STATE OF FLORIDA, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, APPELLANT,
v.
SUMMIT CONSULTING, INC., A FLORIDA CORPORATION, APPELLEE

Fla. 2d DCA | 1992-03-04
No. 91-02818
LEHAN, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.
594 So. 2d 862 Florida District Court of Appeal, Second District (1992) Caution
Cited by 8 cases

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Synopsis

The Department of Labor and Employment Security appealed the denial of its motion to dismiss a lawsuit filed by Summit Consulting in Polk County Circuit Court. The court held that state agencies are entitled to a venue privilege requiring suits to be brought in the county of their principal headquarters (Leon County), and that Summit failed to demonstrate a deprivation of constitutional rights that would waive this privilege.


Holding

The court reversed and held that the Department, as a state agency, is entitled to a venue privilege requiring suits to be brought in the county of its principal headquarters (Leon County), not in Polk County. Summit failed to show a real and imminent deprivation of constitutional rights, so no waiver of the venue privilege occurred.


Headnotes

[1] State agencies are entitled to a venue privilege, and venue properly lies in the county of their principal headquarters absent waiver or exception.

[2] A waiver of the state's general venue privilege occurs only when a real and imminent deprivation of a claimant's constitutional rights can be shown.

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Key Quotes

“Absent waiver or exception in civil actions brought against the state, its agencies or subdivisions, venue properly lies in the county of its principal headquarters.”

Establishes the fundamental venue rule for state agencies in Florida.

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Facts & Procedural History

The Department issued Summit a fifty-dollar fine for failure to make timely payment to a worker's compensation claimant and forwarded a penalty assess…

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Opinion of the Court
PATTERSON, Judge.

PATTERSON, Judge.

The State of Florida, Department of Labor and Employment Security (the Department), appeals the trial court’s denial of its motion to dismiss the complaint filed by Summit Consulting, Inc. (Summit). The Department contends the complaint should have been dismissed for improper venue since it is a state agency entitled to a venue privilege. We agree.

The Department forwarded a letter to Summit advising it of a fifty dollar fine for failure to make a timely payment to a worker’s compensation claimant. On that same date, the Department forwarded to Summit a penalty assessment order requiring payment of a fifty dollar fine. Summit responded to the letter by requesting the Department to reconsider its penalty order. The Department advised Summit that it was referring the matter to a judge of compensation claims pursuant to section 440.021, Florida Statutes (1989).

Summit then filed its complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief in the Polk County Circuit Court. The complaint sought a declaration that section 440.-20(9)(c), Florida Statutes (Supp.1990), and Florida Administrative Code Rule 38F-3.015 are unconstitutional. In its complaint, Summit alleged that these sections failed to provide procedural due process and that Summit’s principal place of business was in Polk County. The Department, however, maintains its principal place of business in Leon County, and it filed a motion to dismiss based on the improper venue.

“Absent waiver or exception in civil actions brought against the state, its agencies or subdivisions, venue properly lies in the county of its principal headquarters.” Florida Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Triple “A ” Enters. Inc., 387 So. 2d 940, 942 (Fla.1980). A waiver of the state’s general venue privilege occurs where a real and imminent deprivation of the claimant’s constitutional rights can be shown. 387 So. 2d at 942; Board of Medical Examiners v. Kadivar, 482 So. 2d 501 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986).

The procedure set out in chapter 440 of the Florida Statutes and in the administrative code rule, determining whether an assessment against a claimant is proper, does not deprive Summit of its constitutional rights since the procedure provides notice and an opportunity to contest the assessment. Under the statutory scheme, a fine may be imposed without a hearing. The recipient of the fine, however, can challenge the imposition of the fine, and if the Department disagrees with the challenge, it refers the matter to a judge of compensation claims. The recipient then has an opportunity to be heard before final determination is made. §§ 440.25(3) and (4), Fla.Stat. (Supp.1990).

Therefore, since Summit failed to show that a deprivation of its constitutional rights was real and imminent, no waiver of the venue privilege occurred. Accordingly, we reverse and remand for transfer to the Leon County Circuit Court.

LEHAN, A.C.J., and FRANK, J., concur.


Cases With Similar Vibessemantic neighbors from the corpus


Citator

Cited By

  • Barr v. The Fla. Bd. OF Regents, 644 So. 2d 333 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994)
    …er of invasion of the plaintiffs constitutional rights by the state agency. PSC v. Triple “A”, 387 So. 2d at 942; Graham v. Vann, 394 So. 2d 178, 179 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); State, Department of Labor and Employment Security v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 594 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992). See also Trawiek, Florida Practice and Procedure, § 5-2 (1993 ed.). This exception is known as the “sword wielder” doctrine.1 Under the sword wielder doctrine, a suit for the protection of the plaintiffs rights may be brough…
  • State v. Lindquist, 698 So. 2d 299 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997)
    …ocess of law. This court held that plaintiffs own allegations established that he was afforded notice and a hearing, thereby defeating his deprivation of due process claim. See also State, Dep’t of Labor & Employment Sec. v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 594 So. 2d 862 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992) (holding that statute alleged to be unconstitutional for failure to provide due process did in fact provide notice and opportunity to be heard, thereby precluding application of sword wielder doctrine). Unlike McCarty and Summit C…
  • Spradley v. Parole Comm'n, 198 So. 3d 642 (Fla. 2d DCA 2015)
    …tively described this exception as "[a] waiver of the state’s general venue privilege' [that] occurs where a real and imminent deprivation of the claimant’s constitutional rights can be shown.” Dep't of Labor & Emp't Sec. v. Summit Consulting, Inc., 594 So. 2d 862, 863 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).…

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