JOE TENNIE, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1992-02-19
No. 91-01513
RYDER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.
593 So. 2d 1199 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 20 cases

AI-generated. These summaries, headnotes, and key points are machine-generated and may contain errors or omissions. Always verify against the full opinion text below. Not legal advice.

Synopsis

Joe Tennie appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, challenging the trial court's failure to examine the prosecutor's race-neutral explanation for striking the only minority juror (a Seminole Indian) and the imposition of court costs without notice. The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that peremptory challenge protections against discriminatory striking extend to all racial minorities, not just African-Americans.


Holding

Yes. The court held that peremptory challenge protections against discriminatory striking apply to all distinct racial minorities, not merely African-Americans. When a defendant makes a prima facie showing that a minority juror was struck solely because of race, the burden shifts to the state to provide a clear, reasonably specific, and racially neutral explanation. The trial court erred by not requiring the state to meet this burden.


Headnotes

[1] A prosecutor's discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge is prohibited when it excludes members of any distinct racial group, not solely African Americans.

[2] When a defendant makes a prima facie showing that a peremptory challenge was exercised on account of race, the burden shifts to the state to provide a clear, specific, an…

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Key Quotes

“the objecting party "must demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group"”

Establishes the foundational requirement in peremptory challenge discrimination cases under Neil v. State

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Facts & Procedural History

During jury selection in Tennie's drug possession trial, the prosecutor used a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Osceola, an apparent Seminole Indian…

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Opinion of the Court
HALL, Judge.

HALL, Judge.

Joe Tennie appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance. He contends the trial court erred in not questioning the state’s reasons for striking the only minority in the jury venire and in imposing costs without providing him notice and an opportunity to be heard. We agree and reverse.

Defense counsel made the following objection to the state’s use of a peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Osceola:

I want to present ... an objection to that strike.... We have one person who, it would appear, who is a minority.... Mr. Osceola presented absolutely no reasons why he is objectionable. He appears to be an Indian, a member of of [sic] a Seminole tribe, and his answers would give no reason to strike him.

The prosecutor incorrectly argued he was not required to explain his reasons for striking Osceola because the law regarding peremptory challenges concerns only Afro-Americans. The trial judge asked if there was further argument, and defense counsel stated he disagreed with the prosecutor, the law dealt with all minorities. The trial judge overruled defense counsel’s objection.

Tennie first points out that in the seminal case regarding the discriminatory use of peremptory challenges the supreme court did not restrict its holding to Afro-Americans, but stated that the objecting party “must demonstrate on the record that the challenged persons are members of a distinct racial group Neil v. State, 457 So. 2d 481, 486 (Fla.1984), clarified, State v. Castillo, 486 So. 2d 565 (Fla.1986), and clarified, State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219, 108 S.Ct. 2873, 101 L.Ed.2d 909 (1988).

Tennie next contends the trial court erred in not following the procedure outlined in Reynolds v. State, 576 So. 2d 1300 (Fla.1991), upon defense counsel’s objection to the state’s exercise of a peremptory challenge, to strike Mr. Osceola. We agree. In making the objection quoted above, defense counsel satisfied his burden under Neil to show that Mr. Osceola was a member of a distinct racial minority, the Seminole Indians, and there was a strong likelihood he was struck solely because of his race, as he was the only minority member of the venire. Reynolds, 576 So. 2d at 1301. Consequently, the burden of proof shifted to the state to provide “a ‘clear and reasonably specific’ racially neutral explanation of ‘legitimate reasons’ ” for its exercise of its peremptory challenge. Slappy, 522 So. 2d at 22. The trial court erred in not requiring the state to meet its burden of proof. Accordingly, we must reverse and remand for a new trial.

Our disposition of the peremptory challenge issue renders moot the imposition of costs issue. We note, however, that proper statutory authority must be cited in support of the imposition of court costs. Brown v. State, 506 So. 2d 1068 (Fla. 2d DCA), review denied, 515 So. 2d 229 (Fla.1987). We also note that in imposing costs of prosecution under section 939.01(6), Florida Statutes (1989), the state attorney must demonstrate the amount of such costs and the trial court must consider the financial resources of the defendant. Smith v. State, 543 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).

Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

RYDER, A.C.J., and PATTERSON, J., concur.


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Citator

Cited By

  • Abel Oliveros Reyes v. State, 655 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1995)
    …the assessment. We renew en banc our holding that costs of prosecution under section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1991), must be expressly requested by a specific agency with adequate supporting documentation. Sutton, 635 So. 2d 1032; Tennie v. State, 593 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). An award of such pros-ecutorial costs must be a case-specific decision that is announced by the trial judge on the record after consideration of the factors contained in the statute. Trial courts have no statutory authority to as…
    1 / 2
  • Sutton v. State, 635 So. 2d 1032 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994)
    …sts of prosecution are based on section 939.01, Florida Statutes (1993), then the state has the burden of proving the amount of these costs, and the trial court must consider the defendant’s financial resources before imposing them. Tennie v. State, 593 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). This procedure was not followed in this case. We, therefore, strike the costs imposed on Sutton. On remand, the state may seek to reimpose these costs consistent with the law expressed in this opinion. Williams; Wray v. State, 5…
  • Cathcart v. State, 643 So. 2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994)
    …). Moreover, if costs of prosecution are based on section 939.01, Florida Statutes, the state has the burden of proving the amount of these costs, and the court must consider the defendant’s financial resources before imposing them. Tennie v. State, 593 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). In the instant ease, Appellant was not made aware of how the $200.00 was arrived at, and the court did not consider the actual amount of the costs incurred or Appellant’s financial ability to pay. Accordingly, we reverse the tria…

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