RONALD M. PORTER, JR., APPELLANT/CROSS-APPELLEE,
v.
LILLIAN L. PORTER, APPELLEE/CROSS-APPELLANT
PER CURIAM.
The trial court upheld the parties’ premarital property settlement agreement but, nevertheless, awarded the wife certain property contrary to its provisions. We find no error in that portion of the judgment upholding their premarital contract, but reverse the trial court’s equitable distribution deviating from the contract. Fecteau v. Southeast Bank, N.A., 585 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991); Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987).
On remand, the trial court may reconsider the alimony and child support awards to the extent that the trial court determines that its conclusions concerning need and ability to pay are collaterally altered by the changes to be made in the equitable distribution.
DOWNEY, ANSTEAD and STONE, JJ., concur.
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Genunzio v. Genunzio, 598 So. 2d 129 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992)…have been invalid. Nor was it found invalid by the trial court. We are therefore constrained to disagree with the trial court that the agreement does not control the disposition of the home upon the dissolution of the marriage. See Porter v. Porter, 593 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). We are also constrained by principles of contractual construction to disagree with the husband’s contention and rebuttal arguments. We must agree with the contention of the wife, for the reasons explained below. Paragraph 1 of…
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Ryland v. Ryland, 605 So. 2d 138 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992)…t the parties’ prenuptial agreement does not preclude the wife from making a claim for lump sum alimony or attorney’s fees, but it does preclude a claim against the husband’s assets acquired separately during the marriage. Id.; see Porter v. Porter, 593 So. 2d 1120, 1121 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992). Therefore, the trial court in the instant case did not err in awarding lump sum alimony and attorney’s fees to the wife because such awards are not expressly waived by the valid prenuptial agreement. But, to the extent tha…
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Essex v. Essex, 649 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)…residence owned by the wife prior to the marriage was to remain her separate property, the trial court erred in utilizing the enhanced value of that separate property when computing the distribution of the parties’ marital assets. Porter v. Porter, 593 So. 2d 1120 (Fla. 4th DCA 1992); See In re Guardianship of Tanner, 564 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990). On remand the value of the wife’s separate property should not be considered when computing the equitable distribution of the parties’ marital assets. Conside…
Authorities Cited
- Fecteau v. Se. Bank, N.A., 585 So. 2d 1005 (Fla. 4th DCA 1991)
- Cladis v. Cladis, 512 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 4th DCA 1987)