MERILYN E. MOUTON, APPELLANT,
v.
GLENN F. MOUTON, APPELLEE
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The Florida Second District Court of Appeal resolved a jurisdictional conflict regarding whether trial courts can modify rehabilitative alimony after all payments have been made but before the rehabilitative term expires. The court held that trial courts retain jurisdiction to modify rehabilitative alimony if a motion is filed within the rehabilitative term, regardless of whether payments have been completed.
A trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to modify rehabilitative alimony if the motion is filed within the rehabilitative term described in the judgment, regardless of whether all payments have been completed. The court's jurisdiction is based on the term of rehabilitation, not the status of the spouse's payment obligations.
[1] A trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to modify rehabilitative alimony if the motion is filed within the rehabilitative term described in the judgment.
[2] Jurisdiction to modify rehabilitative alimony is not lost simply because all monetary payments have been made, so long as the rehabilitative term has not expired.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“a trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to modify rehabilitative alimony if the motion is filed within the rehabilitative term described in the judgment”
States the court's holding on the central jurisdictional issue.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceThe trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution requiring Mr. Mouton to pay Mrs. Mouton $800 per month in rehabilitative alimony for 24 months…
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ALTENBERND, Judge.
The narrow issue in this case is whether a trial court has jurisdiction to entertain a motion to modify rehabilitative alimony throughout the rehabilitative term, or whether that jurisdiction expires at an earlier date upon payment of all amounts owing as rehabilitative alimony. Resolving an apparent intradistrict conflict between Lee v. Lee, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), and Laux v. Laux, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), we hold that a trial court has jurisdiction to consider a motion to modify rehabilitative alimony if the motion is filed within the rehabilitative term described in the judgment.
On January 23, 1989, the trial court entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage in this case. The judgment required Mr. Mouton
to pay the Wife as rehabilitative alimony the sum of Eight Hundred Dollars per month for a period of twenty-four months commencing September 5, 1988. Said payments to be made on the fifth day of each and every month.
Mr. Mouton apparently made his payments on a regular basis and apparently mailed the final payment on or before August 5, 1990. On August 6, 1990, the wife filed a petition to modify the final judgment to extend the period of rehabilitative alimony. Thus, her petition was filed after the rehabilitative alimony had been paid in its entirety but before the expiration of the twenty-four-month term of rehabilitative alimony. The trial court followed our ruling in Lee, concluded it had no jurisdiction because the petition had been filed a day late, and dismissed the action.
In Lee, addressing a matter of first impression, this court held that an award of rehabilitative alimony could be modified so long as the provisions of the final decree were executory in whole or part. See also Brown v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976). In this case, the term for rehabilitative alimony described in the final judgment had not expired, but the husband’s monetary obligation under that provision of the final judgment was arguably no longer executory.
Section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1989), extends jurisdiction to the trial courts to “make orders as equity requires” to modify an award of alimony. The Third District has held that a trial court has jurisdiction under this section to consider any motion to modify rehabilitative alimony that is filed within the rehabilitative term. Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982). This is true without regard to the jurisdictional language of the final judgment. We agree with this result, and followed it in Laux without discussing Lee.
If the court’s jurisdiction were dependent upon the status of one spouse’s payments, that spouse could simply prepay rehabilitative alimony and avoid any risk that the other spouse, as a matter of equity, was entitled to an extension of alimony at the close of the term. Such unilateral control of alimony is not compatible with the goals and purposes of rehabilitative alimony, and section 61.14, Florida Statutes (1989), does not require this court to limit the trial court’s jurisdiction in such an arbitrary fashion. Such a limitation on jurisdiction might also encourage the spouse receiving alimony to prematurely request modification of rehabilitative alimony. Accordingly, we recede from the language in Lee and Brown which suggests that the trial court may lack jurisdiction to modify rehabilitative during the term of rehabilitation.
Reversed and remanded.
SCHOONOVER, C.J., and SCHEB, RYDER, DANAHY, CAMPBELL, LEHAN, FRANK, HALL, THREADGILL, PARKER and PATTERSON, JJ., concur.
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Dogoda v. Dogoda, 233 So. 3d 484 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)…t covered.”). We reject Ms. Dogoda’s argument that Pimm’s second prong establishes a bright-line rule. “Section 61.14 ;.. extends jurisdiction to the trial courts to ’make orders as equity requires’ to modify an award of alimony.” Mouton v. Mouton, 590 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (quoting § 61.14(1), Florida- Statutes (1989)). Consistent with notions of,equity is the consideration of whether the parties contemplated the substantial change ,in circumstances and accounted for such a change when they agre…
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Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d 77 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)…ny. We reverse and hold the petition for modification, which was filed within the two-year term provided for rehabilitative alimony, was timely filed and properly invoked the trial court’s jurisdiction to consider modification. In Mouton v. Mouton, 590 So. 2d 40 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991), the Second District held the end of the term for rehabilitative alimony, rather than the status of a spouse’s obligation for making payments, determined the time limits for filing a petition for modification. In Mouton the court…
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Loza v. Marin, 198 So. 3d 1017 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)…er to save a preexisting common law right). The concept of continuing jurisdiction also abides by this rule. A court possesses continuing jurisdiction to modify a support award, but only during the period provided for support. See Mouton v. Mouton, 590 So. 2d 40, 41 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991) (en banc) (demonstrating this princi ple in the context of an alimony award); Kelsey v. Kelsey, 636 So. 2d 77, 78 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994) (en banc) (same). Unless otherwise agreed to by the parties, or unless section 743.07(2) app…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Ranelle M. LEE v. LEE, 309 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975)
- Pujals v. Pujals, 414 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 3d DCA 1982)
- Brown v. Brown, 338 So. 2d 916 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976)
- Laux v. Forrest E. Laux, 543 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)