TRACY L. WILLIAMS, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Williams appealed his sentencing, challenging the trial court's imposition of various costs and a two-year community control sentence. The court affirmed the $20 victim cost assessment but reversed discretionary court costs and a mandatory assessment that was waived, and reversed the community control sentence for lack of written reasons for the sentencing departure.
The court affirmed the $20 victim cost assessment but reversed the $720 discretionary court costs and $200 assessment because they were not orally pronounced and Williams lacked notice and opportunity to be heard. The court also reversed the two-year community control sentence because the trial court failed to provide written reasons for the sentencing departure.
[1] A trial court's failure to orally pronounce the imposition of mandatory costs is not reversible error.
[2] A trial court must provide adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard before imposing discretionary costs.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“On the authority of State v. Beasley, 580 So.2d 189 (Fla.1991), we conclude that a trial court's failure to orally pronounce the imposition of mandatory costs upon a defendant is not reversible error.”
Establishes the distinction between mandatory and discretionary costs regarding oral pronouncement requirements
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceWilliams was sentenced to one year in prison followed by two years of community control. The trial court imposed $20 in victim costs, $720 in discreti…
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PER CURIAM.
We grant the motion for rehearing, vacate our previous opinion, and substitute the following opinion.
We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court’s imposition of various costs upon Williams. The trial court did not orally assess these costs at the sentencing hearing. We reverse the imposition of two years of community control, because the trial court did not provide written reasons for the sentencing departure.
On the authority of State v. Beasley, 580 So. 2d 189 (Fla.1991), we conclude that a trial court’s failure to orally pronounce the imposition of mandatory costs upon a defendant is not reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm the imposition of $20.00 in victim costs pursuant to section 960.20, Florida Statutes (1989).
We reverse the trial court’s assessment of $720.00 for court costs. Because this assessment was discretionary, the trial court erred both in failing to afford Williams adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard and in failing to orally pronounce the imposition of these discretionary costs upon Williams at the sentencing hearing. See Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947, 949-50 (Fla.1984); Kord v. State, 508 So. 2d 758, 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987). Therefore, the trial court is directed to strike the imposition of court costs upon Williams.
We also reverse the trial court’s assessment of $200.00 pursuant to section 27.-3455, Florida Statutes (Supp.l99Q). Although this assessment was mandatory, the judgment reflects that the $200.00 assessment was waived. Therefore, the trial court is directed to strike this assessment from the order of probation.
Moreover, the trial court improperly sentenced Williams under Villery v. Florida Parole & Probation Commission, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1980), to one year in prison. A Villery sentence consists of a “period of probation preceded by a period of confinement imposed as a special condition.” Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161, 164 (Fla.1988). According to Villery, a special condition of probation is limited to less than one year, or no more than 364 days. Villery, 396 So. 2d at 1111; Harris v. State, 576 So. 2d 426, 427 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The trial court sentenced Williams to one year, or 365 days, which exceeded the sentencing limit by one day. Yet, even though a sentencing error exists, because Williams has already served the term of imprisonment the matter is moot and does not require reversal. See Williams v. State, 549 So. 2d 734, 735 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
Furthermore, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of the two year community control sentence on Williams, which followed his one year of imprisonment. A sentence of community control as a condition of probation is a departure sentence. State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587, 587-88 (Fla.1987). Thus, the trial court was required to provide written reasons for imposing the sentence on Williams, whose recommended sentence was any nonstate prison sanction. Id,; State v. VanKooten, 522 So. 2d 830, 831 (Fla.1988). Because the trial court did not provide written reasons for the community control sentence, the sentence is reversed and remanded to the trial court for it to consider whether a departure sentence is appropriate and, if so, for it to provide written reasons for the departure. Nelson v. State, 579 So. 2d 408 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991). The trial court will not be precluded by Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1990), from entering a departure sentence be cause the record indicates that the trial court did not realize that the sentence it gave Williams was a departure from the guidelines. See State v. Vanhorn, 561 So. 2d 584, 585 (Fla.1990); Jones v. State, 582 So. 2d 181, 181-82 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991).
In summary, we affirm the trial court’s imposition of $20.00 in victim costs pursuant to section 960.20. .However, we reverse the trial court’s imposition of $720.00 in court costs and $200.00 pursuant to section 27.3455 with directions to the trial court to strike these assessments from the order of probation. We also reverse Williams’s sentence of two years of community control and remand the matter to the trial court to consider whether a departure from the guidelines is appropriate and, if so, to provide written reasons for the departure. The sentencing error of one day is moot.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART AND REMANDED.
DELL, GUNTHER and POLEN, JJ., concur.
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McGOWAN v. State, 648 So. 2d 1225 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…the trial court considered the sentence in this case to be a departure from the sentencing guidelines, we remand for the trial court to impose a guideline sentence or, upon valid reasons given in writing, a departure sentence. See Williams v. State, 591 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The written judgment adjudicating appellant guilty of the offense of possession of cocaine was entered January 13, 1994, and waived the $200 trust fund cost pursuant to section 27.3455, Florida Statutes, the $50 crimes compens…1 / 2
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Simmons v. State, 662 So. 2d 754 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995)…court also erred in requiring appellant, without pronouncement in open court, to pay $2 for the “County Resolution Criminal Justice Trust Fund” as this is a discretionary cost under section 943.25(13), Florida Statutes (1993). See Williams v. State, 591 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). The trial court also partially erred when it imposed the following condition without pronouncement: You will neither possess, carry or own any firearms, and you will not possess, carry or own any weapons without first procurin…
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Rozier v. State, 621 So. 2d 589 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993)…PER CURIAM. The state concedes that the discretionary costs imposed upon Karen Rozier were assessed without notice or opportunity to be heard contrary to Williams v. State, 591 So. 2d 295 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991). See Klarstrom v. State, 610 So. 2d 102 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Additionally, the transcript of the sentencing hearing reflects that a “fine” of $455 was orally imposed, but costs were not. The judgment reflects that costs of $405 w…
Previewing 3 of 6 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited (15 total)
- Jenkins v. State, 444 So. 2d 947 (Fla. 1984)
- Poore v. State, 531 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)
- Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1990)
- Villery v. The Fla. Parole & Prob. Comm'n, 396 So. 2d 1107 (Fla. 1980)
- State v. VanKOOTEN, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Bodine, 522 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 1988)
- State v. Mestas, 507 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 1987)
- State v. Vanhorn, 561 So. 2d 584 (Fla. 1990)
- Kord v. State, 508 So. 2d 758 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)
- Williams v. State, 549 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989)