MONICA RAPP, APPELLANT,
v.
TOLBERT ENTERPRISES, INC., D/B/A RAMADA INN OF FORT WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Monica Rapp appealed summary judgment granted in favor of a motel owner after she was struck by a car while crossing a highway to return to her motel room after being directed by security to park across the road. The court reversed, finding genuine factual disputes existed regarding the dangerousness of the highway, whether the hazard was open and obvious, and Rapp's knowledge of the condition.
The court reversed the summary judgment, holding that disputed factual issues existed regarding the dangerousness of the highway condition, whether the condition was open and obvious, and whether the appellant had knowledge of the condition, precluding summary judgment as a matter of law.
[1] Summary judgment is improper when disputed factual issues exist regarding the dangerousness of a condition and whether that condition was open and obvious.
[2] A motel owner may owe a duty to guests regarding perils on a nearby highway if the owner directs guests to park in an area requiring highway traversal.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The two depositions contained in the record clearly suggest that there exist disputed factual issues with regard to the dangerousness of the condition existing along the highway in front of the motel, as well as issues with regard to whether the condition was "open and obvious" and whether appellant had knowledge of the condition.”
Establishes that material factual disputes preclude summary judgment
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceRapp checked into the Ramada Inn on March 30, 1988, and received a guest parking pass. On April 1, 1988, when she returned to the motel, a security gu…
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SHIVERS, Judge.
Appellant, Monica Rapp, appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee/defendant in a negligence action. We reverse.
The record on appeal indicates that the appellant filed an amended complaint against appellee, owner of a Ramada Inn Motel located along Highway 98 in Fort Walton Beach. According to the complaint, appellant checked into appellee’s motel on March 30, 1988, and was issued a “guest parking pass” allowing her to use the motel’s parking lot. On the evening of April 1, 1988, appellant left the motel and, when she returned, exhibited her parking pass to the security guard on duty. Instead of being allowed to park at the motel lot, however, she was instructed by the guard to park in an area located across Highway 98, off the motel premises. Appellant parked as directed and, while crossing the highway on foot to return to her motel room, was struck and injured by a speeding car. Appellee moved for summary judgment, and a hearing was held at which the court apparently considered two depositions. In the first, Robert Burns testified that he had worked as a parking lot security guard at the Ramada Inn on the evening of appellant’s accident. Burns recalled that the motel’s parking lot was very crowded just prior to the accident, due to the presence of several emergency vehicles on the premises. He did not specifically recall directing the appellant to park across the street, but did state that people were sometimes directed to park at “Franco’s,” located across Highway 98 from the motel. When asked what he knew about the reputation of the stretch of highway located in front of the motel, Burns indicated that it was a “dangerous stretch of highway,” explaining that it was a four-lane highway crossed by many pedestrians, with a speed limit that rapidly reduced from 55 m.p.h. to 35 m.p.h.
In the second deposition, Rick Stevens, director of Emergency Medical Services for Okaloosa County, and the paramedic who responded to the scene of appellant’s acci dent, also testified that the stretch of highway in front of the motel was “basically considered to be a fairly dangerous section of highway,” and that there had been several fatalities, and stricken pedestrians in front of the motel. Stevens also indicated that the lighting in the area was “fairly poor” and that his department had spoken with the County Commission at one time suggesting that a pedestrian walk-over be built to try to alleviate the number of accidents, particularly those involving pedestrians. After examining the evidence and arguments of counsel, the trial court granted summary judgment in appellee’s favor, finding there to be no justiciable issues of fact or law, and finding that the appellant had failed to show that the defendant owed a duty “to warn of those perils which are open and obvious.”
We reverse the trial court’s entry of summary judgment. The two depositions contained in the record clearly suggest that there exist disputed factual issues with regard to the dangerousness of the condition existing along the highway in front of the motel, as well as issues with regard to whether the condition was “open and obvious” and whether appellant had knowledge of the condition. We therefore reverse the finding of summary judgment, and remand for further proceedings.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
ERVIN and WIGGINTON, JJ., concur.
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Johnson v. Howard Mark Prods., Inc., 608 So. 2d 937 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…created by defendant’s conduct). Other courts have concluded in the context of cases involving similar dangerous conditions that the case-specific standard of care can be a question for the jury to decide. See, e.g., Rapp v. Tolbert Enters., Inc., 591 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (summary judgment improper when motel guest struck while crossing highway from remote parking), review denied, 601 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1992); Thunderbird Drive-In Theatre v. Reed, 571 So. 2d 1341 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990) (jury question pr…