DOUGLAS FORD, APPELLANT,
v.
STATE OF FLORIDA, APPELLEE
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Ford appealed his sentences for armed burglary, grand theft, and possession of burglary tools, arguing they violated Florida's youthful offender sentencing statute. The court agreed that Ford's sentences exceeded the statutory maximum of six years combined incarceration and probation, and reversed and remanded for resentencing while releasing the State from its plea bargain obligation.
The sentences violated section 958.04(2)(c) because the combined incarceration (three years) and probation (five years) exceeded the six-year statutory maximum for youthful offenders. The maximum permissible probation term in this case was three years, not five.
[1] A youthful offender sentence combining incarceration and probation cannot exceed six years when the incarceration is served in a department facility other than a probatio…
[2] A plea agreement that violates statutory sentencing limitations is illegal.
Previewing 2 of 5 headnotes on this case. FLexlaw’s editorially structured points of law — every proposition, pinpointed — are reserved for members.
Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligence“The period of incarceration imposed or served and the period of probation or community control, when added together, shall not exceed six years.”
This statutory language establishes the mandatory six-year combined maximum for youthful offender sentences that Ford's sentences violated.
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceFord entered a nolo contendere plea to armed burglary, grand theft, and possession of burglary tools pursuant to a plea bargain. The trial court sente…
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W. SHARP, Judge.
Ford appeals from the sentences he received for armed burglary, grand theft and possession of burglary tools. Pursuant to plea negotiations with the State, Ford entered a nolo contendere plea to all three charges, based on the understanding he would be sentenced as a youthful offender as to grand theft and receive a term of three years incarceration, and receive concurrent five year terms of probation for the other two counts consecutive to the incarceration. The trial court sentenced him in exact compliance with his plea bargain.
Ford now argues the sentences violate section 958.04(2)(c), Florida Statutes (1991). That statute provides:
The court may impose a split sentence whereby the youthful offender is to be placed on probation or community control upon completion of any specified period of incarceration; however, if the incarceration period is to be served in a department facility other than a probation and restitution center or community residential facility, such period shall be for not less than one year or more than four years. The period of probation or community control shall commence immediately upon the release of the youthful offender from incarceration. The period of incarceration imposed or served and the period of probation or community control, when added together, shall not exceed six years. (Emphasis supplied).
The State agrees that Ford received an illegal sentence, since pursuant to section 958.04(2)(c) a youthful offender cannot receive longer than six years combined incarceration plus probation terms. Thus, the maximum possible probation term in this case was three years (not five), since Ford also was sentenced to three years incarceration. Accordingly, we quash the judgment and sentence in this case and remand for further proceedings.
On remand, the State shall not be bound by its plea bargain, and it may seek other sanctions. In this case, Ford was charged with a first degree felony punishable by life, and two third degree felonies. His sentencing guidelines recommended range was 21/2-3½ years, and the permitted range was community control up to 4½ years.
Since the plea bargain entered into by Ford and the State is prohibited by statute, on remand, the State may opt to accept Ford’s plea with the youthful offender sentences reduced to a legal term. Or, the State may decline to accept the plea bargain, and both parties will approach the plea stage of this case at “square one.” See Cleveland v. State, 394 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981). The State must exercise its option to accept the plea before the trial court within thirty days of the issuance of the mandate herein. Otherwise, the case shall revert to its status before the plea bargain was formulated.
REVERSED and REMANDED.
GRIFFIN and DIAMANTIS, JJ., concur.
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LEE v. State, 731 So. 2d 71 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)…n denies the motion, it should attach those portions of the record which refute Lee’s allegation. If the trial court grants the motion, we note, without deciding, that the State may no longer be bound by its plea agreement. See, e.g., Ford v. State, 595 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992) (recognizing that where State, on direct appeal, agreed defendant’s sentence was illegal, State would not be bound by its plea bargain and could seek other sanctions on remand). Affirmed in part; reversed in part. CAMPBELL…
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Tucker v. State, 864 So. 2d 580 (Fla. 2d DCA 2004)…as a habitual violent felony offender, then the State would have the option of enforcing the plea bargain of a ten-year sentence without the habitual offender designation, or going back to “square one” in the plea bargain process. See Ford v. State, 595 So. 2d 266, 267 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992), cited in Lee, 731 So. 2d at 74.1 [*582] Accordingly, we remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. CASANUEVA and SALCINES, JJ., Concur. . With respect to the remedy on remand…
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Dino Lewis v. State, 615 So. 2d 259 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993)…sentence; in that event, only the sentence should be vacated under Fla.R.Crim.P. 3.850 and the defendant should then be resentenced to the originally imposed sentence, but without the illegal three-year mandatory minimum sentence. See Ford v. State, 595 So. 2d 266 (Fla. 5th DCA 1992); Ruiz v. State, 537 So. 2d 682 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989); Daniels v. Smith, 478 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985). Affirmed as modified.…
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Join FLexlaw to unlock all legal intelligenceAuthorities Cited
- Cleveland v. State, 394 So. 2d 230 (Fla. 5th DCA 1981)