DANNY BOGGAN, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Danny Boggan was sentenced as a habitual felony offender based on prior convictions that occurred on the same date. The court reversed the sentence and certified to the Florida Supreme Court whether the habitual felony offender statute requires that predicate felonies be committed sequentially after conviction for the immediately previous offense.
The enhanced sentence imposed pursuant to section 775.084 is vacated and the cause is remanded for resentencing. The court certified the sequential conviction requirement question to the Florida Supreme Court as a matter of great public importance.
[1] The habitual felony offender statute requires sequential convictions for sentencing purposes to give effect to legislative intent.
[2] Amendments to the habitual felony offender statute defining an habitual offender as a defendant previously convicted of two or more felonies have not abrogated the sequen…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“the habitual felony offender statute, requires sequential convictions for sentencing purposes”
Establishes the holding from Barnes v. State that controls this case and requires sequential convictions
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAppellant Boggan was sentenced as a habitual felony offender. The predicate prior convictions upon which this enhanced sentencing was based occurred o…
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JOANOS, Chief Judge.
Appellant contends he was sentenced improperly as an habitual felony offender, because the predicate prior convictions occurred on the same date. The state agrees that the convictions relied upon for habitual felony offender sentencing were not sequential, and thus contravene the rule enunciated in Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), but urges that the plain language of the 1988 and 1989 versions of section 775.084, Florida Statutes, does not require sequential convictions. We reverse, finding resolution of this issue is controlled by our decision in Barnes.
In Barnes, the court held that section 775.084(l)(a)l, Florida Statutes (Supp.1988), the habitual felony offender statute, requires sequential convictions for sentencing purposes. The sequential conviction construction was deemed necessary to give effect to legislative intent. However, be cause the court recognized that the construction being accorded to the statute went beyond the plain language of the provision, the question was certified as a question of great public importance. Similarly, in Fuller v. State, 578 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court observed that the long standing sequential conviction requirement had not been abrogated by the 1989 amendments defining an habitual offender as a defendant who has “previously been convicted of any combination of two or more felonies in this state or other qualified offenses[.]” 578 So. 2d at 888.
In conformity with our decisions in Barnes, Fuller, and Malone v. State, 588 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), we certify the following question to the supreme court as a question of great public importance:
WHETHER SECTION 775.084(l)(a)l, FLORIDA STATUTES (1989), WHICH DEFINES HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDERS AS THOSE WHO HAVE “PREVIOUSLY BEEN CONVICTED OF ANY COMBINATION OF TWO OR MORE FELONIES IN THIS STATE OR OTHER QUALIFIED OFFENSES,” REQUIRES THAT EACH OF THE FELONIES BE COMMITTED AFTER CONVICTION FOR THE IMMEDIATELY PREVIOUS OFFENSE?
Accordingly, the enhanced sentence imposed pursuant to section 775.084 is vacated, and the cause is remanded for resentencing.
WOLF and KAHN, JJ., concur.
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Krajewski v. State, 597 So. 2d 814 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…le. See State v. Hunter, 586 So. 2d 319, 321-22 (Fla.1991). See also State v. Evans, 597 So. 2d 813, (Fla. 2d DCA 1992); Ricardo v. State, 591 So. 2d 1002 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Strickland v. State, 588 So. 2d 269 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Wilson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). In Cruz, the Florida Supreme Court determined that there are two coexisting tests to be applied in cases involving entrapment. The threshold test, which is objective, focuses on police conduct and whether it falls below the stan…
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Beattie v. State, 595 So. 2d 249 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…2d 879 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), this court followed Cruz and affirmed that Cruz is still the law in this district, notwithstanding passage of the new entrapment .statute2 and the Third District [*251] Court’s contrary position.3 See also Wilson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (objective test not abolished by section 777.201, Florida Statutes (1987)). We conclude that Beattie established entrapment as a matter of law. Law enforcement created criminal activity where none existed. The government knew of…
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State v. Boggan, 595 So. 2d 49 (Fla. 1992)…OVERTON, Justice. We quash the decision of the district court in Boggan v. State, 589 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), on the authority of State v. Barnes, 595 So. 2d 22 (Fla.1992),1 [*50] and remand this cause for further proceedings consistent with our decision in Barnes. It is so ordered. SHAW, C.J., and McDONALD, BARKETT, GRIMES, KOGAN…
Authorities Cited
- Barnes v. State, 576 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- Fuller v. State, 578 So. 2d 887 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)
- D.C. Gen. Contractors & Claims Ctr. v. Blount, 588 So. 2d 674 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)