ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMPANY, APPELLANT,
v.
DAVID L. CROAKMAN AND SANDRA CROAKMAN, INDIVIDUALLY AND AS PARENTS AND NATURAL GUARDIANS OF MICHAEL CROAKMAN AND KATHERINE CROAKMAN, APPELLEES
AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.
Where a policy contains a valid family exclusion to liability coverage, injured parties within that exclusion cannot collect uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) benefits under the same policy.
Passengers injured in a one-car accident sought UM benefits under the family's auto policy after exhausting the driver's liability coverage. The injur…
The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.
Explore caselaw by topic → Browse Family Exclusion Clause cases and more on FLexlaw
MINER, Judge.
The appellees, Sandra, Michael, and Katherine Croakman, were injured in a one-car accident while riding as passengers in the Croakman family vehicle. The driver was a relative who did not reside with the Croakmans. The vehicle was insured by appellant, Allstate Insurance Company, on a policy issued to David Croakman, the husband and father of the injured appel-lees. After exhausting the driver’s liability coverage, appellees sought to collect under the uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM) provision of the Allstate policy.
We must reverse the trial court’s final declaratory judgment that permitted appellees to collect UM benefits. Where, as here, the policy contains a valid “family exclusion” to liability coverage, and the injured parties are within the exclusion, they cannot collect UM benefits under the same policy. Nor can appellees assert that their automobile, which is the insured vehicle under the policy, is “uninsured” under the terms of the policy’s UM provision. Brixius v. Allstate Insurance Co., 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla.1991); Reid v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977); Hartland v. Allstate Insurance Co., 575 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991).
We must also reverse the award of appellees’ attorneys’ fees which was dependent upon a judgment in their favor. Section 627.428(1), Fla.Stat. (1989). Accordingly, the trial court’s final declaratory judgment and order granting attorneys’ fees are REVERSED.
ZEHMER and WOLF, JJ., concur.
Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus
Citator
Cited By
-
Essex Ins. Co. v. Burton, 906 So. 2d 1157 (Fla. 1st DCA 2005)…4) (concluding “that the policy issued to Simpler does not include coverage for the premises where Burton allegedly sustained her personal injuries”). We now reverse the fee awards based on the overturned judgment. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Croakman, 591 So. 2d 297, 298 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991) (“We must reverse the trial court’s final declaratory judgment that permitted appellees to collect ... benefits.... We must also [therefore] reverse the award of appellees’ attorneys’ fees which was dependent upon a judgment…
Authorities Cited
- Reid v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 352 So. 2d 1172 (Fla. 1977)
- Brixius v. Allstate Ins. Co., 589 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1991)
- Hartland v. Allstate Ins. Co., 575 So. 2d 290 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991)