MARVIN MADREY, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE

Fla. 5th DCA | 1992-02-28
No. 91-497
DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur.
594 So. 2d 841 Florida District Court of Appeal, Fifth District (1992) Positive Treatment
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

Marvin Madrey appealed his conviction for two counts of indecent assault on a child under 16. The court affirmed the conviction but vacated the sentence, finding the trial court erroneously doubled the victim injury points by applying them to each count rather than once per victim per criminal episode.


Holding

Victim injury points must be scored only once for each victim as to each criminal episode or transaction, not once for each count. Because the trial court incorrectly multiplied the points, it improperly calculated the sentencing guidelines range, and the 7-year sentence constituted an unjustified departure from the correct guidelines range.


Headnotes

[1] Victim injury points shall be scored only once for each victim as to each criminal episode or transaction, not once for each count or offense within a single episode.

[2] A 1991 revision to Rule 3.701 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, which allows victim injury points to be scored for each count resulting in injury, is not to be…

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Key Quotes

“[QUOTE REDACTED — failed verbatim audit (paraphrase, not verbatim). See original_text for the text as originally displayed.]”

Establishes the correct legal standard for scoring victim injury points under the sentencing guidelines

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Facts & Procedural History

Madrey was found guilty by jury of two counts of committing indecent assault upon a child under age 16. There was only one victim, and the offenses oc…

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Opinion of the Court
DIAMANTIS, Judge.

DIAMANTIS, Judge.

Appellant appeals his judgments of guilt and sentence which were imposed by the trial court after a jury found him guilty of two counts of committing an indecent assault upon a child under the age of 16.1 We find no merit in the challenges raised to appellant’s conviction; however, the trial court did err in imposing sentence and, therefore, we must vacate appellant’s sentence and remand this cause for resentencing.

Rule 3.701 of the Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure states that victim injury shall be scored for each victim physically injured during a criminal episode or transaction. We have previously held that the sentencing commission, the supreme court, and the legislature intended points for victim injury to be scored only once for each victim as to each criminal episode or transaction and not once for each count or offense into which the events comprising a single criminal episode or transaction may have been divided and charged. Fretwell v. State, 586 So. 2d 483 (Fla. 5th DCA 1991).

Here, the trial court multiplied the victim injury points by two, apparently because appellant was found guilty of committing two indecent assaults. This was error because there was only one victim and there was no proof that the indecent assaults took place during more than one criminal transaction or episode. We note that when the trial court sentenced appellant it did not have the benefit of our decision in Fretwell.

This error affected appellant’s sentence because, instead of assessing 40 points for victim injury, the trial court should have assessed only 20 points. The deletion of the additional 20 points drops appellant’s guidelines sentence from cell five to cell four. In cell five appellant’s recommended range is 4V2 to 5V2 years imprisonment and the permitted range is 3x/2 to 7V2 years imprisonment. In cell four appellant’s recommended sentencing range is 3½ to 4V2 years imprisonment and the permitted range is 2½ to 5V2 years imprisonment. The trial court sentenced appellant within the permitted range of cell five to a term of 7 years imprisonment. This term of 7 years imprisonment constitutes a departure from cell four and, because the trial court has not provided written reasons justifying departure, we must reverse.

However, because the trial court did not realize that it was imposing a departure sentence, on remand the trial court is permitted to consider whether departure is appropriate and, if so, to set forth valid reasons for departure. State v. Betan-court, 552 So. 2d 1107 (Fla.1989). Any departure sentence must be accompanied by contemporaneous written reasons justifying departure. Pope v. State, 561 So. 2d 554 (Fla.1990); Robinson v. State, 520 So. 2d 1 (Fla.1988).

The state argues that the 1991 revision to rule 3.701 should be applied in this case. The revision, which became law on May 30, 1991, provides:

Victim injury shall be scored for each victim physically injured during a criminal episode or transaction and for each count resulting in such injury whether there are one or more victims.

In Fretwell we ruled that the 1991 revisions are not to be applied retroactively and that this court must apply the rule as it existed and was construed at the time of the occurrence of the offense for which the defendant was convicted. Fretwell v. State, 586 So. 2d at 485. The offenses which formed the basis for appellant’s convictions occurred in September of 1990. Therefore, we cannot apply the 1991 revision to rule 3.701.

Judgments AFFIRMED; sentence VACATED; cause REMANDED.

DAUKSCH and W. SHARP, JJ., concur. . § 800.04(1), Fla.Stat. (1989).


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Citator

Cited By

  • Morales v. State, 613 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)
    …gislature’s recent amendments to section 921.001, Florida Statutes (Supp. 1992), which took effect April 8, 1992, see ch. 92-135, § 4, do not apply to this case. The rule must be applied as it existed at the time of the offense. See Madrey v. State, 594 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). Reversed and remanded for resentencing within the guidelines. SCHWARTZ, C.J., and HUBBART, J„ concur. .The State and the defendant agree that the new scoresheet should reflect the defendant’s other convictions which were not…
  • KIO v. State, 624 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993)
    …additional eighty-five points for death or serious injury. The court held that “double scoring under victim injury was error,” and reversed and remanded for re-sentencing based upon a corrected score-sheet. 565 So. 2d at 840. Accord Madrey v. State, 594 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992). In this case, under the “Victim injury” category, appellant was assessed a total of 120 points (forty points each for the three sexual battery convictions) for “penetration or slight injury,” and eighty-five points for [*748] “…
  • Najar v. State, 614 So. 2d 644 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993)
    …im injury points should have been assessed but once. We agree. Only a single score for victim injury should be assessed regardless of the number of sexual batteries a defendant commits upon a victim in a single criminal occurrence.1 Madrey v. State, 594 So. 2d 841 (Fla. 5th DCA1992). The error affected Najar’s sentence. The deletion of the erroneous points reduces his scoresheet total by 85 points, placing him in a recommended range of 27 to 40 years and in a permitted range of 22 years to life. Because life…

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