JOHNNY REYNOLDS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Reynolds appealed the denial of a motion to correct an illegal sentence, seeking credit for time spent at liberty after sentencing due to a jail mistake. The court held that post-sentencing jail time credit does not affect the legality of the sentence and therefore cannot be obtained through a rule 3.800(a) motion, which is limited to correcting illegal sentences.
The court held that post-sentencing jail time credit does not impact the legality of an imposed sentence and therefore is not a proper subject of a rule 3.800(a) motion. Such credit falls under section 921.161(2), which addresses the Department of Corrections' obligations, not the sentencing court's.
[1] A motion to correct an illegal sentence under Fla.R.Crim.P. …
[2] A court's failure to allow credit for time spent in jail before sentencing impacts the legality of the sentence and may be raised in a motion to correct an illegal senten…
Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“A court's failure to allow this jail time credit impacts the legality of the sentence, and a motion for such credit may therefore properly be made under rule 3.800(a).”
Establishes the standard for when rule 3.800(a) motions are proper—only when the issue affects sentence legality.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAfter being convicted and sentenced to imprisonment, Reynolds was prematurely released from county jail due to an administrative mistake. He was subse…
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ALLEN, Judge.
The appellant challenges an order denying his request to have time spent at liberty credited against a sentence which was previously imposed. This request was made by a Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Because the requested credit does not affect the legality of the sentence as imposed, we conclude that the appellant’s motion did not state a basis upon which relief could be granted in this proceeding.
After being convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment the appellant was prematurely released from confinement due to a mistake at the county jail. He was subsequently taken back into custody and returned to confinement. The appellant then filed the rule 3.800(a) motion, alleging that the release was not due to his own fault and requesting that the time spent at liberty be credited against the sentence.
Section 921.161(1), Florida Statutes, establishes that when a sentence is imposed the court must allow a defendant credit for time spent in jail before sentencing. A court’s failure to allow this jail time credit impacts the legality of the sentence, and a motion for such credit may therefore properly be made under rule 3.800(a).
See Morgan v. State, 557 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); Moorer v. State, 556 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990).
But the sentence which was imposed in the present case included a provision for such credit, and the appellant’s motion does not involve jail time before sentencing. The appellant requested credit for a period of time after sentencing but before being delivered to the Department of Corrections, as addressed in section 921.161(2), Florida Statutes. Unlike section 921.161(1), which relates to the court’s obligation regarding credit for time before sentencing, section 921.161(2) relates to the Department of Corrections’ obligation regarding credit for time after sentencing. See Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983).
The request for such credit after sentencing does not impact the legality of the sentence which has been imposed, and thus is not a proper claim under rule 3.800(a).
In denying the appellant’s motion, the court expressed some concern as to whether the claim could be presented by a rule 3.800(a) motion, but the court then proceeded to consider the merits of the motion. The court’s ruling on the merits is to be accorded no binding force or effect, as the appellant did not properly invoke the court’s authority to consider the merits of the claim. As Brown suggests, the appellant might seek a writ of mandamus should the Department of Corrections fail to comply with its obligation under section 921.-161(2).
See also, Sutton v. Department of Corrections, 531 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988).
And in Drumwright v. State, 572 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991), upon which the appellant relies, the sentencing court was not required to expressly incorporate such credit in an amended sentence. But see, Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986).
None of these cases allow the issue to be entertained pursuant to rule 3.800(a).
In addition to the possibility of mandamus, if necessary, the appellant may also have other potential avenues of relief. But the appellant did not properly invoke the court’s authority in this case and, while we express no opinion as to the merits of the claim, the denial of the appellant s rule 3.800(a) motion is affirmed.
KAHN and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By (14 total)
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Washington v. State, 662 So. 2d 1027 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995)…Fla.Stat. (1993). If the post-sentence credit is incorrect, Washington should pursue his administrative remedies, and then seek a writ of mandamus against the department in the circuit court, if dissatisfied with the outcome. See Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Our affirmance in this case is without prejudice to pursue such an administrative remedy. AFFIRMED. GOSHORN and HARRIS, JJ., concur.…
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Dep't of Corr. v. Mattress, 686 So. 2d 740 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997)…atter for DOC rather than the trial court as a request for such credit does not affect the legality of the sentence. See Bowles v. State, 647 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Henderson v. State, 632 So. 2d 653 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983). See also § 921.161(2), Fla. Stat. (1995); Bland v. State, 664 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 5th DCA 1995); Grimes v. State, 657 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995). Conversely, a claim for present…
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Bowles v. State, 647 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994)…time served, the Department of Corrections informed him he was only entitled to 40 days’ credit. If in fact that is his complaint, we note that an award of credit after sentencing is a matter for the Department of Corrections. See Reynolds v. State, 590 So. 2d 1043 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (holding the request in a rule 3.800(a) motion after sentencing did not impact the legality of the sentence, and thus was not properly before the trial court); Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983) (finding that issue…
Previewing 3 of 14 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Hutchins v. McCLUNG, 572 So. 2d 1029 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991)
- Carson v. State, 489 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1986)
- Brown v. State, 427 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983)
- Moorer v. State, 556 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Morgan v. State, 557 So. 2d 605 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990)
- Sherrell C. Sutton v. Dep't OF Corr. & Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 531 So. 2d 1009 (Fla. 1st DCA 1988)