JESSIE LIGHTFOOT, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 1st DCA | 1991-12-23
No. 90-3688
SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur.
591 So. 2d 305 Florida District Court of Appeal, First District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

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Synopsis

Jessie Lightfoot appealed his grand theft auto conviction, challenging the trial court's denial of a special jury instruction limiting consideration of his prior felony convictions to credibility assessment only. The Florida appellate court affirmed the conviction, holding that the defense waived the right to challenge the instruction by failing to request it when the impeachment evidence was admitted.


Holding

The court held that no reversible error occurred. The trial court properly admitted the prior conviction evidence under Florida Statutes § 90.610 for impeachment purposes, and the defense waived its right to challenge the limiting instruction by failing to request it at the time the evidence was admitted rather than at the charge conference.


Headnotes

[1] Evidence of a defendant's prior convictions may be admitted to attack the witness's credibility.

[2] A party may attack the credibility of a witness, including an accused, by evidence of prior convictions if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of…

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Key Quotes

“[a] party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which he was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.”

Establishes the statutory basis under § 90.610 for admitting prior convictions to impeach credibility.

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Facts & Procedural History

Lightfoot was charged with grand theft auto. He testified in his own defense and was cross-examined about his criminal history. He admitted to two pri…

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Opinion of the Court
JOANOS, Chief Judge.

JOANOS, Chief Judge.

Appellant seeks review of his conviction and sentence after a jury found him guilty of the offense of grand theft auto, a violation of section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1989). The issue is whether the trial court reversibly erred in denying appellant’s request for a special jury instruction limiting consideration of appellant’s prior convictions to the issue of his credibility. We find no error, and affirm.

The jury was apprised of appellant’s pri-or convictions when he testified in his own defense. During cross-examination, appellant was asked whether he had ever been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty or false statement. Appellant responded that he had not been convicted of a crime involving dishonesty and false statement, but acknowledged that he had been arrested for a felony. When asked if he had been convicted of a felony, appellant stated that he had pled guilty to commission of a felony on two occasions.1

At the charge conference, defense counsel requested an instruction that the jury was not to infer that because appellant committed crimes in the past, he was guilty of the offense for which he was on trial. Since the request did not involve a standard jury instruction, defense counsel submitted the following instruction:

During your deliberations, the fact that the defendant has been previously convicted of a crime should not be considered by you as proof of whether or not the defendant committed this particular offense. You may consider this fact only in weighing the credibility of the testimony given.

The state objected to the proposed instruction, deeming it insufficient in the context of this case. The trial court agreed, and denied the requested special instruction.

Under the provisions of section 90.610(1), Florida Statutes, “[a] party may attack the credibility of any witness, including an accused, by evidence that the witness has been convicted of a crime if the crime was punishable by death or imprisonment in excess of 1 year under the law under which he was convicted, or if the crime involved dishonesty or a false statement regardless of the punishment.” In a related vein, section 90.107, Florida Statutes, provides that where evidence is properly admitted for a limited purpose such as to cast doubt on a witness’s credibility, “the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.” (Emphasis supplied.) The record in this case reflects that the evidence concerning appellant’s prior felony convictions was admitted for the sole purpose of casting doubt upon his credibility. Moreover, the manner in which the impeachment testimony was elicited was in strict compliance with the procedure outlined in the statute. By the same token, the testimony concerning prior felony convictions was appropriate for a limiting instruction pursuant to section 90.107, Florida Statutes, had such request been made when the impeachment testimony was admitted. Walter v. State, 272 So. 2d 180, 182 (Fla. 3d DCA 1973). We deem the failure to request a limiting instruction at the time the evidence was admitted constitutes a waiver of the right to challenge the point on appeal. See, generally, Riechmann v. State, 581 So. 2d 133, 140 (Fla.1991); Moss v. State, 581 So. 2d 182 (Fla. 2d DCA 1991). There is no authority for requiring a trial court to give such an instruction at the close of trial.

Accordingly, the conviction is affirmed.

SHIVERS and ZEHMER, JJ., concur. . The impeachment cross-examination is set forth here in its entirety:

Q. Mr. Lightfoot, first question I’d like to ask you is, can you tell this jury, have you ever been convicted of a felony or crime involving dishonesty or false statement?

A. Not dishonesty and false statement, but I've been arrested for a felony before.

Q. Have you ever been convicted of a felony, Mr. Lightfoot?

A. Yes, I pleaded guilty.

Q. On how many occasions?

A. Twice.

Q. Twice, according to your own testimony, twice you’ve been convicted of a felony?

A. Right.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Nevil McDonald Lopez v. State, 716 So. 2d 301 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998)
    …admitted for a limited purpose such as to east doubt on a witness’s credibility, ‘the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.’ (Emphasis supplied.)” Lightfoot v. State, 591 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); see State v. Smith, 573 So. 2d 306, 317 (Fla.1990) (“Because no requests for instructions were made contemporaneous to the introduction of other alleged prior inconsistent statements, the trial court did not err by failing…
  • Johnson v. State, 747 So. 2d 436 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999)
    …on regarding an instruction in the absence of a prejudicial error that would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Lewis v. State, 693 So. 2d 1055, 1058 (Fla. 4th DCA), rev. denied, 700 So. 2d 686 (Fla.1997) (citation omitted). In Lightfoot v. State, 591 So. 2d 305 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991), the court noted that there was no authority for giving this instruction during the closing jury instructions. Thus, by failing to request that the instruction be given at the time of the testimony the defendant waived his right…
  • Woodall v. State, 39 So. 3d 419 (Fla. 5th DCA 2010)
    …e, but inadmissible as to another party or for another purpose, is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict such evidence to its proper scope and so inform the jury at the time it is admitted.’ ”) (emphasis in original); Lightfoot v. State, 591 So. 2d 305, 306 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Because counsel failed to request that the evidence be admitted for the limited purpose of impeach [*423] ment, the statement was placed before the jury as substantive evidence. Id.; see also, Miller v. State, 780 So. 2d 27…

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