ROBERT LEFTWICH, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Robert Leftwich appealed his 30-year sentence imposed as a habitual violent felony offender for possession of contraband (marijuana) by an inmate. Leftwich challenged the constitutionality of the habitual offender statute and claimed the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court affirmed the sentence, rejecting both constitutional challenges.
The habitual offender statute is constitutional. The 30-year sentence does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and is appropriate under Florida law. The court rejected Leftwich's claims that the statute bears no rational relationship to its purpose and that it constitutes double jeopardy.
[1] A habitual offender statute is constitutional and does not violate double jeopardy principles.
[2] A habitual offender statute is constitutional even when the current offense is nonviolent, as it rationally relates to the purpose of punishing recidivism.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“In our view, just as the state is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender, its even more severe treatment of a recidivist who has exhibited a propensity toward violence is also reasonable.”
Establishes the constitutional foundation for enhanced sentences under the habitual violent felony offender statute
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceLeftwich, a prison inmate, was convicted of possession of contraband by an inmate after being involved in a scheme to smuggle marijuana into prison gr…
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KAHN, Judge.
Leftwich, an inmate at the New River West Annex of the Florida State Prison, appeals his sentence after conviction on the charge of possession of contraband by an inmate. Leftwich does not dispute the facts, which indicate that he was on the receiving end of a plato to smuggle marijuana into the prison grounds. The jury convicted Leftwich of the charge and the circuit court sentenced him, as a habitual violent felony offender, to 30 years in prison with a ten-year minimum mandatory sentence. Leftwich now claims that the habitual offender statute is unconstitutional on its face, and further that his 30-year sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. We affirm the sentence.
The habitual offender statute is constitutional. Appellant’s claim that the habitual offender statute bears no rational relationship to its purpose, since his present offense is a nonviolent felony, has been rejected by this court. Ross v. State, 579 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). His claim that the statute places him in double jeopardy by punishing him again for an earlier conviction has similarly been rejected. Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990), rev. denied, 576 So. 2d 284 (1990); Love v. State, 569 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
Leftwich’s criminal history, consisting of two convictions for burglary of a dwelling, two convictions for escape, a conviction for aggravated battery with a weapon, and a conviction for first degree robbery, capped off by his present conviction for possession of marijuana on the grounds of a prison, illustrate the wisdom of this court’s words in Ross, supra: “In our view, just as the state is justified in punishing a recidivist more severely than it punishes a first offender, its even more severe treatment of a recidivist who has exhibited a propensity toward violence is also reasonable.” 579 So. 2d at 878.
Leftwich next complains that this 30-year sentence is disproportionately severe, and constitutes cruel and unusual punishment, contrary to the Eighth Amendment. Leftwich clearly fits the parameters for sentencing under the habitual violent felony offender statute. The length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 274, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1139, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980). In Harmelin v. Michigan, — U.S. —, 111 S.Ct. 2680, 115 L.Ed.2d 836 (1991), the Supreme Court rejected an argument that a mandatory life sentence without possibility of parole was “disproportionate” under the Eighth Amendment to the actual drug offense for which Harmlein was convicted. See also, Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 102 S.Ct. 703, 70 L.Ed.2d 556 (1982) (upholding a 40-year sentence for possession with intent to distribute nine ounces of marijuana).
The sentence determined by the trial court is appropriate under § 775.084(4)(b)l, Florida Statutes (1989), and reflects the considered response of the trial court to Leftwich’s criminal history, and his utter disdain for a system of law with which he is all too familiar. BOOTH and WOLF, JJ., concur.
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Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1993)…on is plainly not warranted at this time. In reaching this conclusion, we reaffirm our commitment to the proposition that “[t]he length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative.” Leftwich v. State, 589 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (citing Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 63 L.Ed.2d 382 (1980)). For the reasons expressed, we answer the certified questions in the negative. We quash that portion of the district court’s opinion which held…
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Peters v. State, 128 So. 3d 832 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 367, 30 S.Ct. 544, 54 L.Ed. 793 (1910)). Historically, since “ ‘[t]he length of [a] sentence ... is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative,’ ” Hale, 630 So. 2d at 526 (quoting Leftmch v. State, 589 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)), the Eighth Amendment’s protections are typically applied “relative to the mode and method of punishment, not the length of incarceration.” Hall v. State, 823 So. 2d 757, 760 (Fla.2002), abrogation on other grounds recogniz…
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Wiley v. State, 125 So. 3d 235 (Fla. 4th DCA 2013)…regarding the legality of a sentence within a statutory framework, “[t]he length of the sentence actually imposed is generally said to be a matter of legislative prerogative.” Hale v. State, 630 So. 2d 521, 526 (Fla.1993) (quoting Leftwich v. State, 589 So. 2d 385, 386 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)) (alteration in original). Reviewing courts “should grant substantial deference to the broad authority that legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of punishments for crimes, as well as to the di…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (U.S. 1980)
- Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957 (U.S. 1991)
- Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370 (U.S. 1982)
- Barber v. State, 564 So. 2d 1169 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Love v. State, 569 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Ross v. State, 579 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)