KENNETH MCDUGLE, APPELLANT,
v.
THE STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 3d DCA | 1991-12-17
No. 90-2879
Before SCHWARTZ, C.J., and NESBITT and COPE, JJ.
591 So. 2d 660 Florida District Court of Appeal, Third District (1991) Positive Treatment
Cited by 7 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Kenneth McDugle was convicted of selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone, but the trial court excluded testimony from two police officers without conducting an adequate Richardson hearing to assess prejudice from the discovery violation. The appellate court reversed, holding that a proper inquiry into the circumstances and effects of the discovery violation was required before excluding witnesses.


Holding

The court held that reversal was required because the trial court failed to conduct an adequate Richardson inquiry before excluding the witnesses. The exclusion of Officer Harvard was clearly erroneous because he had been listed on the state's own witness list, and the exclusion of Officer Alvarez was error because the court did not consider whether any prejudice would have resulted from admitting his testimony.


Headnotes

[1] A trial court must conduct an adequate Richardson hearing to inquire into the circumstances of a discovery violation before excluding a witness, determining if the violat…

[2] A Richardson inquiry is designed to determine procedural prejudice caused by a discovery violation.

Previewing 2 of 6 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Key Quotes

“The discretion of a trial court in attempting to remedy a discovery violation can be properly exercised only after the court has made an adequate inquiry into all of the circumstances to determine whether the violation is willful or inadvertent, trivial or substantial, and what effect, if any, it had upon the ability of the aggrieved party to prepare for trial.”

Establishes the Richardson standard requiring trial courts to conduct a comprehensive inquiry before imposing sanctions for discovery violations.

Previewing 1 of 3 key quotes on this case — the court’s exact language, pinpointed for members.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Facts & Procedural History

McDugle was charged with selling cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. The defense disclosed its witness list to the state only after the state …

The full statement of facts, procedural history, and disposition for this case are member content.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

© FLexlaw, Inc. — AI-generated enrichments are proprietary. All rights reserved.


Opinion of the Court
PER CURIAM.

PER CURIAM.

Kenneth McDugle claims that the exclusion of the testimony of two police officers without an adequate Richardson hearing mandates reversal of his conviction for the sale of cocaine within 1,000 feet of a school zone. We agree and reverse.

The state correctly observes that, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(d)(1), a defendant is required to furnish the prosecutor a written list of the names and addresses of all witnesses who the defendant expects to call as witnesses at trial. Further, there is a continuing duty to disclose. Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.220(j). In the instant case, the defense only disclosed its witness list to the state after the state had completed its case-in-chief. The state successfully argued this delay constituted a willful discovery violation.

The discretion of a trial court in attempting to remedy a discovery violation can be properly exercised only after the court has made an adequate inquiry into all of the circumstances to determine whether the violation is willful or inadvertent, trivial or substantial, and what effect, if any, it had upon the ability of the aggrieved party to prepare for trial. Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla.1971). A Richardson inquiry is designed to ferret out procedural prejudice occasioned by a party’s discovery violation. Peterson v. State, 465 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985).

In the instant case, there was no discussion of the prejudice occasioned by the untimeliness of the defense’s attempt to introduce the testimony of two witnesses, both police officers. Likewise, there was no inquiry into the feasibility of rectifying any prejudice by some means short of excluding the witnesses. Adams v. State, 366 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979); see O’Brien v. State, 454 So. 2d 675 (Fla. 4th DCA), review denied, 461 So. 2d 116 (Fla.1984).

Officer Harvard had been listed on the state’s witness list; thus it was clearly error to limit the defendant from calling this officer as a witness without at least ascertaining what prejudice would have resulted by the admission of his testimony. The state’s argument on appeal that a finding of prejudice was implicit in the trial judge’s ruling is without merit. By listing the officer as its own witness, the state was in position to expect the defense might call on him.

Likewise, the trial court’s decision to summarily exclude the defense from calling Officer Alvarez without consideration of the prejudice, if any, which would have resulted from the defense’s introduction of his testimony was error. Further, the inapplicability of a harmless error analysis to procedures which violate the holding of Richardson is clear. Smith v. State, 500 So. 2d 125 (Fla.1986).

Accordingly, the defendant’s conviction is reversed and the case is remanded for a new trial.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Carlton Taylor v. State, 643 So. 2d 1122 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994)
    …eks was neither willful nor substantial. Taylor’s counsel stated, without rebuttal, that Cheeeks was not on the witness list because a prior prosecutor had agreed to call Cheeeks as a State witness.1 As this [*1124] court stated in McDugle v. State, 591 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991), “By listing the [witness] as its own witness, the state was in position to expect the defense might call on him.” Moreover, the police had taken Cheecks’ statement, and the parties had, taken Cheecks’ deposition.2 The State…
  • Robinson v. State, 198 So. 3d 1088 (Fla. 4th DCA 2016)
    …ad in context, the entire interaction between the Appellant, the State, and the court indicates that Appellant did not consent to the striking of her witnesses. The trial court’s failure to hold a Richardson hearing was error. See McDugle v. State, 591 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991); see also Delhall, 95 So. 3d at 163; German v. State, — So. 3d-, 41 Fla. L. Weekly D1170, 2016 WL 2894123 (Fla. 4th DCA May 18, 2016). The question before us is whether that error was harmless. “The harmless error test ,.. pl…
  • Olson v. Jeryl Blasco, 676 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996)
    …onst, art. 1, § 9. Under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(d)(1), a defendant’s right to call a particular witness at trial is conditioned upon his furnishing the prosecutor with the witness’ name and address prior to trial. McDugle v. State, 591 So. 2d 660, 661 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991). A criminal defendant is not required to present any defense to the charges, and his mere disclosure of potential witnesses or other evidence pursuant to rule 3.220 does not obligate him to put on a defense. However, his fail…
    1 / 2

Previewing 3 of 4 citing cases — full citator treatment, depth of discussion, and citing context are member features.

Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence

Authorities Cited

Full citator, related cases, and AI research tools

Open in FLexlaw