.


Holding

The habitual felony offender statute makes no provision for enhancing sentences for life felonies or first-degree felonies punishable by life, so it cannot apply to Counts I through III. The statute does not reclassify offenses by degree but merely extends penalties above the statutory maximum. The trial court erred in reclassifying the aggravated assault and aggravated battery convictions, and the 15-year sentence for aggravated assault exceeded the statutory cap.


Headnotes

[1] The habitual felony offender statute does not provide for enhancing penalties for life felonies or first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment.

[2] A trial court misapprehends the habitual felony offender statute by reclassifying the degree of a felony offense rather than extending the penalties above the statutory m…

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Key Quotes

“Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, makes no provision for enhancing penalties for first-degree felonies punishable by life, life felonies, or capital felonies.”

Establishes the core holding that the habitual felony offender statute cannot enhance sentences for the most serious felony categories.

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Facts & Procedural History

Gholston was convicted of two counts of sexual battery while armed (life felonies), burglary while armed (first-degree felony), armed robbery (first-d…

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Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment and sentence for six felonies. Appellant raises several issues. However, we need only discuss his contention that the trial court misapprehended the habitual felony offender statute.

Under Counts I and II, appellant was convicted of two counts of sexual battery while armed with a deadly weapon, which are both life felonies. Under Count III, appellant was convicted of burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by life imprisonment. Under Count IV, appellant was convicted of armed robbery, a first-degree felony. Under Count V, appellant was convicted of aggravated assault, a third-degree felony. Under Count VI, appellant was convicted of aggravated battery, a second-degree felony. Before sentencing, the court found appellant to be a habitual felony offender under Section 775.084, Florida Statutes. As to Counts I through IV, the court sentenced appellant to four concurrent life sentences. As to Count V, the court reclassified appellant’s aggravated assault conviction from a third-degree felony to a second-degree felony, and sentenced appellant to 15 years’ imprisonment. As to Count VI, the court reclassified appellant’s aggravated battery conviction from a second-degree felony to a first-degree felony, and sentenced appellant to 30 years’ imprisonment. We agree with appellant that the trial court misapprehended the habitual felony offender statute.

Section 775.084, Florida Statutes, makes no provision for enhancing penalties for first-degree felonies punishable by life, life felonies, or capital felonies. See Johnson v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (habitual violent felony offender statute makes no provision for enhancing sentence of defendant convicted of life felony); Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169, 1173 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990) (habitual felony offender statute is not irrational for failure to make any provision for enhancement of first-de gree felonies punishable by life, life felonies, or capital felonies). Accordingly, the habitual felony offender statute can have no application to appellant’s sentences under Counts I through III.

As to appellant’s first-degree felony conviction under Count IV, the trial court correctly sentenced appellant to life imprisonment. § 775.084(4)(a)l, Fla.Stat. However, the judgment must be corrected as to Counts V and VI. The habitual felony offender statute does not reclassify offenses as to their degree; rather, it merely extends the penalties above the maximum otherwise authorized by statute. Here, the trial judge erroneously reclassified appellant’s third-degree felony conviction of aggravated assault to a second-degree felony, and his second-degree felony conviction of aggravated battery as a first-degree felony. Moreover, while the sentence imposed for the aggravated battery conviction (30 years) is within that authorized by the habitual offender statute,1 the sentence imposed for appellant’s aggravated assault conviction (15 years) exceeds the ten-year statutory cap set forth in Section 775.-084(4)(a)3, Florida Statutes.

We therefore vacate appellant’s sentences under Counts I, II, III, V, and VI, and remand this cause for resentencing.

ERVIN, BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. . See § 775.084(4)(a)2, Florida Statutes.

Other

Appellee seeks rehearing, arguing that the statutory provisions proscribing sexual battery with a deadly weapon, a life felony, and burglary while armed with a dangerous weapon, a first-degree felony punishable by life, permit enhancement of sentences for these offenses under the habitual offender statute. However, this court’s recent opinion in Sibley v. State, 586 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), holds that life felonies are not subject to enhancement under the habitual felony offender statute. Further, this court in Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (en banc), receded from the rule announced in our original Gholston opinion. Burdick holds that first-degree felonies punishable by life may be enhanced under the habitual felony offender statute. As in Burdick, we certify the following question as one of great public importance:

IS A FIRST-DEGREE FELONY PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF YEARS NOT EXCEEDING LIFE IMPRISONMENT SUBJECT TO AN ENHANCED SENTENCE OF LIFE IMPRISONMENT PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER STATUTE?

Appellee’s motion for rehearing or certification is granted to the extent indicated herein.

BOOTH and BARFIELD, JJ., concur. ERVIN, J., concurs & dissents with opinion.

Other
ERVIN, Judge,

ERVIN, Judge,

concurring and dissenting.

I concur with the majority in its certification of the question, and in its holding that life felonies may not be enhanced under the habitual felony offender statute. I otherwise dissent for the same reasons expressed in my dissent in Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (en banc).


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Citator

Cited By (11 total)

  • Lamont v. State, 597 So. 2d 823 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992)
    …ed under section 775.084(4)(b)l,” Walker v. State, 580 So. 2d at 281. See also Graham v. State, 583 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding that Section 775.084 does not apply to sentencing of defendant convicted of life felony); Gholston v. State, 589 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (holding that Section 775.084 does not apply to sentencing of defendant convicted of sexual battery while armed with a deadly weapon, a life felony); Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d at 1173 (in rejecting argument that habitual offende…
    1 / 2
  • Conley v. State, 592 So. 2d 723 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992)
    …ims the penalties for life felonies and first-degree felonies punishable by life may not be enhanced under the habitual-offender statute. [*732] This court recently held in Johnson v. State, 568 So. 2d 519 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), and Gholston v. State, 589 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), that the habitual-offender statute cannot be applied to defendant’s convictions classified as life felonies. However, we held in Burdick v. State, 584 So. 2d 1035 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), petition for review filed, No. 78,466 (Fla.…
  • Gholston v. State, 611 So. 2d 1224 (Fla. 1992)
    …PER CURIAM. On the authority of Burdick v. State, 594 So. 2d 267 (Fla.1992), we answer the question certified in Gholston v. State, 589 So. 2d 307 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), in the affirmative and approve that portion of the district court’s opinion that upheld habitual offender sentencing for first-degree felonies punishable by life imprisonment.1 We do not address any other issues and express no o…

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