NICOLE H. WRINKLE, APPELLANT,
v.
JACK HOLTON WRINKLE, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1992-01-17
No. 91-249
GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
592 So. 2d 760 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 6 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

In this Florida divorce appeal, the court addressed the division of marital property, assignment of military pension benefits, and the amount of permanent periodic alimony. The court affirmed most of the trial court's decision but reversed the requirement that the former wife pay for survivor benefit protection securing the alimony award, finding it inconsistent with the alimony amount awarded.


Holding

The court held that the use of survivor benefits as security for alimony is analogous to life insurance and must be considered together with the alimony award. The requirement that the former wife pay for the protection is inconsistent with receiving a full $1,000 alimony award and therefore reversed this aspect and remanded for redetermination of alimony.


Headnotes

[1] An order requiring a party to pay premiums for a survivor benefit plan as security for alimony must be considered by the trial court in conjunction with the determination…

[2] Requiring a former spouse to pay for the premiums of a survivor benefit plan that secures an alimony award is inconsistent with the intent to provide a full alimony award…

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Key Quotes

“the use of survivor benefits here is analogous to the use of life insurance as security for the payment of alimony”

Establishes that survivor benefits securing alimony must be treated like life insurance and considered together with the alimony award.

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Facts & Procedural History

The trial court found that each party owned a one-half interest in the marital residence with no special equity present. The trial court awarded the f…

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Opinion of the Court
COBB, Judge.

[*761] COBB, Judge.

The issues raised on this appeal by the former wife relate to the marital residence, former husband’s military pension, and the amount of permanent periodic alimony awarded. We agree with the former husband that there was competent evidence to support the trial court’s decisions, save one.

In the instant case, the trial court found that each party owned a one-half interest in the marital residence with no special equity being present. Additionally, the trial court awarded the former wife $1,000.00 per month in permanent periodic alimony with the former husband continuing to designate the former wife as the irrevocable beneficiary under a survivor’s benefit plan. The former wife, however, was to pay for this protection in the amount of $288.15 per month. Finally, the former husband was to provide $200.00 per month to the former wife for medical insurance until she reached age 65.

As the former wife correctly argues, the use of survivor benefits here is analogous to the use of life insurance as security for the payment of alimony. See Sobelman v. Sobelman, 541 So. 2d 1158 (Fla.1989). In Sobelman, the court noted that the trial court would have to consider the financial impact of such an order upon the obligated spouse, so that a requirement to pay premiums should be taken into account in the determination of the amount of alimony awarded. See also Edwards v. Edwards, 559 So. 2d 281 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). The point is that alimony and an order requiring security for the alimony should be considered by the trial court together. If the trial court intended for the former wife to receive a full $1,000.00 in alimony, then having the former wife pay for the protection afforded by the survivor’s benefit is inconsistent and detracts from the alimony award. We reverse on this point and remand to the trial court for a redetermination.

Accordingly, the trial court’s final judgment is reversed to the extent that the former wife is required to pay for protection of the alimony award. In all other respects, the final judgment is affirmed.

AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.

GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Richardson v. Leaman Richardson, 722 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998)
    …instructions. ANTOON, J., and BLACKWELL-WHITE, A., Associate Judge, concur. . The use of survivor benefits to secure the support award is analogous to the use of life insurance as security for the payment of alimony. Sobelman; Wrinkle v. Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). . See Sobelman (noting that the trial court would have to consider the financial impact of an order requiring a spouse to maintain life insurance so that a requirement to pay premiums should be taken into account in the determi…
  • Hanson v. Hanson, 217 So. 3d 1165 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017)
    …989) (holding that section 61.08(3), Florida Statutes, permits a trial court to order an obligated spouse to obtain life insurance or similar security to protect the receiving spouse’s alimony award in appropriate circumstances); Wrinkle v. Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d 760, 761 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (analogizing the use of SBP benefits to the use of life insurance as security for the payment of alimony). And while we can appreciate the Husband wanting to limit the Wife to her “standard” benefit, under the facts here—whe…
  • Nelson v. Nelson, 795 So. 2d 977 (Fla. 5th DCA 2001)
    …surance premiums on the policy into account in the determination of alimony and the overall ability of Jesse to pay the obligations resulting from this dissolution judgment. See Bogin v. Bogin, 780 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1st DCA 2001); Wrinkle v. Wrinkle, 592 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Sobelman. IV. ATTORNEY’S FEES. Betty argues on cross-appeal that the trial court erred in not ordering Jesse to pay all of her attorney’s fees. In the final judgment, the court awarded Betty’s attorney $10,000 in fees because…

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